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ABSTRACT
Lexrike, James Wayne, B.A. Southeastern
Louisiana University, 1969.
Doctor of Philosophy, Summer Commence
ment, 1978
Major:
Political Science; Minor:
Philosophy
Political Theory and the Problem of
Explanation
Dissertation directed by Professor
Cecil L. Eubanks
Pages in Dissertation, 228. Words in
Abstract, 592.
This dissertation is an investigation into the nature
of theory, particularly in contemporary political and social
science.

It examines the complicated relationship between

phenomena investigated by political and social scientists
and the conceptual structures and processes employed to
organize information about these phenomena.

Although there

are several possible forms of this relationship, the focus
here is upon the form characteristic of science.

Science

is presented as a particular framework for providing expla
nations.

A theory is an extension of a scientific explana

tory framework.

The purpose of a theory is to provide an

explanation of phenomena under investigation.

The reason

for selecting scientific explanation and theory as the
object of this inquiry is because it is the predominant
pattern of explanation among most contemporary investigators
of political and social phenomena.
vii

There is considerable disagreement concerning what
properly constitutes a scientific explanation and about the
proper form of a theory.

Although this dispute has mostly

been conducted among philosophers of science, it is signifi
cant to political and social scientists for two reasons.
The first is that the acceptance of a concept of explanation
and a model of theory is a prescriptive activity which helps
to structure how particular investigations are conducted.
It aids in the determination of what is to be considered
a problem, of how investigations are to be conducted, of
what is or is not to be counted as evidence, and of how that
evidence is to be interpreted.

The second reason is that

political and social scientists have been influenced by one
particular version of the nature of scientific esqplanation
and theory, the Received View.

The thesis of this disserta

tion is that the consequences of the adoption of the Received
View by political and social scientists have not been
entirely beneficial, and that many of the theoretical and
methodological problems of social scientific inquiry are in
part the result of the acceptance of the Received View
version of what scientific explanation and theory should be.
After outlining the nature of the problem of explana
tion and its relation to political theory, a general defi
nition of explanation is presented.

This definition empha

sizes socio-cultural, group and individual factors which
influence the proposal and acceptance of explanations.
original, tri-partite model of the general structural
viii

An

elements of an explanation, as well as the relationships
between these elements, is also developed.
This is followed by an extensive discussion of the
concept of scientific theory.

A model of the generally

accepted components of a theory is presented.

Considerable

attention is devoted to the Received View model of scien
tific eaqplanation and theory as developed by Hempel and
others.
The influence of the Received View model on political
and social theory is analyzed in terms of three specific
sets of problems.

The problems, as well as the proposed

solutions to them, further demonstrate the impact of
Received View thinking on political and social science.
Finally criticisms of the Received View emanating from
philosophers of science are investigated and alternative
versions of scientific explanation and theory are examined.
The relatively limited impact of these alternative versions
on political and social science is discussed.

The conclusion

is reached that, although the Received View appears to be
inadequate to the solution of theoretical and methodological
problems in political and social science, there is no
apparent, well-accepted successor to it.

Different strate-

gies for dealing with the absence of an adequate account of
eaqplanation and theory for political science are enter
tained; and the suggestion is made for the tentative
acceptance of the definition and model of explanation pre
sented in the second chapter of this work.
ix

CHAPTER ONE
The Problem and Its Scope
This dissertation is an investigation into the nature
of theory, particularly theory in contemporary political and
social science.

Its intention is to shed light on the per

plexing and frequently complicated problem of the relation
ship between the phenomena we investigate and the conceptual
structures and processes that we employ to organize informa
tion about those phenomena.

Although there are several

possible forms of this relationship, I will be primarily
interested in only one— the form typical of science.
It is my contention that the purpose of a theory is to
provide an esqplanation of the phenomenon under investigation.
A theory is the characteristic explanatory "tool" of science.
There are other forms of explanation, each of which has an
explanatory "tool" appropriate to it.

Mythology, for example,

is a form of explanation, and myth is its explanatory "tool".
Religion is another, and dogma is its explanatory "tool".
All of these different forms of ejqplanation share a common
purpose:

to organize the world in such a way that it becomes

understandable.

Indeed, I would argue that ejqplanation is a

general activity, and that different forms of explanation—
different forms of understanding— are at least partially the
result of the use of different esqplanatory tools.

This is

not to say that the selection of an explanatory tool is a
matter of no consequence.

On the contrary.

It is a matter

of considerable importance because it is this choice that
determines what particular order the world is to have for a
particular investigation at a given time.
I have decided to select scientific explanation and
theory as the form and tool of explanation for this inquiry
because it is the pattern of explanation of choice among
most contemporary investigators of political and social phe
nomena.

But scientific explanation itself is not a simple

and homogeneous activity.

There is considerable disagreement

about what properly constitutes a scientific explanation, and
about the proper form of a theory.

The dispute, though gen

erally carried on within the confines of the philosophy of
science, is important to political and social science.

As

was the case in choosing between alternative forms of expla
nation, the choice between different notions of scientific
explanation and different models of theory is of no little
consequence.

The selection of a framework of inquiry (i.e.,

a notion of explanation and a model of theory) is a prescrip
tive activity.

It not only determines what kinds of topics

are amenable to investigation, but also indicates how those
investigations ought to be conducted, what forms of analysis
are fruitful or unfruitful, what kinds of information ought
to be gathered, what should and should not be counted as
evidence and how that evidence ought to be interpreted, and
even what shall be considered a problem in the first place.
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Obviously, choices of this kind are important in contempo
rary political and social science.

And, as will be shown

later, political and social scientists are beginning to be
come more aware of the consequences of these choices.
In this endeavor, the philosophy of science has been
most influential, especially through the impact of one par
ticular version of scientific explanation and one model of
theory, the Received View.
in either of two senses.

This influence may be interpreted
In the weak sense, the Received

View has been influential indirectly, as a source of general
notions of what scientific inquiry ought to be.

In the

strong sense, it has been directly and specifically influen
tial by being either suggested or employed as a model for
scientific social and political theory and esqplanation.
The consequences of the adoption of this model by polit
ical and social scientists, possibly the result of a desire
to achieve the status of "science" for these areas of inquiry,
have not been entirely salutory.

The Received View itself

has been subjected to severe criticism among philosophers of
science.

Today there are few philosophers of science who

advocate this position in the form that is accepted by most
political and social scientists.

Further, it may, and will,

be argued that many of the theoretical and methodological
problems of scientific social inquiry are at least partially
the result of the acceptance of the Received View version of
what a scientific explanation or theory should be.
It might, with some justification, be asked what busi
ness a political theorist has in approaching the problem of

explanation.

As a group political theorists are generally

seen as curators and critics of the ideas of great, usually
dead, political thinkers, as students of and commentators on
political theoretical concepts such as "justice," "the good
society," "power," "representation," "law," and the like, or
as weavers of more or less intricate conceptual frameworks
for analyzing or synthesizing "pluralism," "political partic
ipation, " "coalition formation," "civic culture," or "the
systems approach" to international or domestic politics.
This view is not far from accurate.

Furthermore, these are,

for the most part, legitimate and valuable pursuits.

Such

activities are, however, on.' " f the tip of the theoretical ice
berg.

What a David Easton and a Leo Strauss, a Williaiti Riker

and an Eric Voegelin, an Arnold Brecht and a Hans Kelsen have
in common is that all are attempting to explain certain as
pects of socio-political phenomena.

It is an enterprise they

share with political thinkers through the ages.
is the matrix of theory.

Explanation

It is the two-thirds of the iceberg

that is rarely seen and only infrequently considered.

In

researching this topic, I have been led to study philosophers,
anthropologists, philosophers of science, theoretical physi
cists, and sociologists.

Political theorists, it seems, have

relatively little to say about the nature of esqolanation as
it relates to their discipline.

This lack of critical, theo

retical self-awareness is reflected in our theory.

It would

seem that we describe a great deal, but esqplain very little.
The distinction is subtle but important.

It will take the

better part of this inquiry to establish the difference, as
it will to justify the interest of a political theorist in
this subject.
There is another perhaps more "practical" reason for
approaching political theory from the perspective of expla
nation.

Although I am not by temperament crisis oriented,

and despite the fact that I am generally loathe to add to
the recent spate of crisis-centered literature, I feel that
it is valid to regard the current, frequently discussed,
social, political, religious, and moral rebelliousness,
alienation, and malaise as the result of a "crisis of expla
nation."

For whatever reasons, the explanations of the past

are viewed as inadequate to our understanding of the present.
There is a gap between our experience and the time-honored
forms by which we have been taught to interpret that experi
ence.

The two are out of phase, asynchronized, the former a

heartbeat to an age ahead of the latter.

It is this sunder

ing of experience and esqpectation, of observation and under
standing that is partially responsible for our cumulative
self-dissatisfaction.
I am not contending that this is either unusual or par
ticular to Western culture at this time.

On the contrary,

this tendency of experience to outstrip explanations of it
seems to pervade most periods of Western history.

It is

this condition of dynamic tension between forms of under
standing and experience that provides the impetus to the
development of new answers to old questions, as well as to

the generation of questions never before conceived.

The

intellectual history of man can be written in terms of the
resolution of conflict between existing cognitive frames of
reference and the broadening of experience, information and
insight which leads men to question traditionally accepted
perspectives and presuppositions.
There is, however, a countervailing tendency on the
part of most people to view their particular age as the most
advanced, the most civilized, the "best" age which man has
known.

As a corollary, their science, their religion, their

art and manners, their political ideologies, in short, their
explanations of various specific realities are considered to
be the highest products of human faith, reason, or talent.
The contradiction between intellectual development in a social
context, the product of the aforementioned tension, between
experience and prevailing explanations, and a broad-based
sense of collective self-satisfaction or complacency adds a
social dimension to what until now has been described as an
individual epistemological problem.

Whereas before the prob

lem was one of an individual unable to understand his experi
ence of the world in terms of existing standard explanations,
there is now the added problem of the reaction of society to
the individual who is both sufficiently gifted and courageous
to offer new patterns of esqplanation by which experience may
be reinterpreted.
It is a curious and difficult collective mental gymnastic
that permits a pride at being at the vanguard of history and,

at the same time, demands, for reasons of pride, that the
existing social, moral, and political order be tenaciously
maintained.

It would seem that all men believe that theirs

is a pivotal age in the history of mankind.

While, in a

sense, this is true, there are certain times which, because
they initiate a conspicuous alteration of previous ways of
interpreting reality, are truly pivotal.
of Greek philosophy is one such period.

The "Golden Age"
The time of Christ,

the "Renaissance," and the "Enlightenment" are other periods
in which man, confronted by new problems or inadequate solu
tions to old ones, was forced to re-evaluate old ways of
thinking, to redefine his place in the cosmos.

These were

times of dissatisfaction which paradoxically provided the
conditions in which individuals could move beyond the exist
ing bounds of knowledge and opinion, but which stifled these
same individuals when a threat to the cognitive order was
perceived.

The protagonists of these new ways of thinking

were too often forced to pay a severe price for their inge
nuity.

Witness the fate of Socrates and the near fate of

Aristotle, the proscription of Galileo's works, the ostracism
of Spinoza, the enforced wanderings of Voltaire and Marx,
and the scorn with which the ideas of Freud were initially
met.

Those societies in which genius was forged were also

the crucibles in which genius was tested.

The fires of

imagination and of purification are often ignited by a
common source.
It should be fairly obvious at this juncture that, in
trying to justify this study of e^qplanation, I am stressing
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two different yet related points, both of which are suffi
ciently common as to appear platitudinous.

The first of

these points is that ideas, particularly those sets of re
lated ideas called explanations, have consequences, that
they exert a tremendous, though generally underestimated,
influence on individuals and societies.
are contained our view of the world.

In esqplanations

Explanations, however

created or evolved, are the prisms through which the light
of reality is filtered, categorized and interpreted.

Our

explanations not only allow us to interpret what we know;
they also direct us in the discovery of new knowledge and
improved specific explanations.

Ejqplanations are also the

foundation of moral, political and religious systems.

The

forms of understanding by which we interpret the nature of
reality provide the bases on which our ideas of good and
evil, just and unjust, sacred and profane, and, one might
add, scientific and unscientific are established.
Our minds are molded by the form and content of author
itative explanations, at once bestowing an order to the welter
of impressions, imaginations, and insights in which the human
mind is daily immersed and imposing a limitation by defining
what are "legitimate" ideas or ways of combining ideas.

Our

epistemologies and our systems of logic not only tell us
what is knowable, how we are able to know, and how we may
reason from what we know; but also provide us with standards
of acceptability by which the "truthfulness" of perceptions
and cognitive processes may be judged.

There are, however,

several possible epistemologies, several logics, in short,
several possible worldviews which have developed during the
course of civilization.
effect.

This presents a curious, double-bind

On the one hand, there exists a situation in which

an individual presented with a condition, a set of perceptions,
or a series of insights attempts to render them understandable
according to some standard of reason, experience, faith, and/
or intuition.

On the other hand, if the explanation is

accepted as authoritative, if it is generally taken as a valid
method of understanding a given phenomenon, then it, in turn,
affects perceptions, in terms of the types of evidence which
is admissible, and the processes of thought, in terms of what
types of reasoning are acceptable.
nent of explanation is obvious.

Again, the social compo

Groups (societies, nations,

religions, etc.) have a stake in preserving the ideas which
sustain their way of life.

These ideas, these interpretations

of the "way things are," along with evaluations as to their
essential truthfulness, goodness, or justice provide the basis
from which morality and authority, for that group, derive.
They are also the standard by which new ideas are judged,
thus allowing the categorization of these ideas or interpre
tations as good and beneficial, irrelevant, or dangerous
relative to the established moral, political, and social
order.

The unquestioned, and, for practical purposes, un

questionable correctness of an established, institutionalized
pattern of explanations deemed authoritative by a group is
the sine qua non for asserting the superiority of "our" way
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of life vis a vis the "alien11 and threatening interpretations
of others whether at the group, societal, or cultural levels.
It is not enough that an explanation be "true" in terms of
actually presenting and interpreting our experience of real
ity, it must also be consonant with those established,
"authoritative" explanations by which the integrity of the
group is maintained.

Anything less is a threat to order and

stability.
The second point which I am trying to establish is that
Western culture is now at one of those pivotal points which
periodically recur.

At the risk of falling into a variation

of the same sin of epochal hubris that I ascribe to men of
other ages, the belief that theirs is the pivotal age in
human history, I would contend that contemporary Western
civilization is rapidly approaching, or perhaps is already
in the throes of an historical synapse.

Our age is "metaxic",

strung out between our collective past and an uncertain
future.

We have entered a period in which our roots to the

past are one by one being severed and in which the umbilicus
to the future is in danger of rupture.

Not since the early

Renaissance has the existing pattern of interlocking, mutuallysupportive explanations been so seriously or systematically
challenged.

The United States, seemingly at the vanguard of

the movement, offers several salient examples.

The notion

of America as a "melting pot" in which heterogeneous minori
ties are mystically alloyed, an ideal never in actuality
approached, is being seriously challenged by a spirit of
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widespread ethnic and racial assertiveness.

The "melting

pot" analogy not only does not describe the existing state
of affairs in the U.S., it also fails to correspond as an
ideal with the evolution of minority group relations through
out U.S. history.

Thus, the "melting pot," both as a des

cription and as an ideal, has been replaced by an emerging
awareness of race and ethnicity.

Similarly, the ideal of

the monogamous, nuclear family, once considered a bastion
of American democracy and culture, is under assault on two
fronts.

The first involves esqoerimentation with alternative

life styles (co-habitation, serial monogamy, group and homo
sexual marriage, etc.) which directly question the form of
traditionally prescribed interpersonal relations.

The second

front involves an attack on the roles ascribed to the sexes
by this pattern.

Under the aegis of "Women's Liberation,"

the idea of what constitutes "a women's place," and, by
extention a "man's place," has been re-evaluated.

The

interest and enthusiasm aroused by this issue has been
sufficiently intense that an amendment to the U.S. Constitu
tion establishing "equal rights for women" is currently
under consideration and is the subject of intense debate.
Further examples are afforded by the recent resurgence
of interest in astrology, the occult, and in Eastern and
Indian religions.

It would seem that, the current "Jesus

Movement" not withstanding, traditional Christianity, like
the family, is not immune to the onslaught of those who are
dissatisfied by traditional explanations.

The traditional
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American economic emphasis on productivity is being chal
lenged by people concerned with the effects of this emphasis
on the environment.

In a similar vein, the so-called tech

nological revolution is coming to be viewed as a mixed
blessing, with its attendent problems of technological unem
ployment and the depersonalization wrought by computerized
services.

The Viet Nam war has brought into question the

illusion of U.S. military invincibility, the virtually
unquestioned wisdom, justice, and morality of our military
involvements, and the hitherto sacrosanct nature of "defense"
spending vis a vis other budgetary categories.

Finally, in

opposition to our self-consciously middle-class culture there
has arisen an alleged "counter-culture," an amorphous, quasi
movement which more or less rejects the goals, values and
interests of the conventional culture.

While it is true

that almost none of the examples given are without precedent
in American history, it is the unique concatenation of all
of these criticisms of existing patterns of explanation
during recent years that gives additional warrant to the
assertion that we, perhaps more than most other ages, are
"at the edge of history."
What does this have to do with political theory or
political theorists?

If, as I have contended, the appropriate

domain of theory is the explanation of political phenomena,
and if, as I have argued, the contemporary spirit of criti
cal re-evaluation coupled with a restless seeking-after of
new modes of understanding is at least in part attributable
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to a perceived inadequacy of our several systems of esqplanation in presenting the world to us in a meaningful, under
standable way, then the theorist (regardless of his specific
field of inquiry) whose business it is to make comprehensible
the welter of perceptions, situations, and relations with
which we are confronted, must accept the responsibility of
acting as a guide across the potential historical synapse.
I am not contending that it is necessary that radically new
theories are essential to this endeavor: it may well be that
older formulations, that older value systems, are currently
misunderstood and maligned, and that upon intelligent reevaluation and representation, they might be sufficient to
the task at hand.

It is essential, however, that the theorist

be aware of what it is that he is doing when pursuing his
chosen activity.

He must understand the nature of explana

tion, what it is, what it does, and the consequences it holds
for the subject matter he is investigating, and for the
society in which he operates.

By investigating the process

of explanation in general and in its more specific formula
tion as scientific esqplanation, I hope to contribute to a
critical awareness of the nature of theory leading to the
development or re-interpretation of patterns of esqplanation
capable of rendering contemporary experience comprehensible.
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I will attempt to give flesh to
the skeleton of issues and concerns sketched above.

The

purpose of this inquiry is to define what I consider to be a
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significant problem:

What is an explanation in political

science, and, more generally, in social science?

The premise

that makes this problem a significant one is that any particular investigation operates within an "explanatory framework,"
and that in any area of inquiry several such frameworks may
exist.

Often these frameworks are "tacit": less frequently

they are articulated, which is to say that the components,
and the instructions for properly combining the components,
are made explicit.

Science is one such "explicit" "explana

tory framework," or, more precisely, possesses several
"esqilicit" "explanatory frameworks."

For each of these,

claims to being the "correct" or "best" one have been made.
Contemporary political scientists seem to have accepted an
explanatory framework from among those which purport to be
scientific, the Received View.

The thesis of this disserta

tion, as stated earlier in this chapter, is that the explan
atory framework generally accepted as providing satisfactory
explanations of political and social phenomena is inadequate
as a solution to the problem of explanation in political and
social science, and that, further, many of the theoretical
and methodological problems of scientific social inquiry
are at least partially the result of the acceptance of this
particular version of what a scientific explanation, and
theory, should b e .
In a sense, what is being proposed in this inquiry is a
relatively different— for political science— orientation to
analyzing theories, one which takes the theory itself, rather
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than the subject matter of any given theory, as its object.
The validity of this approach is contingent upon the validity
of two suppositions.

The first of these is that the term

"theory, 11 and the activity it signifies, means something.
When used in phrases like "social contract theory, 11 or "sys
tems theory," or "Marxian theory," or "coalition theory,"
the term is not simply, like a zero, a "place holder," nor
is its meaning completely exhausted by terms like "specula
tion" or "conjecture" or "thought."

Rather, the term implies

that a particular conceptual form or arrangement is being
used to order and to help understand political phenomena in
a particular way.
The second supposition, deriving from the first, is
that the form of a theory and the processes for selecting,
structuring, analyzing, and interpreting information warranted
by the theory are essential to any conclusions reached about
the nature of any political phenomenon.

This sounds tautol

ogous, and one is tempted to mutter, "But of course, one
doesn1t need to be told that."

My point is that one does

need to be told, to be constantly reminded, that a "theory"
is more than a set of conclusions: it is a conceptual form
that carries with it both opportunities and limitations.

To

use good Aristotelian language, it is the particular combi
nation of form and matter that gives an object of study
intelligibility.

The combination of the two is essential,

especially to the construction of good political and social
theory.
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This consideration leads directly to a related, if
somewhat covert, theme that weaves its way throughout this
inquiry.

This is the belief that political theory as it is

currently practiced and currently taught as a subdiscipline
in political science is far too passive an enterprise.

It

emphasizes, for the most part, learning and critiquing the
"thought," that is, the conclusions, of eminent and neareminent political thinkers with little consideration as to
what it is that is "theoretical" about them.

This disserta

tion emerged, as much as anything, from the hope that politi
cal theory could be more than a subspecialty of intellectual
history.

It is the attempt to provide a possible venue for

the overcoming of this unfortunate stereotype that guides
this work.
Although the topic of this dissertation is an ambitious
one, my objectives are fairly modest.

For the most part, I

am attempting to outline and evaluate both existing and
potential points of contact between two areas of inquiry,
philosophy of science and political theory, using the concept
of (scientific) explanation as the basic unit of analysis.
The reasons for selecting philosophy of science are two.
First, philosophers of science have formulated the clearest
and most cogent explications of the concepts of esqplanation
and theory, and it is my belief that political scientists
can benefit from their efforts.

Second, as I have suggested,

work by some philosophers of science has already influenced
political and social scientists.

But although the connections
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between these disciplines have already been established, the
consequences of this influence have yet to be assessed.

Such

an assessment is a specific objective of this investigation.
To this end, chapter two will initiate a general discussion
of explanation.

Considerable attention will be given to the

presentation of a general definition of explanation.

One of

the unique features of this definition will be the emphasis
placed on socio-cultural, group, and individual factors
which influence the proposing and accepting of explanations.
The second half of chapter two will be devoted to the develop
ment of an original, tri-partite model of the general com
ponents of an explanation and the relationships between these
components.

The purpose of the model is to help to introduce

some terms basic to what I will later call the "explanatory
process" and to provide a point of reference for the dis
cussion and evaluation of different notions of scientific
explanation and theory and their effect on political and
social theory.

Later, in chapter five, I will return to this

model and suggest its acceptance as a possible alternative
to other strategies for constructing explanations of politi
cal and social phenomena.
Chapter three will narrow the focus of this inquiry
considerably, and will be concerned with the "explanatory
tool" of scientific explanation,

"theory".

After a brief

discussion of the more recent history of the development of
the concept of theory, a model of the generally accepted
components of a theory will be presented.

The remainder of

18
the chapter will be devoted to the development of an over
view of the Received View model of scientific explanation and
theory as developed by Hempel and others.
Chapter four will attempt to demonstrate the influence
of the Received View on political and social science.

The

writings of philosophers of science who have specifically
directed their attention to political and social sciences,
of political and social scientists concerned with the develop
ment of a scientific mode of inquiry for their areas of
interest, and of political and social scientists doing re
search on specific topics will be presented to show the
pervasive impact of Received View thinking on political and
social science.

Next, I will analyze contemporary political

and social theory in terms of three specific sets of problems
along with solutions that have been proposed to them.

The

purpose of this analysis, in addition to further demonstrating
the influence of the Received View, is to introduce what I
believe is a cogent and fruitful approach to the understand
ing of contemporary political and social theory.
In the final chapter, objections to the Received View
will be investigated, and alternative versions to the
Received View will be discussed, as will the relatively
limited impact of these alternative versions on political
and social theory.

Different strategies for dealing with

the absence of an adequate account of explanation and theory
for political science will be entertained.

Finally, I will

suggest the advantages and limitations of tentatively
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accepting the idea of esqplanation outlined in chapter two
as one possible solution to "the problem of explanation."

CHAPTER TWO
Explanation
Explanation;

A General Definition

Explanation is the process whereby an understanding of
a given phenomenon or of the relationship between given
phenomena is presented for evaluation.

This definition it

self warrants explication and, as will be seen, qualifica
tion.

The salient features of this working definition are

contained in the terms "process," "understanding," "phenom
ena," and "evaluation."

These terms will each be considered

in turn.
Process

By process is meant a related series of actions

directed toward some goal.

Implicit in this usage is the

notion that an esqplanation, in the most general sense, is
not a thing, not an object having an independent ontological
status.

Rather, it is an activity, a description of a par

ticular pattern of relationships which direct the mind toward
an understanding of things, or of other processes.

Particu

lar explanations are approximations of an absolute, albeit
ideal, understanding.

They are stages within the larger

process of attempting to make the world comprehensible.

Be

cause they are approximations, no particular explanation can
be said to be true in any ultimate sense.

This does not

necessarily entail an epistemological relativism.
20

For while
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specific esqplanations of given phenomena are not susceptible
to criteria of absolute "Truthfulness," the process of expla
nation, as an endeavor toward ultimate comprehension, can be
said to be directed toward truth understood as a perfect
isomorphism between understanding, an activity of the mind,
and that which is understood, the concrete, objective,
existential facticity which is the object of understanding.
The process of explanation is dialectical in the platonic
sense of the term.

It involves an asking of questions and

a proposing of solutions, the latter being refined by further
questions, clarification, and criticism, leading to the pos
ing of additional questions and responses.

The process,

while perhaps interminable, does ideally lead to closer,
more complete approximations of the phenomenon under investi
gation.

The portrayal of explanation as a process under

scores the dynamic nature of inquiry.

Inquiry lacking this

quality is best exemplified by dogma which is a form of
explanation that has made truth claims that have resulted in
a prohibition of questioning.

In the case of dogma, as well

as in some other forms, the process is truncated, and an
explanatory cul de sac occurs.
Understandinq

The second salient term of the proposed

definition is "understanding."

It is, at once, the most

essential feature of explanation, and the most difficult to
discuss.

The notion of understanding to be presented here

is limited in that its main purpose is ultimately to help to
elucidate "scientific" understanding.

The idea of understanding
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to be developed is avowedly "activist" to the extent that I
am interested in those aspects of understanding which attempt
to make sense of the world.

This is not to deny that under

standing may have a "passive" dimension, one in which the
intellect is more like a receptacle than an artificer.

Nor

is it to deny that for other forms of ejqolanation, under
standing, as a device for "relieving curiosity," may be a
secondary consideration.

In the sense that I wish to develop

here, the primary and ultimate purpose of explanation is
understanding.

To explain something is to make it, in some

way, understandable, to bring it to comprehension.

Under

standing is that moment in the process of cognition in which
the mind, figuratively, reaches out and encompasses the
phenomenon under consideration.

It is a moment of illumina

tion during which the opacity of objects, relations, or
states of mind are placed in relief against the background
of experiences and perceptions so as to render them intelli
gible to the inquirer.
standing is of one type.

This is not to say that all under
There are various modes and levels

of understanding and, thus, of explanation.

For example, a

child curious about the reddish color of the sky at twilight
might well be satisfied with the explanation that, "Angels
do their baking at this time."

A scientist, however, would

probably be more satisfied by an explanation emphasizing the
refractory properties of the ionosphere producing visible
light radiation within certain spectroscopic parameters as
determined by pointer-readingsr that is, by atmospheric
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scattering.

Both explanations are sufficient to assuage, at

least temporarily, the curiosities of the respective question
ers.

Both give some means of coping with the observed phenom

enon; they provide a way of understanding that is appropriate
to their respective capabilities.

It is unlikely that the

child would have anything added to his understanding by an
esqslanation employing concepts or devices beyond his ken. By
the same token, it is unlikely that the scientist, in his work
as a scientist, would be able to employ the angel explanation.
The example is indicative of a feature of understanding
that is significant, especially in situations more profound
than the one given.

Understanding emerges, it would seem,

out of a framework of comprehension.

There exists a store

of accepted understandings and experiences which are central
to the achievement of new particular understandings.

To re

turn to the twilight example, it can be assumed that the
adequacy of the angel explanation to the child is predicated
upon a relatively stable belief in the existence of such
creatures.

Problems would arise if this new understanding

conflicted with previous information about the nature of
angels (e.g., angels don't need to eat or drink, therefore
why should they both with baking?); b u t , in the absence of
such contradictory information, the explanation given would
probably be satisfactory.

Indeed, an esqplanation in terms

of ionospheres and spectroscopes would not only be meaning
less, because it would fail to correspond to the pattern of
beliefs and understandings at this particular level; it would
also fail to answer the initial question for this inquirer.
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I am not saying that the angel explanation is correct
or incorrect, nor am I saying that it is the only possible
way of understanding the observed phenomenon.

I am not con

tending that understanding is intransigent, that an explana
tion once deemed satisfactory will always be considered
satisfactory.

I am saying, however, that the relationship

between explanation and understanding demands a degree of
complementarity, that to be acceptable, specific explana
tions must be given in terms having some correspondence to
the reality assumptions of the individual to whom the expla
nation is offered.
likely to happen.

If it does not, one of two things is
Either the explanation, because it is not

understood, will be rejected or, at best, stored for future
reference, or it will be necessary to instruct the person to
whom the eaqplanation is offered in an altered, new, or differ
ent mode of understanding.

The latter is done rather rou

tinely through education, which may be viewed as a systematic
way of disabusing us of "childish," "simplistic" understand
ings in favor of more "mature," "sophisticated" ones.

The

former occurs when the explanation is so alien as to render
it unintelligible, or so dangerous as to threaten the exist
ing core of understanding by which all explanations, or all
explanations germane to a particular phenomenon, are judged.
All of this is not to say that explanations which are not
understood are not esqilanations at all.

On the contrary,

they are, but they are not relevant or meaningful to a par
ticular person or group at a particular time.
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As I stated earlier, understanding is a particularly
difficult experience to discuss.

The sketch of understand

ing presented above emphasizes a particular aspect of under
standing which I feel is important to a particular form of
explanation.

In addition, the preceding esqposition, by

emphasizing the understanding of a particular person of a
particular phenomenon, neglects the significant social dimen
sion of understanding.

For example, the social phenomenon

of language, a learned, social activity, is obviously vital
not only in the communication but also in the formulation of
understanding.

Presently, the social dimension of under

standing and esqplanation will be discussed more thoroughly.
Phenomena

I intend that the third significant term of

the proposed definition,
possible sense.

“phenomena," be taken in the broadest

Its usage encompasses, in the context of

this inquiry, not only objects of direct, sensory perception,
but also mental processes, aspects of socio-political inter
action, and concepts both empirical and intuitive.
concisely,

More

"phenomena" refers to anything that can be per

ceived, thought, intuited, or imagined.

Implicit in this

usage is the notion that all phenomena, so defined, are sus
ceptible to explanation or attempts at explanation.

Moreover,

relations between phenomena similarly fall within the purview
of potential explanation.
The above statement entails, at least tacitly, an epistemological position, if only by exclusion.

The contentions

of empiricism, pragmatism, logical positivism, and, to some
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extent, phenomenology as to what is esqolainable are e^qpanded.
That for which "meaningful explanations" can be offered can
not be more or less arbitrarily limited to the merely tangi
ble.

To so argue is to make reality assumptions which are

contradicted by our own day to day esqperience.

To say that

only the measurable, seeable, touchable, hearable, or tasteable is the proper domain of knowledge consigns emotions,
values, beliefs, and predispositions, to say nothing about
speculation about tangibles and the relation of the mind to
them, to a limbo of non-being or, at best, non-comprehension.
But if the aforementioned positions are in error because
they exclude all but the concrete, the epistemology of Plato
and his intellectual progeny is unsatisfactory because it has
the effect of making the concrete, the mundane, trivial.
see little advantage to adopting either extreme.

I

Because we

are beings-in-the-world, our knowledge must account for this
particular here and now: because we are obviously capable of
removing ourselves, through conceptualization and imagination,
from what is simply here and now, we must similarly account
1
for such capabilities.
The effect of synthesizing the con
cerns of both of these extremes is to open radically the
arena of potential ejqplanations by not precluding, as a re
sult of definition, any subject from its ambit.

Hence, the

broad rendering of the term "phenomena."

^Edward H. Henderson, "Homo Symbolicus: A Definition
of Man," Man and World vol. 4, no. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 132134.
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Evaluation

Because of the non-exclusivity of the term,

phenomena, as it has been defined, and because of what I
take to be the generally dialectical nature of esqplanation,
the final term of the proposed definition,
assumes added significance.

"evaluation,"

Evaluation is a process wherein

the faculty of judgement is exercised (according to the
specific interests of this inquiry) as to the acceptability
or unacceptability of a proposed explanation.

Evaluation,

as an act of judgement, requires criteria according to which
judgements can be made.

The selection of "valid" criteria to

some extent replicates the problem of selecting "valid" expla
nations because both tend to be specifications of a more
general, more basic set of reality assumptions, values, and/
or conventions.

Thus, Aristotle's defense of slavery in

certain circumstances would be less odious to an Athenian,
whose view of the nature of man and the proper ordering of
society support such an argument, than they would be to con
temporary, Western man for whom slavery has no such funda
mental warrant.
The problem, however, is not so simple and unidimensional.
There are many levels of evaluative criteria and many spheres
among which standards for evaluation vary.

All fall more

or less within the framework of culturally accepted assump
tions about the nature of reality, truth, and virtue.

In

order to facilitate discussion, I have collapsed these
numerous spheres of evaluation and interpretation into three
basic levels, each of which is subject to further subdivision.
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They are, in order of decreasing generality, the Socio2
cultural level, the Group level, and the Individual level.
At the Socio-cultural level are found the basic reli
gious , moral, political, and philosophical predispositions
which define our general worldview.

In the Western tradi

tion, for example, the basic acceptance of Judeo-Christian
theology and ethics (including monotheism, belief in a tran
scendent, personal God, a system of eternal reward and
retribution requiring individual responsibility for temporal
activities, the notion of universal brotherhood, a definition
of specific actions as good or evil, etc.) serves not only
as a basic framework for dealing with questions about the
nature of the divine and man's relation to it, but also pro
vides a set of fundamental criteria for the evaluation of
the "truthfulness" or "value" of other possible theological
systems.

For example, a Christian, imbued with the spirit

of Western theology, might well reject Hinduism as polythe
istic, apersonal, and non-eschatological, that is, for not
adhering to the "truths" of Western theology.

^The assumption necessary to this taxonomy is that,
although a number of counterexamples may be presented with
out any great difficulty, the majority of the members at
each level adhere to the evaluative and interpretative
standards at each level. Further, it should be noted that
these levels, as well as the categories occurring within
them, are intended as conceptual and heuristic devices, and
are presented in the same spirit, and with the same purpose,
as, for example, Locke's "state of nature" argument.
Taken
in this sense, this strategy is not too dissimilar from that
suggested by Nagel whereby phenomena are analyzed in terms
of ideal conditions or pure cases.
(See chapter 4 below).

29
The moral precepts by which the lives of Western men
are directed are derived from an extension of our religious
tradition.

The codification of these precepts, embodied in

the Decalogue, are viewed as divine decrees according to
which man must order his life if he is to attain the rewards
promised by his theology.

The symbiosis between the theo

logical and the ethical spheres gives ultimate authority
and indubitability to the latter, and even the rupture
between the two, a recurring cultural phenomenon, has not
materially changed the substance of the precepts but has,
instead, led to a search, again recurring, for alternative,
non-theological, justifications for existing ethical norms.

3

As standards for evaluation, these precepts provide the
basis for judgements concerning the value of alternate ethi
cal systems, or of specific ethical judgements.

For example,

an ethical system in which virtue is determined by the num
ber of heads of tribal enemies accumulated, or by the number
of wives or slaves would be unethical by Western standards.
The evaluative verities of Western political experience
are more difficult because of the diversity of their evolu
tion.

Indeed, it might be argued that there is as much

variance within this particular cultural sphere (along a

JSuch attempts may be discerned in works ranging from
such pre-Christian sources as Aristotle and, to some extent,
Plato, through certain strains of humanist thought, to some
social contract-type speculation, to the utilitarians, to
Marxian ethical speculation, to contemporary atheistic
existentialism, and to some sociological and social-psycho
logical theories.
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temporal dimension) as there is among divergent cultures.
One reason for this might be that the process of seculariza
tion progressed more rapidly in the political sphere than
it did within the ethical, and, it goes without saying,
theological spheres.

Still, certain features have provided

a thread, however tenuous, of evaluative unity.
Among these are the following:

First, an interest in

individual freedom, variously formulated, extended, and
understood, which has endured as a partial justification for
political action from the struggle for cultural and reli
gious freedom by the Jews from Babylon and Egypt, to the
repulsion of Persian tyranny by the Greeks, to wars to make
the world safe for democracy and to allow political selfdetermination.

Second, the notion that God is the ultimate

source of political authority, or, in a more secular vein,
that God sanctions, supports, and directs "just" or "legiti
mate" governments is to be found in such diverse sources as
Plato, whose ideal rulers derive their right to rule through
a mystical-philosophical perception of the Good which, though
not divine in the usual cultural sense, is extra-personal,
and trans-historical, reaching a zenith in Augustine, John
of Salisbury, Aquinas, and the notion of the Divine Right of
Kings, and surviving the radical secularization of political
thought and the separation of church and state to the extent
that we still speak of "one nation under God" in the nation
in which such a separation is most profoundly homaged, and
in the persistence of "state churches" in other nations.
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Witness also the fact that it is not enough that communism
he adjured by some on secular, political grounds, but that
it must bear, for some, the overweening stigma of "godless
ness. 11 Third, a belief in the "rule of law," a persistent
chord from Moses to Solon to the Roman lawmakers to the Magna
Charta to various national constitutions.

The emergence of

legal rationality from charismatic and traditional forms of
authority is employed by Weber as a primary difference between
occidental and oriental political development.

While Weber

intended that this observation be descriptive and analytical,
its use as a normative standard of evaluation has not been
4
overlooked.
Fourth, and finally, there is the idea of
individual allegiance to political authority, the assertion
of which presents an apparent contradiction with the firststated trait, an interest in individual freedom.

Much of

the history of the development of political thought can be
understood as an attempt to establish the proper balance
between these two concerns.
The contemporary Western cultural attitude toward polit
ical allegiance cuts a rather narrow evaluative swath.

Tyr

anny (or despotism) and anarchy are generally used as pejoratives, having reference to slavish obedience or subservience
on the one hand, or to political apostasy and chaos on the
other.

Our ideal, it would seem, is one of allegiance to an

^Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait,
(Garden City: Doubleday & C o . , Inc., 1962), pp. 388-389.
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authority which permits wide personal discretion, and over
which we have some degree of control.
The final major set of Socio-cultural criteria to be
considered are philosophical, more specifically epistemological and ontological.

These may be reduced to four "laws"

and what may be best described as a disposition.

The dis

position refers to the recognition (or imposition) of limits
to the power of the human mind to know reality which leads
to a bifurcation of understanding into areas most frequently
characterized by the terms "faith" or "intuition," and "rea
son. "

This mental dualism finds conscious expression only,

as far as I can determine, in the Western intellectual
tradition, and thus may be viewed as a fundamental character
istic of the Western cultural worldview.

As a standard of

philosophical evaluation, its value is difficult to assess.
This is largely because a unitary worldview based upon both
perspectives has failed to emerge as a well-developed, influ
ential philosophy.

Instead, what has emerged is an alternation

of paradigms whereby first one then the other attitude toward
5
the nature of human knowledge has gained predominance. Most
frequently these modes of knowing have been turned upon one
another and used as standards by which segments of Western
thought have been evaluated.

^Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers, (New York:
& Dunlap, 1959), Parts I and II, passim.

Grosset
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The four basic "laws" (really axioms or reality pre
suppositions) which I contend serve as the foundation of
Western thought are the law of identity, the law of non
contradiction, the law of the uniformity of nature, and the
6
law of sufficient reason.
Briefly described, the law of
identity states that a thing is co-determinant with itself—
that A is A.

Secondly, the law of non-contradiction states

that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and
in the same aspect; that is, the statement "All S is P" can
not be simultaneously and sincerely affirmed and denied by
the same person.

Thirdly, the law of the uniformity of

nature states that a thing is essentially what it is, and
remains such, whether or not it is observed, unless acted
upon by some external agent or by some intrinsic process by
which it is altered.

Though similar to the law of identity

in that both posit self-consistency, the law of the uniformity
of nature implies the possibility of the establishment of
classes of objects sharing similar characteristics over time,
or similarly affected by similar agents or processes.

Final

ly, the law of sufficient reason states that every occurrence
is brought about by the action of some antecedent event or
events which are necessary and sufficient for that occurrence,
and, secondly, that the relation between prior events and

g

These "laws" are a compilation of basic presuppositions
characteristic of Western philosophy.
I am unaware of their
origin, in this form, in any literature with which I am
familiar.
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particular occurrences are, in principle, determinable
through reason, faith, revelation, or intuition.
Although some of these criteria have been questioned by
some thinkers (e.g., Hume and the uniformity of nature), no
one has systematically refuted or denied all four in the
same system of thought.

As criteria of evaluation, they

have been employed to judge the value of philosophical sys
tems outside of the Western tradition for which such propo
sitions are not axiomatic.

For example, certain branches of

Indian philosophy are little concerned with the presence of
contradictory statements as in the Hindu Koan, "first there
is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is,"
and could, therefore, be questioned on the basis of the
second "law."
These then are some of the features basic to Western
speculation in religion, ethics, politics, and philosophy
which also function as criteria of evaluation at the socio
cultural level.

They serve the dual purposes of structuring

our view of reality, of the nature of man, of man's relations
with other men and with nature itself, while at the same time
serving as first-level evaluative criteria.

However, their

essential generality not only mitigates their utility as
standards of evaluation, but also leaves them open to inter
pretation— in fact, makes interpretation necessary.
effect of interpretation is two-fold.

The

The first effect con

cerns the relationship among the four substantive areas
themselves.

The tendency to regard all four as co-equal
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partners in a system of evaluation is rare.

The concerns of

any age leads to an ordering of the relative value placed
upon any four areas mentioned.

For example, the subsumption

of ethical, political, and philosophical speculation under
the constraint of religious orthodoxy set the ecclesiastical
tone of the Middle Ages.

The imposition of religious criteria

of evaluation on the other three areas of inquiry had the
effect not only of dictating certain types of solutions, but
also of stifling imagination in approaching problems specific
to politics, ethics, and philosophy.

A similar, yet opposite,

situation emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries with the
ascendance of "Natural Philosophy" ("Science") and its concommitant criteria of evaluation to a position of predomi
nance, resulting in a "Watchmaker God" (Paley), a "social
physics" ethics and politics (Quetelet and Comte), and an
epistemology based upon the addition and subtraction of
names of sensations (Hobbes).
Second, interpretation leads to a differentiation of
emphasis within the substantive spheres themselves.

For

example, in the substantive area of political speculation,
one interpretation may emphasize (consider pre-eminent)
individual freedom over individual allegiance to authority.
Generally speaking, differentiation in this mode refers to
a system of interpretive ordering of significant considera
tions.

This may take the form of a rank-ordering of the

features (e.g., in Augustine, God, as the ultimate source
of political authority, is primary: individual allegiance
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to political authority is secondary; belief in the rule of
law is tertiary; and individual freedom is tangential), or
of emphasizing one or two features to the exclusion of the
others (vide Hegel or J. S. Mill).
The need for interpretation of the general presupposi
tions at the Socio-cultural level, coupled with a vying for
pre-eminence among the four substantive areas (and within
these areas, among the general criteria), provides the
source and substance of the second level of evaluation, the
group or associational level.

It is at this level that, for

most people, evaluational criteria are operative.

The frame'

work of "Western culture" with its constituent pre-supposi
tions, for present purposes considered as criteria of evalu
ation, lacks specificity and concreteness.

Criteria at the

Socio-cultural level pose too many questions, and provide
too few solutions to problems of implementation.

As was

stated previously, the generality of these criteria makes
interpretation unavoidable, and it is through interpretation
that these general presuppositions become the conceptual and
evaluative basis for the organization of groups.
For the sake of illustration, assume a society whose
worldview is composed solely of uninterpreted general pre
suppositions.

Further, assume that, at a given time, there

is complete acceptance of and satisfaction with these pre
suppositions by the entire population.

If the admission of

a single question is permitted, and it need not be one chal
lenging a particular presupposition but merely a request for

37
clarification (or interpretation), the stage is potentially
set for the clash of opinion and the crystalization of
support around contending positions.

For example, if in

this hypothetical society it is generally accepted that "God
is the ultimate source of political authority," it might be
reasonably asked, "To what extent does God superintend,
sanction, or direct political leaders?"

The general belief

gives no indication of the degree of direction: it simply
posits that it exists.

To answer the question it is necessary

that an extrapolation from the information provided be made,
that an inference from the general statement to a more
specific rendering of the statement be formulated and, in
some way (persuasion, coersion, etc.) be made convincingly.
The range of responses (providing that a variety be allowed)
could run from, "The ruler is God, or descended from God,
and, therefore, his actions and authority are divine, or, at
least, God-like" to "His office, but not all of his actions,
has unquestionable divine sanction."

Whether for reasons of

conviction, self-interest, fear, or habit, individuals are
attracted to and come to support one of this range of re
sponses, and seek to convert others to the rightness, efficacy,
or practicality of their opinion.

The power to coalesce

public opinion or coerce acquiescence will determine, for a
time, which one of these positions will gain pre-eminence,
becoming the standard position.
nated by this one resolution.

The process is not termi
Changes in circumstances or

experience may again bring into question the existing
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interpretation.

But as long as there remains sufficient

force or reason to support the given interpretation, it
will remain not only a justification for, in this case, the
authority of the ruler, but also a standard for evaluating
other interpretations.
The same process, the formation of groups around opin
ions, ideas and interpretation, operates throughout society
on a broad range of issues.

Lest this be construed as a

reductionist approach to, or a total explanation of, this
phenomenon, let me hasten to add that I do not contend that
this is the only way, or even the most important way that
factions are perpetuated.

Certainly heritage and habit play

a significant role in the maintenance of membership or par
ticipation in large, traditional groups such as churches,
political parties, and the like.

Chance operates, to a

certain extent, in the constitution of social classes and
nationalities.

But, with few exceptions (e.g., race, eth

nicity), the formation of groups was aided by constellations
of opinion around some interpretive position on some issue.
And, in varying degrees depending upon the nature of the
group, adherence to certain central positions is critical in
determining group membership.

There is a reciprocity between

ideas espoused and association which only at a later time
is mitigated by habit, custom, and conformity.
The third level of evaluation, the most specific and
fundamental, is the individual.

In a very real sense, it

is only through the individual that evaluation occurs.

The
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Socio-cultural and Group categories are, for the most part,
convenient symbols for aggregations of individuals holding
certain opinions and activities in common.

The influence of

these aggregates upon the individual in forming evaluations
is of indubitable importance.

Whereas the concatenation of

several individuals of similar opinion concerning some issue
is essential to the formation of groups, the influe;- e of
the group position not only reinforces the individual in
certain aspects of his thinking, but also provides a subtle
framework which serves to organize ancillary propositions
about related matters.

This is most obvious in those large,

broadly based, traditional associations such as churches and
ideology groups where interpretative authority in widely
ranging areas of concern is claimed for the orthodox.
The lack of total homogeneity, as evidenced at one level
by the plurality of groups espousing varying positions around
a central issue, and at another by the persistence of dissi
dents within a group about a point of interpretation, is an
indication of the continuing process by which the individual
evaluates standard interpretations and finds them wanting.
The genesis of their dissatisfaction may be the result of
several factors.

These may be subsumed under the general

contention that the standard interpretation, though perhaps
satisfactory at one time, no longer corresponds to the
7
experience of the individual.
The reasons for this may vary.

^As described in chapter 1.

40
New, or more complete information may render basic statements
more understandable.

Perceptions of interest or advantage

may alter with changing circumstances, making different
interpretations more practical and beneficial.

New inter

pretations , necessitated by previously unanticipated situa
tions or information, may conflict with older, standing
positions and this conflict may require amelioration.

Or,

simply, an interpretation may not "seem" right to an indi
vidual either singly or in the context of similar explana
tions.
For whatever reasons, evaluation by the individual is
a constantly recurring phenomenon.

Individuals are contin

ually responding to ideas, situations, and proposals, evalu
ating them in such a way so as to reaffirm, rearrange, or
reappraise aspects of their thinking.

The broad framework

of evaluation defined at the Socio-cultural level by general
agreement over a long period of time on generalizations of
the kind mentioned with reference to theology, ethics, poli
tics, and philosophy, and the more specific renderings of
these generalizations at the Group level provides the con
text in which individual evaluation operates.

From these

levels are derived the most fundamental and pervasive of
conceptual influences, including language, terminology,
grammar, syntax, and other rules of symbol usage which
function as a prism in the definition, interpretation, and
judgement of ideas, situations, and dispositions.

The first

and second levels of the evaluative framework themselves,
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however, are the repositories of countless individual judge
ments and evaluations which have been, through time and cir
cumstance, abstracted, collated, and generalized to the
status of "standards," "canons," and "truths."

The relation

ship between the first two and the third levels of evaluation
is one of dynamic symbiosis in which the influence is bidirec
tional, and change, for the most part, is accretional and
incremental.

The interaction effects between levels are

constant and pervasive, if not of equal intensity (e.g., the
influence of a particular group— an organized religion, for
example— on almost any individual is greater than that of
the individual of the group).

The focus of the process of

evaluation, symbolized by this tri-partite construct, is
the individual both as the sole source of new interpretations
and evaluations and as the subject upon whom this process
operates.

The individual is, so to speak, both the producer

and the consumer of explanations and their consequences.
Explanation:
Theoria

A Working Model

The uniquely human proclivity to offer esqola-

nations arises out of the need to organize esqperience in
some meaningful, understandable way, to impose or discover
some order on what I earlier called the welter of impressions
and ideas with which one is confronted daily.

The definition

of explanation which I have formulated attempts to present
this organizing tendency intensionally (through the discussion
of "process," "understanding," and "phenomenon") and extensionally (through the extensive discussion of "evaluation").
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Much remains to be said about the technical aspects of expla
nation especially as it pertains to scientific explanation
and to theory.

Any further consideration of the phenomenon

of explanation necessitates an investigation of its source
in the cognitive process, and an analysis of its relation
to two other concepts, description and prediction.
I have contended that there exists a "need” to organize
experience, and have implied that this need is seminal to
the explanatory process.

I would argue, however, that this

need itself is a consequence of some more primary urge or
disposition which gives both impetus and direction to the
search for explanations, and exists in relation to this need
as the source of a sound does to the sound made, or the
source of an action does to an action.

This disposition,

most commonly symbolized by the terms "wonder," "curiosity,"
or "inquisitiveness," is the problem-conceiving or problemformulating aspect of the process of explanation.

The cen

trality of curiosity or wonder to creativity, and hence to
esqplanation as a creative act, is affirmed by Arthur Koestler
in his impressive work, The Act of Creation.

In it, he states,

"this oceanic feeling of wonder is the common source of
religious mysticism, of pure science, of art for art's sake;
Q

it is their common denominator and emotive bond."

In

evidence, Koestler presents the following testimony;

®Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, (New York:
MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 258.

The
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'Men were first led to the study of Natural
Philosophy' wrote Aristotle, 'as indeed they are
today, by wonder.' Maxwell's earliest memory was,
'lying on the grass, looking at the sun, and
wondering.1 Einstein struck the same chord when
he wrote that whoever is devoid of the capacity to
wonder, 'whoever remains unmoved, whoever cannot
contemplate or know the deep shudder of the soul
in enchantment, might as well be dead for he has
already closed his eyes upon life.'
Wondering activity is the link between phenomena and under
standing.

It is the nexus joining the world "out there"

and the symbolization of that world, the gate through which
that which is external to the mind passes and arouses those
feelings which are preliminary to attempts at understanding.
Curiosity, wonder, inquisitiveness, the pricking of the
imagination by something which is not comprehended, or by
previously unnoticed aspects of things familiar initiates a
series of activities through which the unexplained is organ
ized to make it potentially understandable.

The object of

interest is analyzed, identified, and rearranged so that
speculation about it becomes possible.

Thus, when one says

that a problem is "formulated," there is a tacit recognition
of this process in operation; the observation is given a form
which makes it amenable to c o n t e m p l a t i o n . F o r purposes of

®Ibid.

Italics in Maxwell.

•^As adumbrated in chapter 1 and again earlier in this
chapter, the way in which this formulation occurs is largely
influenced by pre-existing, accepted forms of thought. In
deed, the very perception of a problem is likely dependent
upon these structures. Again, the social component of
explanation enters the picture. For further information see
Eugene Meehan, Explanation in Social Science, (Homewood:
Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 42-43.
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simplification, I will label this whole process, including
those activities preceding attempts at explanation, theoria,
that is "looking at" or contemplation, and consider them as
a prologue to, or preparatory stage for the process of expla
nation.
If theoria provides the impetus and the initial formu
lation to prospective explanations, then three activities,
which may be separated for purposes of analysis, provide the
substance.

These activities, directly the result of contem

plation, are description, explanation, and prediction.

In

a very superficial way they may be regarded as indicating
responses to three classes of questions that can be asked
about a phenomenon:

What is it?

Why is it as it is?

And,
11
how will it effect (or be affected by) future events?
A
very real semantical and logical problem is presented by
this trichotomy in that I am employing "explanation" as a
term in defining the process of explanation which I take to
include theoria plus some combination of description, expla
nation, and prediction as activities in that process.

The

solution to this difficulty lies in accepting the term,
"explanation" in two senses, or, more accurately, on two
levels.

The first usage, that employed to this point, takes

explanation in its more general, non-technical sense as an

^ A s will be seen, such syntactical distinctions will
prove inadequate to distinguishing these activities. They
are presented here only as first approximations.
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enterprise directed at efforts to broaden human understand
ing by attempting to make phenomena more intelligible.

The

second sense, or level meaning, of explanation is more specif
ic and technical.

In this usage, the term "explanation" is

usually preceded by a qualifying adjective, such as "scien
tific, " "mythical," etc., which indicates that a particular
form of esqolanation having specific attributes and inclusion
12
criteria is being discussed.
The inclusion of description
and prediction in the trichotomy of eaqolanatory activities
is justified— indeed, made necessary— by dint of the special
relation between these three terms and the activities which
they symbolize.

The nature of this relationship will be

made more explicit in the following discussion.
Description

A description is a representation.

an indication of a specific occurrence.

It is

Descriptions are, in

a sense, re-creations.

They are symbolic reenactments of

particular experiences.

In addition, a description is a

social event, that is, we generally describe a thing to some13
one other than ourselves.
A man, after witnessing, for
example, an exceptionally exciting sporting event, may wish
to share it with others who were not present.

In order to

12

Incalculable damage has been, and is still being, done
by the failure to distinguish between these two senses of
explanation. The damage is the result of taking a particular
form of explanation and asserting it as the form of explana
tion generally, to the exclusion of all other particular forms.
^Stephen Toulmin and K. Baier, "On Describing," Mind,
LXI, no. 241 (Jan., 1952), p. 16.
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accomplish this he may paint it, or take a picture of it,
or write a poem or an essay about it.

His intention in

each act is to capture certain features of this experience
for presentation at a later time.

His presentation will

not be of the total event, nor of each and every feature of
the event.

Rather, he will delimit those features which,

for him, were meaningful, unique, or significant vis a vis
similar experiences he has had.

His mode of presentation,

the symbols by which he chooses to esqjress himself, will be
consonant with his intention in re-creating the experience,
and directed toward a particular audience.
A description may be seen as a way of specifying e^qoerience, of focusing attention toward particular phenomena.

In

describing something, whether it is an object, a process, a
thought, or an emotion, one presents that thing as distinct,
or distinguishable, from other accompanying perceptions.
Because descriptions are social, and because they are repre
sentations, they are different from the experience of dis
tinctiveness itself.

In offering a description, one is

abstracting from the experience those salient features which
are at least potentially communicable.

In this sense,

descriptions can be viewed, with some reservations, as extend
ed, detailed reports about experiences or perceptions.
It should be noted that not all statements are descrip
tions.

Toulmin and Baier in their article, "On Describing,"

have contended that statements of fact are not, in themselves,

descriptions.

Although all statements of fact have ob

jects, i.e., persons, things, events, processes, etc., to
which they refer, facts themselves, "...cannot be described:
15
(they) can only be stated."
Further, "description is not
a word parallel to the phrase 'statement of fact:'

it refers

rather to a type of use to which a sentence may be put."^
For example, to make the statement, "there is an ashtray on
my desk," is not to describe the ashtray, my desk, the room,
nor anything else.

Such a statement may serve as the begin

ning of a description, (e.g., "There is an ashtray on my
desk.

It is ceramic, brown and white, and shaped like a

leaf supporting a large ceramic pipe.

A large piece has

been chipped from it."), but need not do so (e.g., It is hot
today; it's 11:30 p.m.).

Utterances of the "statement of

fact" type are called "reports" by Robert Brown, and are
distinguished from descriptions on the grounds that "to
describe something is to tell someone what some state of
affairs is like.

A successful description enables the audi

tor to recognize what has been described to him, when he
otherwise would not be able to do so.
17
need not do this...."

A successful report

14Ibid., p. 17.
15Ibid.
16

AOIbid.
17

(emphasis in original)

Robert Brown, Explanation in the Social Sciences,
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1963), p. 16. It should
be noted that the line distinguishing "report" from "descrip'
tion" is a tenuous and shifting one determined, for the most
part, by the use that is made of a particular statement.
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Toulmin and Baier stipulate that a description must
describe its object as it exists at the time perceived {to
deny this is to assert that one could describe "nothing");
that it must state the sort of thing being described and not
simply give characteristics (e.g., saying that "it is ceramic,
brown and white, leaf and pipe shaped, and missing a piece"
would not be an adequate description of the specific object
on my desk, and would probably not edify the hearer); and
that the describer must be in a better position, either
physically, or in terms of knowledge, to describe the phenom18
enon than the person receiving the description.
It is
Toulmin and Baier's position that a verbal or written descrip
tion should function much as a picture would.

To use their

example, a description of a criminal will be good insofar as
19
it, like a picture, aids police in recognizing the felon.
Likewise, the description of a process or procedure "...will
be the better the more nearly it will do instead of a demon20
stration."
A description is to be judged "successful"
according to these criteria plus the condition that it is
. .
21
"sufficiently full, fair, accurate, and well-balanced."
This is not to argue that there is one and only one
description for any phenomenon.

18

To the contrary, Bertrand

Toulmin and Baier, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

19Ibid.. p. 19.
20Ibid.
2^Ibid., p. 23.

49
Russell contends, "There are innumerable correct descrip22
tions of any given object."
For example, two persons
having different interests, training, backgrounds, and abil
ities, who are standing side by side witnessing the same
event may arrive at quite different descriptions of that
event.

Both are descriptions if their purpose is to repre

sent a particular experience.

Neither can be said to be

correct or incorrect as descriptions; particular facts may
be erroneous, or the total product may be inaccurate; but
this is not to say that it "is not a description at all."

23

The possibility of a multiplicity of descriptions for
any particular phenomenon may be seen as part of a larger
problem— that for any given situation there are a multiplicity
of possible descriptions.

A zoologist, a botanist, and a

meteorologist placed in the same forest for a given period
of time with the instructions to describe their environment
will each probably come up with totally different pictures
of their "common" ejqperience.

The zoologist will be more

likely, because of his training and inclination, to describe
the fauna, the botanist, the flora, and the meteorologist,
the climatological conditions.

The same objective totality

will be perceived differently by the three observers.

It is

impossible that any observer give a complete description of

^Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philos
ophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, n.d.), p. 140.
Toulmin and Baier, op. crt., p. 23.
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every facet of the situation.

The particular phenomena,

though finite, are (for practical purposes) innumerable.

It

becomes necessary to pick and choose, to emphasize and deemphasize, to establish foreground and background, according
to some criteria of salience or relevance.

Often these

criteria are so basic, so fundamental, that the observer is
24
not even conscious of them.
The three observers in the
example, all being "scientifically" trained, probably share
the same set of reality assumptions, the same general rules
of observation and evidence, and yet they will probably come
up with different descriptions because they define different
features of their environment as being problematical.
The situation is complicated further when descriptions
are made by persons not sharing the same set of reality
assumptions, and for whom there are no common symbols by
which the phenomenon may be described.

Imagine, for example,

a Tassaday indian trying to describe the launching of an
Apollo rocket, or a television program, or snow, first to a
fellow Tassaday, and then, in the same terms, to a Westerner.
There would be no "universe of discourse," no common sphere
in which terms were understood to apply.

The meaning of

terms and, therefore, the describability of phenomena, are
dependent upon common definitions not only of symbols, but of
the reality which those symbols represent.

This is often the case with the items in the three
levels of evaluation cited earlier. Their application is
automatic.
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The point being made here is that descriptions are con25
textual,
that the recognition resulting from a successful
description derives from a common understanding of related
phenomena.

Russell contends that a description, "consists

of several words, whose meanings are already fixed, and from
which results whatever is taken to be the 'meaning' of the
26
description."
If, as has been argued, description is a
process of rendering familiar data of experience or intui
tion according to definitions of what is real, significant,
or meaningful, a correspondence between the means by which
understanding is attained ("explanation" in the more general
sense of the term) and the necessity for defining particular
phenomena according to symbols given meaning by a particular
understanding becomes not only obvious, but essential.

To

borrow (and corrupt) a Husserlian tenet, description is
intentional and perspectival, and both the direction of
attention and the perspective are provided by those systemat
ically related concepts called explanations.
Some philosophers have argued that explanation is a
27
reduction of the unfamiliar to the familiar.
It is my
belief that this characterization pertains more properly to

7S

Michael Scriven, "Definitions, Explanations, and
Theories," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
vol. II (1958), pp. 99-195, passim.
^Russell, op. cit., p. 174.
The adequacy of this view of explanation will be
considered in the next section.
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description.

Description, as a process of familiarization,

serves three functions.

First, it makes more explicit the

characteristics of phenomena for which we already have defi28
nite symbols (i.e., definitions, names, etc.).
Secondly,
it helps to specify differences among particular instances
in classes of phenomena for which we have established cate
gories.

Thirdly, it aides in the identification of unknown

or unclassified phenomena by stating their characteristics
according to definite symbols (where possible), thus allow
ing for comparison with known objects having similar charac. .
29
tenstics.
The purpose of description is to organize phenomena
into similar classes, to arrange perceptions in such a way
so as to make them cognitively manageable, and, thus, intelli
gible.

Description deals with the singular, either as it

occurs in discrete phenomena or in constructed classes which
abstract similar characteristics from a number of phenomena.
By establishing such classes, judgements concerning relations
within classes and between them are facilitated.

As will be

argued in the next section, explanation is primarily con
cerned with understanding such relationships.

28A definite symbol is one which has an established
meaning in some universe of discourse.
28It makes no difference if the "unfamiliarity" of the
phenomenon in question is individual (i.e. I personally do
not know what it is) or general (i.e. beyond the scope of
organized knowledge at the time). The same function is per
formed.
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Explanation

The earlier and extensive definition of

explanation as a process whereby an understanding of^ a given
phenomenon or of the relationship between given phenomena is
presented for evaluation, while still appropriate, needs
specification.

The earlier formulation of this concept pro

vides the framework for understanding the entire description-explanation-prediction complex.

In order to provide

more substance, to detail the linkages between description
and prediction, a consideration of particular features of
esqplanation will be necessary.
Explanation is concerned with relationships.

It is

close to meaningless to ask someone to "explain an apple."
One can report, "There is an apple on the table."

Or one

can describe a particular apple, or apples in general— " (An)
applets) is (are) roundish in shape, yellow to red in color,
tart to sweet in taste, etc."
esqplain an apple or apples.

But one cannot be said to
However, the relationship

between, for example, apples and nutrition, or apples and
Newton's theory of gravitational attraction can possibly be
esqplained or, at least, is susceptible to attempts at expla
nation.
Often explanations of a single phenomenon, or of a class
of phenomena are requested.

What is usually desired is either

a description of the phenomenon, in which case the wrong
question has been asked, or an iteration of related factors.
For example, if one is asked to explain the voting behavior
of Black Americans, one can, depending upon how the question
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is understood, discuss the way some percentage of Black
Americans have traditionally voted over some period of time;
or one can present the relationship between being Black and
voting in a particular way by introducing related factors
{SES, parent's party identification, peer group pressure,
etc.)*

In the first instance, a description has been given;

in the second, a possible explanation.
be asked to "explain" paranoia.

Similarly, one may

The response can be either

a listing of characteristics {nervousness, a sense of power
lessness, anxiety, etc.) or a rendition of factors not
included in the description of paranoia, but which are posited
as being related to it in a particular way.

Again, as in

the voting example, the first response would be, in the
strict sense, a description; the second, because it deals
with a relationship between the phenomenon in question and
other factors, a tentative explanation.

As Norwood Russell

Hanson has argued, "One cannot explain the properties of a
class of entities by appealing to entities which possess
those properties, that is which are members of the class."

30

John Hospers makes a corollary point in saying that,
"Explanation is always in terms of something else, and there
can be no explanation (to request one is to make a demand
logically impossible of fulfillment) if there is nothing even

30Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cam
bridge; Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 159. Hanson
is here elaborating a point made by Heisenberg.
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31
hypothecated in terms of which to make it.,r

In an expla

nation, the things being explained, the explananda (um) are
32
said to be accounted for by the exolanans,
i.e., those
factors offered in explanation.

Although the nature of the

relationship between explananda and ejqplanans varies from
type of esqplanation to type of explanation and is the topic
of continuing debate, a common characteristic of all expla
nation is this relational quality according to which some
thing is accounted for in terms other than of itself.
The argument that there are differences between expla
nation and description does not entail the argument that they
are altogether unrelated activities.

To the contrary, I

have contended that both are concerned with phenomena or
classes of phenomena, and that both are involved in the
effort to render the world intelligible.

It would be foolish

to argue that any explanation which is not totally formalized
and abstract does not depend on description both for its
formulation and its application.

Even the highly formalized,

mathematicized explanations of quantum physics require des
criptions of postulated phenomena if they are to be applied.
I do contend, however, that explanations and descrip
tions deal with different aspects of understanding.

The

31

John Hospers, "On Explanation," The Journal of Philos
ophy Vol. XLIII, no. 13, (June, 1946), p. 350.
32Also called, but in a different context, explicanda
(um) and explicans.
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relationship between the two is symbiotic.
other in direct and significant ways.

Each effects the

A description of phe

nomena will structure the manner in which relations between
phenomena are perceived.

Concomitantly, a general explana

tory framework will help to filter significant factors from
raw perceptions, thus providing guidelines for description.

33

The relation between description and explanation has
been portrayed in various ways.

Some have contended that we

never explain things, we only offer elaborate descriptions
of them.

"The sciences, therefore, achieve what are at best

only elaborate and accurate systems of description, not of
34
eiqplanation."
Others hold that explanation ''strives to go
beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing
35
an explanation of the phenomena it investigates."
Kaplan
has argued that explanations are "concatenated descriptions"
which function "not by invoking something beyond what might
be described but by putting one fact or law into relation
with others.

Because of the concatenation, each element of

what is being described shines, as it were, with light

33See Hanson, op. cit., especially chapter 1 for a
detailed account of this process.
34Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961), p. 26. Nagel is
merely stating a position. It is not his own.
35
Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Expla
nation," in Herbert Feigl and May Broadbeck, eds., Readings
in the Philosophy of Science, (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1953), p. 319.
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reflected from all others...."

36

. .
Another position states

that explanation is the reduction of the unfamiliar to the
37
familiar.
Aside from demonstrating the vitality (and
ambiguity) of the concepts of description and explanation,
this brief recitation presents issues Which, I think, can be
resolved by the understanding proposed in this paper.
First, the debate over whether description is more than
or less than explanation is resolved by viewing them, not as
separate acts, but as aspects of the same process each affect
ing and being affected by the other toward the same purpose,
that of understanding.

Secondly, Kaplan's "concatenated

description" view is subsumed, or is, at least, subsumable,
according to the tenet that explanations are concerned with
relations between phenomena, thus obviating the "when is a
description not a description" circumlocution.

If Kaplan's

concatenated descriptions are simply multiple characteriza
tions of aspects of the phenomenon in question, then these
characterizations function as descriptions.

If they are

characterizations in terms of other related phenomena, and
the nature of the relationship can be stated clearly and
precisely, then the concatenation is ejqplanatory in function.
It should be emphasized that parallel descriptions are not,
of themselves, ejqplanatory.

co:

It is necessary that something

36
Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, (San Francis
Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 329.
37

Hospers, op. cit., pp. 338-340.
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be posited about the nature of the relationship between them
that is sufficient to account for the concatenation in a
systematic way.

Finally, the "esqplanation as the reduction

of the unfamiliar to the familiar" formula becomes a species
or aspect of description, the categorization of phenomena
38
according to common characteristics.
This admittedly does not exhaust all of the issues
concerning explanation, or explanation and description.
Many of these issues will be joined in the next chapters.

It

does, however, demonstrate the utility of the perspective
here proposed, and helps to establish some of the concerns
to follow.
Prediction

A prediction may best be portrayed as a

description projected into some future time.

It describes

a state of affairs which is yet to be experienced.

Like

descriptions, predictions usually deal with characteristics
of particular phenomena or classes of phenomena.

They

generally take the form, "At time so and so, certain con
ditions having been met, such and such will be (become) the
case."

It should be noted that, when used colloquially,

either the specific time or the specific conditions may be

38

This is perhaps a too facile treatment of this charac
terization of explanation, particularly in its nomotheticdeductive and hypothetic-deductive formulations. It should
be noted, in contrast to this view, that Popper characterizes
explanation as the reduction of the "familiar to the unfamil
iar." Quoted in F. A. Hayek, "Degrees of Explanation,"
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 6, pp.
210- 211 .
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omitted from the prediction.

For example, "If the temperao
ture in the room gets above 35 , the ice will melt," or "On
December 14, 1978 at 9:30 a.m., there will be a partial
eclipse of the sun."

When used in its more rigorous sense,

a prediction usually takes the form of a hypothetical state
ment in which both time, stated as a rate of change, and
conditions are stated.

For example, "If the number of polit

ical messages received by a potential voter is increased in
the three days preceding an election, then he will be more
likely to vote in that election."

But this need not be the

case, as in the prediction, "The velocity of this ball when
it hits the ground will be proportional to the time it has
39
fallen."
The general, and almost universally accepted function
of predictions is to act as a check on the truth of eaqplanations.

If a certain set of conditions are posited as being

factors relating phenomena, then these conditions ought to
40
hold for future instances of the same relationship.
If
not, then the explanation is disconfirmed, and other explana, 41
tions are sought.
The damage done to a possible explanation by the dis
covery that its tenets fail to yield accurate predictions,

39

I realize that the conditions supporting these two
predictions are of a different nature. Here, I am interested
only in the form of the prediction.
40
ceteris paribus.
41
. . .
.
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New
York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 40.
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and the number of inaccurate predictions which can be tole
rated before an explanation must be transformed or abandoned
is a matter of some debate.

In fact, the exact nature of

the relationship between explanation and prediction seems to
be a major point of contention among those concerned with
the problem of explanation.

One school takes the position

that esqplanation and prediction are symmetrical, that for
an explanation to be adequate it must also be capable of
42
serving as a prediction.
Another school contends that
symmetry between escplanation and prediction is not a necessary
condition of "adequate" or even "adequate scientific" expla
nations.

Norwood Russell Hanson cites numerous examples of

explanations, or explanatory patterns, having little or no
predictive value, but which, nonetheless, serve to organize
43
phenomena in a meaningful way.
In contrast, Hanson cites
predictions made regularly and routinely for which no esqpla44
nations were offered.

42

•

See, among others, Hempel, Aspects of Scientific
Explanation: Hayek, "Degrees of Esqplanation,"; Braithwaite,
Scientific Explanation: Nagel, The Structure of Science.
43
Norwood Russell Hanson, "On the Symmetry between
Explanation and Prediction," Philosophical Review. vol.
LXVII (July, 1959), pp. 350-351. See also Hanson, Patterns
of Discovery, p. 71 and passim, and Scriven, "Explanations,
Prediction, and Laws," p. 176 ff., among others.
44
Hanson, Ibid., p. 350. As an example of an explanatory
system with little or no predictive value Hanson cites
Aristotle's cosmology. As an example of predictions for
which no ejqolanations were offered, indeed, for which the
possibility of explanation was ruled out, Hanson cites the
astronomy of, among others, Eudoxus and Ptolemy.

One of the problems of stipulating a necessary relation
ship between explanation and prediction concerns the nature
of prediction itself.

Prediction is based on the notion

that similarities of phenomena and between phenomena persist
over time.

This is one of the fundamental principles of the

Western philosophical worldview (the uniformity of nature)
and seems to accord with both experience and with most specu
lation about experience (Hume not to the contrary).

The

problem revolves around the tautological nature of this ren
dering of prediction.
tomorrow morning."

One may predict, "The sun will rise

The prediction will probably (and hope

fully) be a true one.

If the question is asked, "How did

you know this would happen?" the predictor may reply, "It
always has before," or he may cite reasons— the rotation of
the earth.

The first is an esqolanation only in the loosest

sense, and is hardly satisfactory.

There is no necessary

connection between this "explanation" and the prediction.
It leads, quite naturally, to the further question, "Why did
it always do so before?"

The esqplanation is merely postponed.

The second explanation is only slightly better.

It includes

the sun as a reference point and, thus, the phenomenon is
explained in terms of itself. Even if the phenomenon were
45
explained by "laws"
not including the sun, the reference
would still be to past events (repeated occurrences which

4^More will be said of Laws in the next chapter.
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make a law a law), and the event, sunrise, is implied in the
ejqplanation.

The problem, more simply stated, is that the

explanation predisposes us to expect and anticipate the pre
diction because it is part of the explanation, much in the
same way that the botanist in the previous example described
his surroundings according to his primary frame of reference,
plants.

Though the two activities, explanation and predic

tion, are related, they perform different functions.

The

former is concerned with meaning and understanding; the
latter, with justification and control.

To require predicta

bility, even in principle, as a condition of ejqplanation is
to ignore this difference.

To quote Ducasse, "Prediction is

one thing and explanation of predictability is another
46
thing."
Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented a general definition
and a working model of explanation.

The purpose of these

activities has been to provide information about a general
concept of explanation and some of the concerns and problems
such a concept involves.

The next chapters will investigate

a more narrowly circumscribed notion of explanation, that of
scientific explanation.

This will be accomplished through

ACt

C. J. Ducasse, "Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology,"
in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, eds., Readings in
Philosophical Analysis, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1949), p. 541.

an investigation of the "explanatory tool" of science, theory.
I will be particularly interested in what has come to be
called the Standard or Received View account of scientific
explanation and of theory because of the considerable influ
ence it has had upon political and social scientific theory.
Finally, I will attempt to assess the adequacy of the
Received View both as an account of scientific explanation,
and as a guide to the solution of conceptual and theoretical
problems in political and social science.

CHAPTER THREE
Theory
At root, the purpose of science, as distinguished from
technology or engineering, is to offer explanations of a par
ticular kind in an attempt to make the world intelligible. .
It shares in this endeavor with other similar enterprises—
religion, mythology— and with them takes as its goal the
task of discovering or creating order, of changing chaos
into cosmos.
The tool employed by science in this task is theory.
Theory is the particular conceptual device by which science
constructs the world or, at least, its particular worldview.
The precise characteristics of that worldview are a matter
of some controversy, but there is considerable agreement,
particularly among some philosophers of science, that theory
"explains" differently from dogma and myth, the explanatory
"tools" of religion and mythology, respectively.
The nature of the difference of scientific explanation
from other forms has come to be known as "the problem of
47
demarcation."
The problem is an old and vexing one, and

^ K a r l Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New
York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 34. A discussion of the
problem of demarcation is presented here because attempts to
resolve it are directly concerned with the problem of what
should or should not count as a scientific explanation or as
a scientific theory.
64
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it involves as corollaries the problems of induction, and of
meaning.

In its various forms it occupied much of the atten48
tion of Hume and Kant.
Comte was particularly concerned

with it, and his "solution" of the problem is contained in
his notion of the three stages of the development of the
human mind, each of which is characterized by a different
type of explanation and attended by a different form of
49
social organization.
Raymond Aron summarizes Comte's xdeas
in the following way:
The law of the three stages consists in the
assertion that the human mind passes through three
phases. In the first, the mind explains phenomena
by ascribing them to beings or forces comparable to
man himself. In the second phase, that of metaphysics,
the mind explains phenomena by invoicing abstract
entities like "nature." Finally, in the third phase,
man is content to observe phenomena and to establish
the regular links existing among them, whether in a
given moment or in the course of time. He abandons
the search for the final principle behind the facts
and confines-himself to establishing the laws that
govern them. 0
Thus, the point of distinction between scientific and
non-scientific thought for Comte is the abandonment of non
observable entities and forces as explanatory devices in
favor of the description of observed regularities among
natural phenomena.

This alternative carries with it the

consequence that science becomes "simpler," that it makes

48Ibid.
49
Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought.
vol. I, (Garden City: Anchor Doubleday, 1968), p. 76.
50Ibid.

66
fewer ontological assumptions than do other forms of thought.
This entails the methodological consequence that "science"
is to proceed "empirically," that the sine qua non of scien
tific assertions is a foundation in experience through per
ception.

General scientific assertions are the result of

the meticulous observation of particular, concrete natural
phenomena and are simply descriptions of observed regulari
ties.

The direction of inquiry is from the particular to

the general, and it is the formulation of general statements
of observed regularity that is the aim of science.

In short,

science proceeds inductively to laws of a descriptive nature
which are "meaningful" because they are rooted not in specu
lation involving unobservable forces or entities, but in
observation.
The fundamental tenets of Comte's solution to the prob
lem of demarcation were continued and developed in more
recent times by the neo- or logical positivists of the Vienna
Circle and their intellectual descendents.

To the thorough

going methodological inductivism of Comte and John Stuart
Mill, the logical positivists added the epistemological cri
terion of "meaningfulness."

By this was meant that only

those concepts which were derived from experience, that is,
reducible to sense ejqperience or memory of sense experience
51
were meanxngful and subject to verification.
Later formu
lations of this position further reduce the applicability of

^Popper, op. cit. , pp. 34-35.
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the criterion of meaningfulness to the "atomic propositions"
or "protocol statements" of Wittgenstein, Neurath, and Car52
nap.
Sentences which are not directly reducible to data
of sense experience, and, as a consequence, are not induc
tively verifiable, are characterized as "literally sense53
less" and, therefore, devoid of meaning.
A "genuine
statement" is one which is "capable of conclusive verifica54
tion."
"If there is no possible way to determine whether
a statement is true, then the statement has no meaning what
soever.

For the meaning of a statement is its method of
55
verification."
The criterion of demarcation differentiating
scientific from other statements was the verifiability cri
terion of meaning.

Theories, as the explanatory tools of

science, came to be seen, according to this view, as systems
of generalized observation statements which were inductively
56
verifiable.

52

Ibid., pp. 35-36, 95. Carnap's notion of "meaning
fulness" has gone through several formulations. For an
account of this evolution see Popper's "The Demarcation
between Science and Metaphysics," in Conjectures and Refuta
tions, {New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 253-292.
53
A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), p. 31.
^4Morris Schlick cited in Popper, The Logic of Scien
tific Discovery, p. 40.
55Waismann cited in Ibid. It should be noted that in
Language, Truth, and Logic, Ayer presents a modified version
of this extreme verificationism.
5®This, in part, is the foundation of the view, pre
sented in Chapter 2, that science "only describes."
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The resolution of the demarcation problem, and with it,
the at least tacit definition of the form and content of a
scientific theory, presented by the logical positivists of
the Vienna Circle was attacked at its twin foundations,
induction and the verifiability criterion of meaning, by
Karl Popper.

The former, contended Popper, was both "logi

cally inadmissible," and inaccurate as a portrayal of theory
57
construction.
The latter, argued Popper, had the effect
of throwing the baby out with the bath.
Popper rejects the Baconian view that science, and with
it, theory, proceeds from observations, or singular state
ments embodying specific observations, to more general state
ments concerning classes of objects over time.

The view

that scientists collect facts (data), scrutinize them for
relationships or regularities, and then develop theories
capable of "ejqplaining" them is erroneousj science begins
with hypotheses, "conjectures" as Popper calls them, which
guide and direct observation.
inductive but deductive.

It is not fundamentally

Popper credits Kant with this in

sight concerning the conduct of scientific inquiry, saying:
...Kant shows how well he understood that we
ourselves must confront nature with hypotheses and
demand a reply to our questions; and that, lacking
such hypotheses we can only make haphazard observa
tions which follow no plan and which therefore can
never lead us to a natural law. In other words,
Kant saw with perfect clarity that the history of
science had refuted the Baconian myth that we must

^^popper, Ibid.

69
begin with observations in order to derive our
theories from them. And Kant also realized very
clearly that behind this historical fact lay a
logical fact: that there were logical reasons why
this kind of thing did not occur in the history
of science: that it was logically impossible to
derive theories from observations.
This criticism derives from the second part of Popper's
first line of attack on the logical positivist position, the
notion that induction is logically insupportable.

Popper

argues:
Now in my view, there is no such thing as
induction. Thus, inferences to theories, from
singular statements which are "verified by
experience" (Whatever that may mean), is logically
inadmissible. Theories are therefore never empiri
cally verifiable...I am not, of course, here
considering so-called "mathematical induction;"
what I am denying is that there is such a thing as
induction in the so-called "inductive sciences;"
that there are either "inductive procedures" or
"inductive inferences." 9
Popper believes, following Hume, that any attempt to
justify a principle of induction involves either an infinite
regress of principles or, it leads to a Kantian-type a
60
priorism.
Considering the problems of induction to be
insuperable, Popper offers, in its stead, a deductive view of
the nature of theory which he summarizes as "the view that a

Karl Popper, "On the Status of Science and Metaphysics,"
in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 189. This article also
contains an excellent summary of the deductivist view of the
history of science, and demonstrates that the theories of
Kepler, Newton, and others did not proceed from observation
to theory, but vice versa.
59
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 40 and
f.n. (Emphasis in the original).
60Ibid., pp. 28-30.
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hypothesis can only be empirically tested— and only after it
61
has been advanced.11
Popper's second criticism of the logical positivist
position is that the "verifiability theory of meaning" based
on observation and induction not only fails to provide an
adequate principle of demarcation, but also has the effect
of eliminating the most useful and widely accepted theories
of what is commonly accepted as "science."

In criticizing

Carnap's notion of the verifiability criterion, Popper con
tends ,
This criterion excludes from the realm of mean
ing all scientific theories (or "laws of nature”);
for these are no more reducible to observation reports
than so-called metaphysical pseudo-propositions. Thus
the criterion of meaning leads to the wrong demarca
tion of science and metaphysics. This criticism was
accepted by Carnap in his Logical Syntax of Meaning
and in his Testability and Meaning...
If induction is logically inadmissible, or at best
63
superfluous,
and verifiability, which is the methodological
stepchild of inductivism, is inadequate as a criterion of
demarcation, what then remains?

As one might guess, Popper

has a proposal which he considers logically acceptable, con
ceptually and historically accurate in conveying the develop
ment of scientific theory, and which, in addition, provides

61

Ibid., p. 30.

(Emphasis in the original).

52Popper, "The Demarcation between Science and Meta
physics," in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 261.
(Emphasis
in the original).
63 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 29.
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a sufficient criterion of demarcation between scientific and
non-scientific explanation. The remedy to "positivist dog64
matism"
is to be found in the union of the deductive
method and a criterion of falsification.

The deductive

method, Popper understands in the normal way as the deriva
tion of statements of lesser generality from statements of
greater generality.

The deductive inferences from the high65
er to the lower level are what Popper calls explanation.
Deductivism has, for Popper, the merit of escaping the logi
cal dilemma of induction by avoiding a Humean infinite
regress or a Kantian a priorism.

It is also a more accurate

reconstruction of how scientific theory is formulated and
66
has been formulated historically.
Theories in science are
not the result of observation; they cannot be reduced to
observation.

Rather, theories are bold conjectures concern

ing observations:

"Our intellect does not draw its laws

from nature, but tries— with varying degrees of success— to
67
impose upon nature laws which it freely invents."
With
Einstein, Popper views laws as inventions.^

^ I b i d ., p. 38.
65Ibid., p. 277.
66por examples and elaboration, see Popper's "On the
Status of Science and Metaphysics," and "The Demarcation
between Science and Metaphysics," in Conjectures and Refuta
tions.
^^Popper, "On the Status of Science and Metaphysics,"
in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 191. Popper is here
paraphrasing Kant.
®®Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Appendix
XII (Letter from Einstein), p. 458.
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If, as Popper contends, this is an accurate view of
scientific theory, then how is it to be distinguished from
non-scientific speculation?

Part of the solution to this

problem lies in what Popper calls the "deductive testing of
theories" which is described in the following way:
...the method of critically testing theories,
and selecting them according to the results of tests,
always proceeds on the following lines. From a new
idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in
any way— an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical
system, or what will you— conclusions are drawn by
means of logical deduction. These conclusions are
then compared with one another and with other rele
vant statements, so as to find what logical relations
(such as equivalence, derivibility, compatibility,
or incompatibility) exist between them.”®
The testing of a theory is pursued in four possible ways.
First, the conclusions are tested among themselves to make
sure that they are logically consistent.

Second, the theory

is tested to see whether it is empirical in nature or whether
it is tautological.

Third, the theory is compared with

other similar theories to determine whether or not it would
add to the understanding of the phenomenon in question, if
it were to prove empirically supportable.

Finally, the

theory is tested by empirical application of the conclusions
70
(predictions) derived from it.
Although the proposed deductive approach avoids the
logical deficiencies of inductivism while still providing an

69Ibid., p. 32.
70Ibid., pp. 32-34.
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adequate methodology for the testing of conjectures, it is
not yet sufficient to provide a criterion of demarcation.
Such a criterion is provided, according to Popper, by the
idea of falsification.

Stated simply:

"It must be possible

for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experi71
ence."
Popper has two reasons for proposing falsification.
The first is a logical consideration concerning the relations
between singular and universal statements.

The relation is

this:

no singular statement is sufficient to verify a uni72
versal statement; but, under appropriate conditions,
a
73
singular statement can falsify a universal statement.
Thus
for Popper falsification is logically a more pragmatic strat
egy.
The second reason is epistemological, having to do with
truth and our means of approaching it.

Truth, for Popper,

is a fragile and elusive thing which, somewhat paradoxically,
must be pursued boldly by means of audacious assertions which
can potentially clash with observations.

The function of a

theory, for Popper, is esqplanation, and "the better theory is
the one that has the greater explanatory power; that explains
more; that explains with greater precision; and that allows

^~*~Ibid., p. 41.
^ Ibid. , p. 86.
^ Ibid., p. 41.

us to make better predictions."

This implies two things.

First, that a theory, in order to make better, more test
able predictions, must eliminate some assertions; that is,
it must refer to a class of events, the existence of which
can serve to refute the conjecture presented.

Such an

assertion cannot be simply a matter of definition, nor a
tautology.

Rather, it must refer to experience in such a

way that the assertion can be confuted. Second, that while
truth, particularly as a regulative idea, is an important
concern, it is not an overriding one.

It is the content of

a theory that is of at least equal importance.

Popper rea

sons:
Yet we also stress that truth is not the only
aim of science. We want more than mere truth: what
we look for is interesting truth— truth which is hard
to come by. And in the natural sciences (as distinct
from mathematics) what we look for is truth which has
a high degree of explanatory power, in a sense_which
implies that it is logically improbable truth.
Popper contends that his emphasis on content is based
on the "simple and obvious" idea that the informational con
tent of any conjunction of statements will always be greater
than, or at least, equal to the informative content of any
of the statements taken singularly.

76

Popper gives the

following example in support of his position:

74Popper, "On the Status of Science and Metaphysics,"
in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 192.
7^Popper, "Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Knowl
edge," in Ibid., p. 229.
(Emphasxs in the original).
76Ibid., p. 217.
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Let "A" be the statement "It will rain on
Friday;" "B" the statement "It will be fine on
Saturday:" and "AB" the statement "It will
on Friday and it will be fine on Saturday."77
The conjunction "AB" clearly contains more information
than either "A" or "B" taken singularly.
consequence that the probability of "AB"

But it hasthe
will be less than

the probability of "A" or "B" taken alone: or, more generally,
as the content of a theory (statement) increases its proba78
bility decreases.
Popper uses this "trivial though funda
mental result" against those who argue that it is the place
of science to propose highly probable (verifiable) state
ments.

If this were adequate, the crowning glory of science

would be trivial, though highly probable, hypotheses.

In

stead, he contends that science should "much prefer an
attempt to solve an interesting problem by bold conjecture,
even (and especially) if it soon turns out to be false, to
any recital of a sequence of irrelevant truisms...because
this is the way we can learn from our mistakes: and in find
ing that our conjecture was false, we shall have learned
79
much about truth...."
Popper argues that if a high informa
tive content is the aim of science, then so, as a consequence,
is potentially low probability, "since a low probability means
a high probability of being falsified, it follows that a

77Ibid.. pp. 217-218.
78Ibid.
79Ibid.. p. 231.

76
high degree of falsifiability, or refutability, or testa
bility, is one of the aims of science— in fact, precisely
the same aim as a high informative content."

80

Finally, Popper argues:
All we can ever hope to say of a theory is that
it explains this or that: that it has been tested
severely, and that it has stood up to all our tests.
We may compare, say, two theories in order to see
which of them has stood up better to our severest
tests— or in other words, which of them is better
corroborated by the results of our tests. But it
can be shown by mathematical means that degree of
corroboration can never be equated with mathematical
probability...This logical analysis shows that
esqperience does not consist in the mechanical accumu
lation of observation. Experience is creative. It
is the result of free, bold and creative interpretations,
controlled by severe criticisms and severe tests . ^
Thus, according to Popper's position, the proper criteria of
demarcation between science and non-science, and, by impli
cation, the proper form and purpose of a scientific theory,
is not induction and verificationism as argued by the logi
cal positivists, but a deductive model in which the methodo
logical procedure is falsificationism.
After Popper's criticisms, the nature of the demarca
tion debate changes from deciding on a principle of demarca
tion, to the more specific problem of determining the proper
structure and function of scientific theory.

As might be

expected, Popper's views were not immediately and congenially
accepted.

Reichenbach, for example, perhaps in an attempt to

80Ibid., p. 219.
8^Popper, op. cit., pp. 192-193.
original).

(Emphasis in the
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salvage induction, and with it, verification, argued that
there was a difference between the formulation of theories
and the justification of theories, between what he called
the "context of discovery" and the "context of justifica82
tion."
Popper had confused the two, and whereas induction
and verification perhaps did not operate in the former, they
were certainly germane to the latter.

Attention thus shifted

to the justification of theories and of scientific explana
tion.

The "Deductive-Nomothetic Model" {which will be pre

sented as the "Received View" of scientific explanation) can
be viewed as a reconstructed logic of justification incorpo
rating Popper's deductive model and a modified version of the
83
verifiability theory of meaning.
The acceptance of this
view, or a variation of it, has become a criterion for dis
cerning scientific from non-scientific esqolanation.
What is a Theory?
In its simplest, most reduced form, a theory is generally
taken to be an interrelated set of propositions consisting
of an uninterpreted or partially interpreted calculus, a

82Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophical Significance of
the Theory of Relativity," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck,
eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p. 197.
83

This modification is based on a reinterpretation of
verifiability in terms of probability and/or verifiabilityin-principle. Popper, by the way, finds this little more
satisfactory than the older "naive" verificationism and
still argues for an admittedly modified falsificationist
strategy.

78
84
non-logical vocabulary, and a set of correspondence rules.
Some writers on the structure of theory add to these basic
components another feature, a "model" or "interpretation"
85
of the theory.
A calculus is the "logical skeleton" of a
86
theory.
It consists of rules or procedures for stating
logical relations among the elements in the theory such as
combinations, identities, distinctions, disjunctions, and
legitimate inferences.

In addition to these logical compo

nents, a theory also contains "primitive" (i.e., undefined)
or "theoretical" terms, and "observation" terms which, taken
together, form the non-logical "vocabulary" of the theory.
A primitive or theoretical term is one which is understand
able only in the context of the theory in which it appears.
Its meaning, to a large extent, "derives from the part it
87
plays in the whole theory."
"Electron," "point," "Oedipus
Complex," and "functional prerequisites" are examples of
theoretical terms.

They are distinguished, in the non-logi

cal vocabulary of the theory, from observation terms.

Obser

vation terms refer directly to publicly observable phenomena

84.

Proponents of this view of theory include: R. B.
Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1960), Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961), and Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," in Feigl
and Brodbeck, Ibid., pp. 319-352, among others.
85

See, for example, Braithwaite, Ibid., chapt. IV, and
Nagel, Ibid., pp. 90 ff.
®®Nagel, Ibid., p. 90.
87

co:

Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, (San Francis
Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 56.
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(things, events, etc.), observable qualities or attributes
of phenomena, and/or gross, easily perceived relations
between observable phenomena.

The meaning of observation

terms is specified by their correspondence with directly
observable phenomena via the five basic senses.

Examples

of observation terms include red, hard, large, cold, and
their relational forms (e.g. redder than, harder than,
larger than, etc.).

Taken together, the calculus of a

theory provides the logical framework according to which
elements are defined and inferences are made, along with a
specification of the domain of the theory as designated by
the theoretical and observational vocabulary, and to which
the logical components of the calculus are applied.
The second component of the standard sketch of the
structure of a theory consists of what are variously called
"correspondence rules," "dictionaries," "operational defi
nitions," "epistemic correlations," "coordinating defini88
tions," or "rules of interpretation."
A calculus, of the
type described above is not sufficient to discriminate a
scientific theory from other forms of explanation.

Taken by

itself, a calculus could be simply an exercise in mathematics,
symbolic logic, or abstract thought.

The symbolic formula

tions contained in the calculus must be related more

®®See Nagel, op. cit., p. 93, or Frederick Suppe, "What's
Wrong With the Received View on the Structure of Scientific
Theories?" Philosophy of Science, Vol. 39 (March, 1972),
p. 3.
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specifically and directly to the phenomena being considered.
Observation terms, which simply denote language for identi
fying these phenomena, are not of themselves adequate to
this task.

In addition, there must be some way of relating

the phenomena being investigated, including the language by
which it is symbolized, with the logical apparatus and theo
retical terms of the theory.

This, according to most philos

ophers of science, is achieved through the agency of corre
spondence rules.
The precise nature and function of rules of correspond
ence is a matter of some controversy even among proponents
of this more or less standard sketch of the structure of a
theory.

The answer to the question, "What is a correspondence

rule?" entails an answer to questions concerning the precise
relation between observation and theory, the "reality" status
of theoretical entities, the problem of measurement, and the
appropriate method (model) for interpreting a theory (i.e.,
89
is a theory a description, an analogy, an instrument).
Despite this lack of concensus, and the "relatively vague
90
schema"
by means of which correspondence rules are presented,
there are certain shared features among versions presented by

®^See, for example, Nagel, Ibid., p. 95 ff., and Wil
fred Sellars, "The Language of Theories," in Herbert Peigl
and Grover Maxwell, eds., Current Issues in the Philosophy
of Science, (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1961),
p. 59 ff.
^Patrick Suppes, "What is a Scientific Theory?" in Sid
ney Morgenbesser, ed., Philosophy of Science Today, (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1967), pp. 56-57.
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various philosophers of science.

The correspondence rules

of a theory are taken as linking, in some way, theory with
observation.

They are seen as "a set of rules that assign

an empirical content to the logical calculus...."

91

As I

see it, there are basically three types of correspondence
rules.

First, these sets of rules may be semantic, in

which case they provide the basis for translating or inter
preting theoretical terms or statements according to obser
vational terms or statements.

Second, they may be "material"

in which case they would provide for the correlation of
conceptual constructs with things which are observable.

Or

third, they may be methodological in which case they would
establish the means for locating and measuring in the empiri
cal world properties posited in the theoretical vocabulary.
Despite the dispute over the proper interpretation, most
advocates of this view of theory agree that correspondence
rules are that part of the theory which serves as a nexus
between the theory, as a system of concepts about phenomena
or relations between phenomena, and the "actual" phenomena
itself, as it exists independently of the theory.

Corre

spondence rules are, to some extent, instructions, guide
lines, or ideas about how to relate the concepts of the theory
to the "objective," "empirical" world.

As such correspondence

rules would answer such questions, which may be asked of a

91,.
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Ibid.
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theory, as "How are these ideas related to (whatever is being
investigated)?" "What indications are there that (the proper
ties, relations, etc.) designated in the theory are opera
tive?," or, "What does this (object of investigation) mean
in terms of this (framework of the theory)?."
This, then, is the standard or Received View of what a
scientific theory, reduced to its essential elements, should
be.

These elements include an uninterpreted or partially

interpreted logical language on calculus, a non-logical
vocabulary, and a set of correspondence rules.

As was men

tioned, this view is controversial, both among proponents of
the Received View who, accepting the basic skeleton, would
argue over the arrangement and labeling of the parts, and
among opponents who seek to disarticulate the skeleton, con
tending that although it has its merits, it is inadequate in
the final analysis as a description of a theory.

A particu

larly damaging counterargument, one which strikes at the
foundation of the Received View, attacks the apparently cen
tral assumption that it is possible to make a meaningful
distinction between theoretical terms and observational terms.
According to Hilary Putnam, the dual dichotomy between obser
vational and theoretical terms and statements is "completely
92
broken-backed."
The problem which suggested the dichotomy,

2Hilary Putnam, "What Theories Are Not," in Ernest
Nagel, Alfred Tarski, and Patrick Suppes, eds., Logic,
Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science, (Stanford: Stan
ford University Press, 1962), p. 241.
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the interpretation of theoretical terms, is a pseudo-problem
arising from the effect of prior epistemological considera
tions, namely those asserting the priority of observation
or sense-data to conceptualization.

Although there are

generally included in treatments of the observation-theory
distinction disclaimers that "no sharp boundaries" separate
observational from theoretical terms, and that "the choice
of an exact line is somewhat arbitrary,"

93

the magnitude of

imprecision, coupled with the failure of "dichotomists" to
provide any but "a very few examples of what would count as
..94
observation terms and what as theoretical terms,"
has
fortified the claim that such a distinction cannot be sus
tained.

As a consequence, problems concerning the nature and

function of correspondence rules lose much of their importance
and immediacy.
Despite these and other difficulties,

95

the Received

View remains very influential, particularly in the social
sciences.

For this reason it should prove instructive to

investigate in depth a more fully articulated reconstruction
of scientific explanation, of theory, and of theory construction

go

Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics,
p. 259, cited in Suppe, pp. cit., p. 5.
94

Suppe, Ibid., p. 4.

9 ^Patrick Suppes, op. cit., pp. 56-57, contends that "it
is unheard of to find a substantive example of a theory
actually worked out as a logical calculus," and that simi
larly, correspondence rules are seldom precisely worked out.
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along the lines of the Received View, that of Carl J. Hem-

Hempel1s Model of Scientific Explanation and Theory
According to Hempel (and Paul Oppenheim), explanation
in the empirical sciences is the quest for answers to the
97
question "Why?".
However, not any response is satisfac
tory.

For an answer to be considered "scientific" it must

fulfill certain structural requirements as well as empiri
cal conditions.
It is Hempel1s position that answers to such questions
are most reliably provided when the phenomenon under inves
tigation is subsumed under a general principle which deals
with phenomena like the one being studied.

Explanation,

for Hempel, is a process whereby a phenomenon is accounted
for when the appropriate general statements concerning events
of its kind are provided.

The phenomenon is seen as being

^®The reasons for choosing Hempel1s reconstruction over
that of other Received View theorists (e.g., Braithwaite,
Campbell, Carnap, Nagel, etc.) are two. First, Hempel's
position, it seems to me, occupies something of a middle
ground, synthesizing the positions of other similar theo
rists, and is, therefore, highly representative of this
group of thinkers as a whole. Second, Hempel has directed
considerable attention to the social sciences, making the
linkages between investigation in these areas of inquiry
and the so-called "hard sciences."
97 Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic
of Explanation," in Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Expla
nation, (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 245. This
seminal article first appeared in Philosophy of Science in
1948, and has been reprinted on many occasions in many
anthologies. Further references will be to the Hempel volume.
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of a kind with other similar phenomena, the occurrence of
which is sufficiently general and consistent that regulari
ties concerning it have been established.

The explanation

of the phenomenon is provided in terms of these appropriate
general statements, and the event is said to be "covered"
by their invocation.

For Hempel, these general statements

take, or should take, the form of laws; and explanation is
the result of an inference from these laws to the particular
phenomenon.

For these reasons, Hempel's model of scientific

explanation has been called the Covering Law model.
The D-N Model of Explanation

The particular Hempelian

formulation of the covering-law model that has received the
most attention, the one in terms of which the Received View
is usually presented is the Deductive-Nomological.

The D-N

model of scientific explanation consists of an explanandum
(a sentence or set of sentences describing the phenomenon to
be explained) and an explanans (a set of sentences intended
to account for the phenomenon).

The explanans has two com

ponents which Hempel labels "C" and "L".

"C" statements
98
are sentences describing "antecedent conditions,"
"particu99
100
lar occurrences,"
"statements of particular fact,"
or

98Hempel, Ibid., p. 249.
99

Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," in Ibid., p. 174.

■^^Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Ibid.,
p. 299.
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101
"particular circumstances."

As such, C statements stip

ulate the initial conditions surrounding the occurrence of
the explanandum as well as the domain of events which can
be used to characterize it.

Ideally, properly formed C

statements establish the "determining conditions" for the
occurrence of the explanandum.

More explicity, C statements

provide the causal conditions for the generation of the
102
explanandum.
In explanation of the D-N variety, the explanandum (E)
is shown to be the result of the occurrence of prior (or,
perhaps, simultaneous) circumstance(s) C.

E is seen as

being of a kind with the sort of phenomena that are dealt
with by the specific C statements presented.

That is, E is

the kind of event that occurs when C conditions are present.
The relationship between C and E is generally given a hypo
thetical formulation,— "If so-and-so is the case (specific
C statements), then so-and-so will follow (E).

Which is to

say, that, certain antecedent conditions having been present,
the specific result will follow.

The euqplanandum, the event

for which an explanation is sought, is thus to be expected
as the result of C.

It is C which is said to account for

E.

101
p. 331.
102

Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in Ibid.,

Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History,"
in Ibid., p. 232 ff.
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The mere co-presence of C followed by E is insufficient
warrant for inferring E because of C.

It is the second com

ponent of the explanans, the L statements, which is responsi
ble for providing the necessary information for linking C
with E.

L statements, in the D-N model of explanation, are

laws.

They are what Hempel calls "statements of strictly
103
universal form."
A statement of strictly universal form
is "...an assertion to the effect that all cases which meet
certain specified conditions will unexceptionally have such
104
and such further consequences."
General laws establish
"systematic connections among empirical facts in such a way
that with their help some empirical occurrences may be
105
inferred...from other such occurrences."
The function of laws in D-N esqplanation is to provide
the linkages between the phenomenon to be explained, and the
conditions capable of generating that phenomenon.

Laws pro

vide the criteria according to which C is relevant to E,
that is, according to which E is adduced to be the result of
C.
Although laws provide the means by which the linkage
between C and E can be made, they are not exclusively rules
of inference.

Rather, they are primarily statements of

empirical regularity and as such egress uniformities about

103Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," p. 175.
104„ . ,
Ibxd.
105
Ibid., p. 177.
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phenomena of a stipulated kind.

The business of providing

the appropriate logical connections between L and C, be
tween C and E , and between L , C, and E is accomplished by
the calculus in terms of which the explanation is structured.
For Hempel, the "proper" logical form of a D-N explanation
is deductive.

The general laws of the D-N model of explana

tion fill the logical role of "major premises" in a deduc
tive argument; but more significantly, they function to
connect discrete empirical events in patterns of general
and necessary regularity.
Hempel makes it clear that it is by the proper invoca
tion of general laws that explanation occurs.

In "Aspects

of Scientific Explanation," he states that "it is in virtue
of such laws that the particular facts cited in the explanans
possess explanatory relevance to the explanandum phenome106
non."
E is seen to be an instance of a regular pattern
of events of a kind which occurs under C conditions and
which may be understood in terms of L. To take a simple
107
example,
an adequate explanation of the phenomenon, E,
or answer to the question, "Why does this oar look bent when
I put it in water," would include a statement of conditions,
C (i.e. There is an oar which is virtually straight, part of
the oar is in water, and part of it is in the air, etc.),

106
107

Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 337.

Something like this example is used by Hempel m
"Studies in the Logic of Esqplanation, " p. 246.
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and the presentation of general laws, L, which deal with
this type of phenomenon (i.e., the Law of Refraction, and
the law that water is an optically denser medium than air).
The explanandum— Why did the oar appear bent?— is accounted
for by the conjunction of C (the oar and its partial immer
sion in water), and L (the laws of Refraction and Optical
Density) which form the explanans.

Clearly, all of these

components are necessary to the explanation.

C by itself

does not account for Ej it merely establishes the conditions
surrounding the event.

L by itself is not sufficiently

specific to directly account for this particular E.

And L

and C alone would only state general expectations for classes
of events which may or may not apply depending upon what it
is that we wish to explain.
The preceding example, along with the earlier informa
tion, implies an additional feature of the D-N model, one
which Hempel considers to be very important.

According to

Hempel, a scientific explanation is fully adequate only when
"its explanans, if taken account of in time, could have
served as a basis for predicting the event in question."

108

For Hempel, explanation and prediction are symmetrical, or
109
structurally identical.
As a consequence, whatever is
said "concerning the logical characteristics of explanation

108Ibid., p. 249.
^88Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 367.
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or prediction will be applicable to either....

The

difference between explanation and prediction is not one of
logical structure; rather, they differ in "certain pragmatic
respects.11

Concerning this pragmatic difference, Hempel

says:
The customary distinction between explanation
and prediction rests mainly on a pragmatic difference
between the two: while in the case of an explana
tion, the final event is known to have happened, and
its determining conditions have to be sought, the
situation is reversed in the case of a prediction:
here, the initial conditions are given and their
"effect"— which in the typical case, has not yet taken
place— is to be determined.
Thus, in the oar example just presented, the explanation
would be considered "adequate" because it could be used to
predict accurately the "bending phenomenon" before its occur
rence.

The difference between explanation and prediction
113
for Hempel xs one of the tense of the explanandum.
The

reason for the symmetry between explanation and prediction
has to do with the logical structure of the esqplanans, par
ticularly with reference to the requirement of the presence,

110Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p.
249.
^^Hempel,

"Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p.

367.
112

Hempel, "The Function of General Laws xn Hxstory,"

p. 234.
113This also applies to what Hempel, following Reichenbach, calls "post-diction," i.e., the explanation of histori
cal (past) events. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma,"
pp. 173-174.
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in the ejqplanans, of general laws or universal hypotheses.
Hempel says that the condition that every adequate explana
tion is potentially a prediction,
... is an almost trivial truth in the case of
D-N explanation, since here the explanans logically
implies the explanandum. But it is also supported
by a more general principle, which applies to other
types of esqslanation as well, and which expresses,
I would submit, a general condition of adequacy for
any rationally acceptible explanation of a particu
lar event. That condition is the following: any
rationally acceptible answer to the question "Why
did event X occur?" must offer information which
shows that X was to be expected— if not definitely,
as in the case of D-N eaqplanation, then at least
with reasonable probability. Thus, the eaqplanatory
information must provide good grounds for believing
that X did in fact occur; otherwise, that informa
tion would give us no adequate reason for saying:
"That explains it— that shows why X occurred."
And an explanatory account that satisfies this
condition constitutes, of course, a potential pre
diction in the sense that it could have served to
predict the occurrence of X...if the information
contained in the explanans had been available at a
suitable earlier time.114
The D-N model of scientific explanation may be summa
rized by the following schematization, and the four logical
and empirical conditions of adequacy.

A D-N explanation

takes the following form:
C , C ,
1
2

c

L , L ,
L 1
2

L

k
Explanans

Logical
Deduction

■

■

■

I

r

E

^■^Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," pp.
367-368.
(Emphasis in the original).
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Where:

C , C , ...,C are statements of antecedent
1 2
1c
conditions.
L , L , ...,L are general laws or universal
1 2
r
hypotheses.
E is a description of the empirical phenomenon
to be explained.-1-^

Such a D-N explanation is considered to be adequate if
116
these conditions are met:
Rl. The explanandum must be a
logical consequence of the explanans; that is, the explananmust be logically deducible from the information contained
in the explanans if the latter is to provide adequate grounds
for the former.

R2. The explanans must contain general laws

and these must be required for the derivation of the ejqplanandum.

(This rule, in addition to stipulating the necessity

of general laws to any adequate explanation, implies the
requirement that the general law(s) must be appropriate to
the explanandum.

This would preclude, for example, the Law

of Inertia from being the L part of the explanans in the
previous oar example.)
cal content.

R3. The explanans must have empiri

It must be capable, at least in principle, of

test by experiment or observation.

R4. The sentences con

stituting the explanans must be true.
explanans must be factually correct.

That is to say, the
The condition applies

not only to the statement of antecedent conditions but also
to the statements of general laws or universal hypotheses.

115

Following Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explana
tion," p. 249.
116
These are derived from Ibid., pp. 246-249.
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While deciding the "truthfulness" of initial conditions is
far from easy, deciding the "truthfulness" of general laws,
117
unless they are purely logical, or analytic,
is extreme
ly difficult.

This, and other problems with the nature of
118
general laws,
has led Hempel to discuss the D-N model m
terms of "potential ejqplanations" employing "law-like"
statements in which all of the above conditions with the
119
possible exception of R4 are successfully met.
However,
if an esqplanation is to be true, condition R4 would natu120
rally have to remain in force.
The D-N model of scientific explanation is not the only
model of scientific explanation provided by Hempel.

Because

of some of the difficulties with the D-N construction (e.g.,
the problem of adequately explicating general laws and/or
hypotheses, the restrictive nature of the model— the class

^Which they all cannot be by Condition R3.
118
Hempel is, of course, aware of all of these diffi
culties concerning the nature of general laws. Basically,
they reduce to the problem of developing an adequate expli
cation of this concept. See Part III in Hempel's "Studies
in the Logic of Esqplanation, " and Section 2.3 in "Aspects of
Scientific Explanation," for a discussion of these difficul
ties. It should be noted that the "facticity" of C state
ments, and their relation to L statements is a more compli
cated problem, particularly for the behavioral sciences, than
Hempel would lead us to believe. A further discussion of
this will follow in the next chapter.
^®Hempel,
120

"Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 388.

Hempel stipulates that "the same formal analysis,
including the four necessary conditions, applies to scien
tific prediction as well as to scientific explanation."
"Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p. 249.
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of "scientific explanations" included by the D-N model under
strict interpretation may be empty, etc.), and because the
D-N model does not cover all forms of scientific explana121
tion generally considered to be adequate,
Hempel pre
sents what he calls the Inductive-Statistical model (I-S)
of explanation.
The I-S Model of Scientific Explanation

The Inductive-

Statistical model of scientific explanation is similar in
its basic form to the D-N model.

The major difference is

an internal one having to do with the nature of the laws
employed in the explanation, and, thus, with the nature of
the conclusions which are permitted.

The law-like state

ments of I-S explanation are probabilistic or statistical.
Whereas the laws of the D-N model, if true, cover all
occurrences of a specified kind under given conditions, the
laws of the I-S model state only the likelihood of an event
of a specified kind occurring under given conditions.

The

explanans of the I-S model, rather than logically entailing
the explanandum, presents evidence at some level of confi
dence.

The explanans offers information relative to the

explanandum; it provides "the grounds or evidence conferring
more or less strong inductive support or confirmation or
122
credibility upon some statement...."

121

That is, all explanation used in science is not
"causal."
122

Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 384.
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Hempel contends that general statements of the kind
described above are "less stringent counterparts of laws
123
that have the universal conditional form"
employed in
D-N explanations.

The characteristic shared by these two

types of laws is that "both make general claims concerning
a class of cases that might be said to be potentially infi124
nite."
A law of basic statistical form refers not simply
to all actual occurrences of an event, but also to all of
its potential instances.

For this reason, it may be said,

in a loose sense, to cover if not all possible occurrences
of a class of events, at least a specified proportion of
those occurrences.
tion.

Such laws designate levels of expecta

They do not permit the judgement that event X will

certainly be accompanied by event Y, but do permit judge
ments of the kind that, given event X it is highly probable
(probable, unlikely) that event Y will occur.
of Y, given X, is evidential not causal.

The occurrence

Ejqplanations of

the I-S form give support to the conclusion that we can
reasonably expect an association of a particular kind.

The

esqplanans of an I-S explanation "confers upon the explanan
dum a more or less high degree of inductive support or of
125
logical {inductive) probability."

^2^Ibid., p. 377.
124Ibid.
125Ibid., p. 385.
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Hempel gives the following schematization of a pro126
posed I-S explanation:
p(G, P) = r
Fb

=

[r]

Gb
Where: p indicates that the statement is a probability
statement.
G and F are events, phenomena, or kinds of
events or phenomena.
b is a specific event or occurrence or phenomena.
r is the statement of probability, between 0 and
1, in the form of a statistical
law for that class of events.
And, "the double line separating the 'premises'
from the 'conclusions' is to signify that the
relation of the former to the latter is not that
of deductive implication but that of inductive
support, the strength of which is indicated in
square brackets."127
Thestatement would

read:

"The probability that G is

F (or thatG is associated with F or

that G occurs when F

occurs) is some number (e.g., .90) or a statement such as
'highly probable,'

'very likely,'

F-type event, or an instance of F.

'improbable.'

It is likely or probable,

then, that "b" is also an instance of G.

126Ibid., p. 399.
^2^Ibid., p. 383.

"b" is an
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A simple, and standard, example may help to clarify
this model.
Let F be the class of all events of the flipping
of a fair coin.
G be heads.
b be a particular flip of the coin.
We Know from past experience, experiment, and/or observa
tion that the probability of a fair coin fairly flipped
turning up heads is .5.
would be:

The statistical law in this case

"The probability of a coin turning up heads (G)

in the class of all possible occurrences of a flip of a fair
coin is .5 (r)."

A particular fair coin, b, is flipped (Fb)

and the likelihood (probability) is .5 that it will turn up
heads (Gb).
This example illustrates all of the features mentioned
about the I-S model of scientific explanation.

The law of

statistical form is a probability statement developed induc
tively.

It makes a claim about a class of events which is

potentially infinite, and gives evidence, or inductive
support, concerning the class of events in question.
In what sense, and under what conditions, does the I-S
model provide an explanation?

What factors external to the

model itself must be considered?

Concerning the first ques

tion, it is more difficult to determine what Hempel would
count as an adequate I-S explanation than was the case with
D-N explanation.
this form.

He gives no "conditions of adequacy" for

Part of the reason for this lies in the nature

of inductive explanation itself.

A properly constructed

98
inductive explanation is not a "proof" in the same sense
that a properly formed deductive explanation would be.
Rather, it is an evidence-presenting form.
not the necessary, but the probable.

Its domain is

Even if it were to

satisfy a set of valid, binding "conditions of adequacy,"
if such a set were to be constructed, its application to
particular phenomena would not hold for every case, but only
for a stated proportion of those cases.

This characteristic

presents a corollary problem— at what level of probability
(the r statement) must the esqplanans confirm the esqplanandum?

Hempel contends that, "of course, an argument of this

kind will count as explanatory only if the number r is fair
ly close to 1.

But it seems impossible, without being

arbitrary, to designate any particular number, say .8, as
the minimum value of the probability r permissible in an
128
eaqplanation. "
In spite of this ambiguity, Hempel is firm in his asser
tion that probabilistic arguments are esqplanatory:
It is also sometimes thought that because
probabilistic arguments are not logically conclu
sive they cannot serve to explain; for even if the
explanans is true, it is possible that the explanan
dum phenomenon might not have come about.... But
this objection to the idea of probabilistic eaqplanation rests on a too restrictive conception of
scientific explanation; for many important eaqplanatory accounts offered by empirical science make

1 pQ

Ibid., p. 390. Hempel is here referring to the
particular circumstance of eaqplanation of individual cases;
the point, I think, holds generally.
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quite explicit use of statistical laws which, in
conjunction with the rest of the esqjlanatory infor
mation adduced, make the esqplanandum no more than
highly probable.
Further, he argues:
...accounts in terms of statistical laws or
theories thus play a very important role in science.
Rather than deny them explanatory status on the
ground that non-realization of the eaqalanandum is
compatible with the explanans, we have to acknowledge
that they constitute explanations of a distinct logi
cal character, reflecting, we might say, a different
sense of the word "because".... Statistical explana
tion in the sense here under consideration...sets
forth what might be called a statistical-probabilis
tic concept of "because,"— in contradistinction to
a strictly deterministic one, which would correspond
to deductive-nomological explanation.
Taking for granted, for the time being, Hempel's asser
tion that I-S arguments are at least potentially explanatory,
albeit in a different sense of the term from D-N type esqplanation, what factors external to the model itself effect its
"explanatoriness?"

Hempel cites two significant factors

which he calls "epistemic relativity," and the "requirement

129Ibid., p. 391.
130
Ibid., p. 393. This argument is preceded by three
examples of the use of I-S-type explanation in science—
genetics, radioactive decay, and Einstein's explanation of
Brownian Movement. Implicit in the use of these examples to
justify calling the I-S form "explanatory" is the idea that
"science is as science does" which is unexceptional were it
not for the fact that later in the same essay Hempel says
that, "...These models (D-N and I-S) are not meant to des
cribe how working scientists actually formulate their esqplan'
atory accounts. Their purpose is rather to indicate in
reasonably precise terms the logical structure and rationale
of various ways in which empirical science answers explana
tion-seeking why-questions." Ibid., p. 412. More will be
said about this in the next chapter.

100
of maximal specificity."

The epistemic relativity of I-S

explanations derives not only from its previously mentioned
ambiguity (i.e., the possibility that the explanandum might
not come about even if the explanans is "true") but also
from the fact that I-S explanation, because it is inductive
in nature, is dependent upon a particular "knowledge situa131
tion."
An I-S explanation is dependent upon the nature
and degree of available information about a particular situ
ation, more than is a D-N explanation.

There occurs, in I-S

explanation, the possibility that "for a proposed probabilis
tic explanation with true explanans which confers near cer
tainty upon a particular event, there will often exist a
rival argument of the same probabilistic form and with
equally true premises which confers near certainty upon the
132
non-occurrence of the same event."
The adequacy of an
I-S esqplanation is effected by the kind of information avail
able and employed in the probabilistic framework.

From the

same total set of accepted scientific statements rival sets
of premises can be drawn which lead us to expect that the
133
phenomenon both will and will not occur.
Hempel provides

131ibid., pp. 395-396.
132

Ibid., pp. 394-395. Hempel continues, "This predic
ament has no analogue in the case of deductive explanation:
for if the premises of a proposed deductive explanation are
true, then so is its conclusions, and its contradictory,
being false, cannot be a logical consequence of a rival set
of premises that are equally true."
l33Ibid., p. 396.

101
the following example.

134

.

.

.

.

A patient is ill with a strep

tococcal infection and is treated with large doses of peni
cillin.

We know probabilistically, i.e., in most cases,

the recovery rate from such infections given this treatment
is close to 1; and it is very likely that relative to this
body of evidence, the patient will recover.

But if the

particular strain of streptococcus is penicillin-resistant
or if the patient is "an octogenarian with a weak heart,"
the probability of recovery with this treatment is very
small.

Thus, depending upon the information available and

employed from the same knowledge situation, either of the
two occurrences are probable.

Since there are no explicit

criteria (or "conditions of adequacy") for choosing among
the set of possible premises, we are neither compelled nor
constrained in using any information from the knowledge
situation.
In an attempt to remedy this predicament, Hempel pre
sents what he calls the "requirement of maximal specificity"
which states that in formulating an I-S explanation one must
employ "a statistical probability statement pertaining to
the narrowest reference class of which, according to our
information, the particular occurrence under consideration
135
as a member."
Hempel, following Carnap, says that this
requirement is not concerned with the "formal validity" of

134Derived from Ibid., pp. 382, 394, 398.
135Ibid., p. 398.
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inductive logic or inductive argument.

" R a t h e r . i t is a

maxim for the application of inductive logic.

We might say

that it states a necessary condition of rationality of any
such application in a given 'knowledge situation,' which we
will think of as represented by the set...of all basic
136
statements accepted in the situation."
In the example
cited above, if the patient were a weak-hearted eighty year
old with a penicillin resistant infection then that would
constitute the narrowest reference class, and the require
ment of maximal specificity would dictate that the proba
bility statement dealing with that class be employed rather
than the probability statement dealing with the general
association between penicillin treatment and recovery from
streptococcal infection.
Despite the imposition of the "requirement of maximal
specificity," I-S explanation remains relative and knowledge
situation-dependent in that one can never be certain that
all relevant statistical laws in a knowledge situation have
been employed in the esqplanans.

For this reason, I-S expla

nations are not simply weakened forms of D-N esqplanations;
but explanations of a basically different form which, Hempel
contends, nonetheless are genuine explanatory tools within
the domain of science.

*1 Q g

Ibid., p. 397.
(Emphasis in the original). Actually,
here Hempel is citing Carnap's characterization of his "re
quirement of total evidence," (which Hempel finds unsatis
factory) but from the context of the discussion, I think it
is clear that Hempel intends it to similarly characterize his
"requirement of maximal specificity."
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T,C Reconstruction

The preceding discussion deline

ates Hempel's ideas concerning the nature of scientific
explanation, and in so doing, makes reference to theory as
it functions in the context of scientific explanation.

In

order to develop a more complete picture of the role of
theory in scientific explanation, and to bring Hempel1s
account into line with the ideas presented in an earlier
section of this chapter ("What is a Theory"), it will be
necessary to look, briefly, at another of Hempel's reformu137
lations of the explanans/explanandum relationship.
In this reconstruction, Hempel presents the explanans
138
in terms of "the ordered couple of sentences, T,C,"
where
T and C are given a semantic interpretation: that is, they
are analyzed according to the meaning of the language in
which they are formulated.

T and C are expressed by theo

retical and observation terms, implying an at least tacit
139
theoretical/observational term distinction.
The C component

^ Much of this information is a recapitulation of what
was said in the earlier section mentioned above. The reason
for this is that the Received View of theory, like the Re
ceived View of explanation derives largely from Hempel1s
work. I risk what perhaps will appear to be a tedious repe
tition in order to make explicit the specific relationship of
theory, as the "tool" of scientific esqplanation, to scien
tific explanation itself.
*^®Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p. 273.
139
In this section I will only consider the "extralogical" vocabulary of the theory. I will take it as understood
that the T,C formulation includes as a part of the framework
of the explanans, a (minimal) logical syntax expressed by a
deductive calculus of a type discussed in the previous sec
tion. For further information, see Hempel, "Studies in the
Logic of Explanation," p. 270 ff.
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of the T,C reconstruction is written in what is called the
observational vocabulary, the terms of which make explicit
reference to phenomena, dispositions, etc., which are
directly and publicly observable.

The T component is pre

ponderantly written in the theoretical vocabulary: that is,
its terms make reference to "presumptive objects, events,
and attributes which cannot be perceived or otherwise di140
rectly observed by us."
These terms are either undefined
(no definition is given) or they are implicitly defined in
relation to other similar terms.

The T statements serve

the same basic function as L statements in the previous
model.

They provide information concerning general and

systematic relationships between phenomena but do so by
employing concepts which are not, themselves, directly the
result of observation.

In a loose sense, one might say that

they provide the means whereby the observed is accounted
for by the unobserved.

A further analogue between L and T

statements in their respective models is provided by Hempel's
141
, 4
contention that "every law is also a theory."
Laws (L)
and theories (T) serve analogous functions in their respec
tive reconstructions.
The combination T and C is said to account for the
explanandum event, E, when E is (deductively) covered by

^^Hempel,

"The Theoretician's Dilemma," p. 177.

141Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p.
272.
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the esqalanans.

Neither T nor C alone constitute an ade

quate scientific theory for the explanation of E.

In order

for T, consisting of at least some non-observable, or theo
retical terms, to account for an observable phenomenon,
there must be some way of translating, interpreting, or
demonstrating its applicability to the phenomenon in ques
tion.

This is the task of C.

The theory, T, is applied to

the explanandum by rules of correspondence, C.

Rules of

correspondence link the conceptual, abstract, generalized,
systematically-related entities of the theory with the
empirical, concrete, observable phenomena of the explanan
dum.

They provide an interpretation or a translation of

theoretical terms by observation terms.

This, in turn,

delineates the conditions and range of permissible applica
tions of the theory to the explanandum.

Through the "good

offices" of the correspondence rules, the theory gains
empirical relevance; it is correlated to the empirical phe
nomenon, and thus becomes "cognitively significant" within
142
the framework of an empiricist epistemology.
The problem of determining precisely how the correspond
ence rules link the explanatory artifices, expressed by
theoretical terms, with the phenomenon to be explained is a
particularly vexing one.

Several attempts have been made

to specify the nature of this relationship by positing

1AO

Hempel, "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Signifi
cance," p. 101 passim.
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specific functions to correspondence rules.

Some approaches

seek the complete elimination of theoretical terms; and
their replacement by strictly observational terms, and
correspondence rules, formulated via Craig's Theorem or by
Ramsey Sentences, are the devices of this elimination.
Other approaches, for example, Carnap's "bilateral reduction
sentences," attempt to specify the range of meaning for
theoretical terms in experimental application.

Still other

approaches, such as operationalism, envision correspondence
rules as rules of measurement.

For the operationalist the

meaning of a theoretical term is nothing other than the
.
.
143
experimental procedure by which it is measured.
It is
generally agreed that none of these approaches is adequate
to provide a total and complete interpretation of the mean
ing of theoretical terms.

The result of the failure of

these several attempts to replace completely theoretical by
observational terms has been complex and mixed.

Whereas

theoretical terms have come to be seen as not only indispensible but also essential to scientific explanation, the
continuing quandary of how observable phenomena can be
accounted for by things unobservable remains.

The problem,

as formulated, strikes at the heart of scientific in contra
distinction to other forms of explanation, and thus at the

143

For a discussion and criticism of these various
attempts, see Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma,'' pp. 187217.
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"demarcation problem" discussed earlier.

It also presents

the issue of whether theoretical terms refer to anything
"real" or whether they are merely "convenient fictions"
useful in "explaining" observable phenomena.
Despite these several difficulties, a consistent view
of the nature of scientific explanation and the relation
ship between it and theory, according to Hempel1s and the
Received View, can be summarized as follows.

The scien

tific explanation of a phenomenon entails its subsumption
under principles of general regularity which deal with
phenomena of the kind in question.

The relationship between

the explanandum and the explanans may be either deductive
or inductive depending upon whether the principles of
general regularity are laws or probability statements.

The

former explanatory relationship is the stronger of the two,
and provides the paradigm case for scientific esqplanation.
Scientific explanations are formulated in terms of theories
which consist conjointly of a logical apparatus, theoreti
cal terms expressed in laws or probability statements, and
rules of correspondence which establish initial and boundary
conditions, as well as criteria for applying the general
and systematic constructs of the theory to the event to be
explained.

A science is said to progress or develop when

laws explaining particular kinds of events are subsumed by
still more general theories which account for and cover the
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occurrence of these regularities themselves.

144

Thus, not

only is the structure of scientific e:sq?lanations and scien
tific theories (predominantly) deductive, but so is that
of science.

Science can be seen as a unified enterprise

sharing not only a common structure, but also a content in
which particular sciences are architechtonically related
according to levels of generality wherein the more general
145
is said to account for the less general.
It remains to demonstrate the influence of the Received
View on political science, and on the social sciences gen
erally, and to assess its utility in developing an adequate
and appropriate understanding of explanation and of theory
for these areas of inquiry.

This enterprise is the concern

of the next two chapters.

144por more information on this view of the development
of science by reduction, see, for example, Hempel, "Aspects
of Scientific Explanation," pp. 343-347.
■L^‘3Por example, from the "Unity of Science" approach,
biology, within itself an area of scientific inquiry, may be
reduced to (accounted for) by chemistry, which, in turn, may
be reduced to (accounted for) by physics.

CHAPTER FOUR
The Received View in Political and Social Theory
The impact of the Received View (R.V.) on political and
social theory may best be demonstrated through the writings
of philosophers of science who are interested in and write
about the social sciences, through the work of social scien
tists who are concerned with the development of a "scientific"
approach to the study of social phenomena, and through the
work of social theorists who recommend strategies for the
construction of adequate, scientific social theories, or who
develop theories along the lines suggested by the R.V. recon
struction.

After presenting examples of the work of each of

these categories of thinkers, I will address several of the
concerns and problems which dominate the R.V. approach to
political and social theory.
Among the R.V. philosophers of science who have written
on the social sciences, it is not surprising that all con
sider the D-N or I-S model, in one form or another, appli
cation to the problem of explanation and theory construction
in the social sciences.

The differences between the physi

cal or natural sciences and the social sciences are considered
to be differences of degree rather than of kind:

degree of

precision; degree of abstraction or generalizability of law
like statements; degree of verifiability; and the like.
109

The
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structure of an adequate scientific explanation and the
procedures for justifying esqolanations are considered to
be invariant across disciplines.

Hempel argues that, "The

decisive requirement for every sound explanation remains
146
that it subsume the explanandum under general laws,"
and
that this requirement holds for the social sciences.
The purpose of scientific explanation whether in the
physical or social sciences, according to Hempel, is to
show that the event (phenomenon) in question occurred not
as "a matter of chance, but was to be expected" given
specifiable antecedent conditions.

"The esqjectation," he

continues, "...is not prophecy or divination, but rational
scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of
general laws."
Hempel contends that the social sciences, he cites
sociology and history specifically, use something like
general laws in presenting their explanations.

The differ

ence between explanations in the social and natural sciences
is that, in the former, these laws are not explicitly
stated.

Hempel sees two possible reasons for this.

First,

it is often assumed that the laws used are familiar to
everyone, and, thus, are taken for granted.

Second, it

l^Carl Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation,"
Aspects of Scientific Explanation, (New York: The Free
Press, 1965), p. 258.
147

Carl Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in
History," in Ibid., p. 235.
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would, in most cases, be very difficult to formulate the
laws and their supporting assumptions in a manner which was
both precise and consistent with "all the relevant empiri148
cal evidence available."
Despite their frequent implic
itness and imprecision, Hempel contends that such laws are
readily used to link initial conditions and the event to
be explained.

The laws and, hence, the link between con

ditions and event may be formulated either deterministically
{i.e., as general "causal" laws), or, as will more likely
be the case, as probability statements.

The main problem

for Hempel is not so much the manner of their construction
as it is the ambiguity and general lack of clarity of their
implementation. 149
Because of the elliptical nature of explanations in
the social sciences, Hempel prefers to call them "explana150
tion sketches."
An esqplanation sketch "consists of a
more or less vague indication of the laws and initial con
ditions considered as relevant, and it needs 'filling out'
151
in order to turn into a full-fledged explanation." ^ Such
a "filling out" is accomplished by "further empirical re
search, the direction for which is indicated by the explana
tion sketch itself, and the specific statements of initial
conditions and linkages generated by the sketch are to be

148Ibid., p. 236.
149Ibid., pp. 237-238.
150
Ibid., p. 238.
151

Ibid.
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testable.

The process of pointing to and testing which de

rives from the explanation sketch leads to greater precision
in formulation.

The number of possible initial conditions is

reduced by test; the kind of information considered to be
germane to the explanation is more rigorously specified, and
the general principles linking conditions to phenomenon are
more carefully articulated.
To recapitulate, Hempel sees no essential difference
between the structure of scientific explanation in the natu
ral and the social sciences.

In both, adequate explanations

are the result of specifying the relationship between initial
conditions and the event to be explained by invoking general
principles, either deterministic or probabilistic, which
cover such relationships.

Because of the elliptical manner

in which explanations are presented and because of the prob
lems of fully articulating laws in the social sciences, they
are better characterized as explanation sketches.

An expla

nation sketch is a potential candidate for an esqolanation if
it indicates, albeit vaguely, laws and initial conditions
capable of accounting for the phenomenon in question and then
only if these vague laws and initial conditions can be sub
jected to empirical test.

Esqplanation sketches become more

fully articulated, and more precise, through this testing
procedure.

By implication, most social scientific explana

tions , given the condition that they are empirical in nature
(i.e., testable), are explanation sketches.

As such, they

are subject to more precise and explicit formulation.

This,

it may be assumed, is to be accomplished by a rigorous test
ing of predictions which are generated from the logical
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consequences of the explanation sketch.

Those predictions

supported by, or not refuted by, the test procedures remain
as part of the improved eaqplanation sketch.

For example,

if from the ejqplanation sketch it is predicted that five
initial conditions are related, either necessarily or at
some (high) level of probability, to a phenomenon, and an
adequate test of the prediction yields the constant or con
sistent occurrence of three, then these three initial con
ditions are retained as part of the succeeding explanation
sketch and the other two are eliminated.

As a consequence

of the elimination of two initial conditions, the general
principle governing the relationship is further specified.
In this manner, the general tenets of the basic covering
law model are maintained, as is the Hempelian condition
regarding the symmetry of explanation and prediction.

Fur

ther, it is evident that Hempel is not only describing the
basic identity of natural and social scientific explanation,
but he is also prescribing a model for the development of
increasingly scientific patterns of explanation in social
152
science.

152
Although Hempel holds out the prospect of achieving
"scientific" eaqplanation to the social sciences, he is par
ticularly hard in evaluating such attempts by social scien
tists. See, for example, his discussion of functionalism
in "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Hempel, Ibid. pp.
297-330. In this essay he contends that, although "the
functionalist mode of approach has proved illuminating,
suggestive, and fruitful in many contexts" (p. 330) its
"explanatory import" is "limited and precarious" (p. 314),
and its predictive ability results from concepts which, far
from being empirical, are really "covert tautologies" (p.
316ff.). See also, "Typological Methods in the Natural and
Social Sciences" in the same volume.

114
Ernest Nagel is another philosopher of science who is
generally considered to be a proponent of the R.V. and who
argues for the applicability of R.V. tenets of scientific
explanation to the social sciences.

After a lengthy inves

tigation of the usual objections presented against the use
of "the e^qplanatory systems and logical methods of the
natural sciences as models to be emulated in social re153
search,"
Nagel concludes, "the net outcome of the dis
cussion... is that none of the methodological difficulties
often alleged to confront the search for systematic esqplanations of social phenomena is unique to the social sciences
154
or is inherently insuperable."
The major difference
between explanations in the social and physical sciences is
to be found in the kinds of generalizations which each
employ.

Whereas many branches of science have succeeded in

providing explanations in terms of universal laws stating
invariant relationships for all phenomena within their
domain of application, the generalizations of the social
sciences are, for the most part, statistical or probabilistic in nature, and even then, of a low order of generality.
There are two reasons for this.
the terms used in each.

155

The first has to do with

The "laws" of natural science employ

153

Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961), p. 448.
154Ibid., p. 503.
155Ibid., pp. 503-504.
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terms, the criteria of application for Which are precisely
and unambiguously designated.

The terms used in "empirical

social study," Nagel argues,
are, for the most part, adaptations of distinctions
employed in everyday discussions of social questions,
and are often used in formulating empirical generali
zations with little redefinition of their vague,
common-sense meanings....Moreover, even when the
meaning of a term is made relatively precise, the
precision is frequently achieved by way of some
essentially statistical procedure, so that the
items falling into its intended designation can
possess different specific forms of the property
connoted by the t e r m . 156
Even those terms which are precise and non-probabilistically formulated (he gives as examples of these, "foreignborn" and "voting in the last election) refer to "classes
of individuals who often vary widely in other characteristics
15
which may be highly relevant to the problem under inquiry."
As a consequence, the terms used in social scientific gener
alizations tend to be "indeterministic;" "they codify less
refined or detailed distinctions," and "the items subsumed
under them are less homogeneous in pertinent respects" than
158
the terms employed in natural science generalizations.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that, if the terms
employed are ambiguous and imprecise, then it is to be
expected that the relations between these terms will not

156Ibid.. p. 506.
157Ibid.
158Ibid.
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admit of precise and invariant formulation— thus, the sta
tistical formulation of social science generalizations.
this Nagel adds the expected injunction:

To

"The obvious

moral...is that social scientists should...develop more dis
criminating classifications of social phenomena, if strictly
159
universal social laws are to be established."
The second reason for the statistical nature of social
generalizations has to do with the failure of the social sci
ences to employ what Nagel calls "a successful logical strat160
egy" which is frequently used in the natural sciences.
Nagel notes that the empirical evidence for the universal
laws of the physical sciences is frequently imperfect.

In

fact, had these laws been formulated strictly on the basis
of observation, they too would be statistical.

Instead, the

strategy employed assumed that the laws stated were univer
sally valid under ideal conditions or for pure cases.

Be

cause of the precision of the terms and relationships
utilized, the discrepancy between observed and postulated
occurrences could be systematically accounted for.

The

social sciences have followed a strategy of seeking "to
establish relations of dependence between phenomena by
161
correlating raw data."
The reason for this, Nagel believes,

159Ibid., pp. 506-507.
160Ibid., p. 508.
161Ibid.
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is that "adequate theoretical notions have not been devel
oped in most of these disciplines to suggest how laws
universally valid for 'pure cases' of social phenomena might
162
be fruitfully formulated."
Because the social sciences
lack these "adequate theoretical notions," when this strategy
has been attempted the discrepancy between observed and
postulated conditions has been considerable, leading the
strategy itself to be severely questioned.

The solution to

this problem, like the solution to the previous one, resides
in the achievement of greater precision, in this case not
so much in terminology, but in specifying "situational fac
tors" (which I, following Hempel, have been calling "initial
conditions") relevant to a particular domain.
It should be noted that this prescription flows from
Nagel's more general treatment of scientific eaqplanation.
As was stated in chapter 3, Nagel is an exponent of that
variation of the R.V. that considers a model to be a vital
component of an adequate scientific explanation or theory.

163

A model may be understood as a representation which aides
in mapping the range of applicability of a theory.

It is

clear from Nagel1s discussion of models that in performing
one of their functions, fleshing out the logical skeleton of

162

Ibid., pp. 508-509. It should be noted that such
attempts have been made, for example, in political science
by Downs and Riker. These efforts will be discussed presently.
163

Ibid., p. 90.
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a theory, models would similarly aid in narrowing the gap
between the observed and idealized initial conditions men
tioned above.

Thus, it can be inferred that the develop

ment of adequate models of a theory can be highly instru
mental for the social sciences in employing the "logical
164
strategy" of the physical sciences.
Despite the primitive and imprecise nature of concep
tualization, the preponderance of statistical generaliza
tions, and the failure to employ successfully the desirable
and plausible logical strategies of the natural sciences,
and while waiting for the implementation of his suggestions
to remedy these deficiencies, Nagel argues that there is,
in empirical social science as it now exists, sufficient
warrant to assert the fundamentally scientific and deductive
nature of social scientific inquiry.

This assertion is

based on the observation that "the social sciences not only
succeed in establishing statistical generalizations, but
165
sometimes also in explaining them...,"
and that they
accomplish this in the same way as do the other sciences:
by considering these statistical generalizations to be prem
ises in an argument of deductive form.

Statistical generali

zations serve as lower-order premises which are subsumed and
explained by premises of greater, more universal, generality.

1

See Ibid., pp. 95-96. The model of a theory is not
intended to be a substitute for conceptual precision nor for
adequate correspondence rules.
165Ibid., p. 501.
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The procedure, according to Nagel, is the same in both the
166
physical and the social sciences.
Richard Rudner is another philosopher of science who
argues for the essential similarity between forms of expla
nation in the social and physical sciences.

There are two

related bases for this assertion, according to Rudner.

The

first is that "the structural characteristics of a social
science theory are precisely the same as those of any other
167
scientific theory."
For Rudner, a theory is a "systemat
ically related set of statements, including some law-like
168
generalizations, that is empirically testable."
The form
of systematic relationship which characterizes a theory is
deductive; and its purpose, derived from "the ideal of
science," is "to give an organized account of the universe—
to connect, to fit together in relations of subsumption the
169
statements embodying the knowledge that has been acquired."
Further, "such an organization is a necessary condition for

1 fifi

Nagel is none too clear about how this procedure
operates in the social sciences. He has discussed this re
duction procedure at some length earlier in The Structure of
Science, and I assume the procedure is the same. Immedi
ately after making this assertion, Nagel begins a discussion
of "varient forms" of interpretation in social inquiry
which, he admits, he borrows from Paul Lazarsfeld. It seems
to be only tangentially related to showing the essentially
deductive structure of social scientific explanation.
X67
Richard Rudner, Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 10.
168Ibid.
169Ibid., p. 11.
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the accomplishment of two of science's chief functions,
explanation and prediction...the sort of systematic re
latedness exemplified among statements of scientific theo170
ries is deductive relatedness."
Rudner1s account of the
structure of a scientific esqplanation is virtually indis
tinguishable from Hempel1s , and includes an account of
explanation as answers to "why" questions, a simplification
of the D-N model, and an emphasis on the symmetry between
explanation and prediction.
The second basis, related, as I have said, to the
first, is that the logic of justification is the same for
both the natural and social sciencesr and this entails that
they both share the same methodology:
To claim that there is a difference in method
ology between two disciplines or two types of disci
plines... is to make a very radical claim. For the
methodology of a scientific discipline is not a
matter of its transient techniques but of its logic
of justification. The method of a science is, in
deed, the rationale on which it bases its acceptance
or rejection of hypotheses or theories. Accordingly,
to hold that the social sciences are methodologically
distinct from the non-social sciences is to hold not
merely (or perhaps not at all) the banal view that
the social sciences employ different techniques of
inquiry, but rather the startling view that the
social sciences require a different logic of inquiry.
To hold such a view, moreover, is to deny that all of
science is characterized by a common logic of justi
fication in its acceptance or rejection of hypoth
eses or theories. 1

171

Ibid., p. 5. Rudner is here distinguishing the uncontroversial claim that the "techniques" of science are
different from the claim that their methodologies are
different.
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In the penultimate chapter of his book, Rudner con
siders the cogency of various arguments to the effect that
the logic of justification of science, in its extended
sense, is not adequate to the special problems of the social
sciences.

These he handles with dispatch; all such claims,

he contends, are based on a mistaken view of scientific
inquiry and/or ambiguity or confusion within the objection
172
itself.
Although he considers some of the special prob
lems of applying the R.V. to the social sciences, he finds,
like Hempel and Nagel, that these are problems of degree to
be resolved in a manner already suggested by Hempel and
Nagel.
To summarize, R.V. philosophers of science who are
interested in the social sciences, and of whom Hempel,
Nagel, and Rudner are representative, argue for the in prin
ciple symmetry between explanation in the natural and social
sciences.

Differences in results obtained in these two

broad areas of inquiry are seen as differences in degree of
precision and theoretical sophistication, and have little,

17?

See Ibid., pp. 68-83. for a detailed account of
these objections and the arguments against them. For a simi
lar treatment of objections to the application of the R.V.
to social inquiry see, for example, "Meaning and Action" and
"Esqplanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect Knowledge' "by May
Brodbeck. Both may be found in Brodbeck, Readings in the
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (New York: The MacMillan
Co., 1968). Similar, but not identical, treatments of social
inquiry by philosophers generally considered to be sympathetic
to the R.V. may be found, for example, in Kaplan. The Con
duct of Inquiry, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company,
1964).
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if anything, to do with any inherent or intractable differ
ences in subject matter.

For the most part, with the

exception of general suggestions as to how to increase pre
cision and theoretical sophistication, arguments for the in
principle applicability are negative in that they demonstrate
that arguments against applying the R.V. to the social
sciences are based on misunderstanding, misinterpretation,
fallacious argument, or ambiguity and confusion inherent in
the objections themselves.
A second source of insight into the influence of the
R.V. on social and political theory and explanation is to be
found in the work of social scientists who are concerned with
the development of a "scientific" approach to the study of
173
social and political phenomena.
One of the most consistent, if not the earliest, pro
ponents of this point of view in political science has been
David Easton.

Easton has long advocated the development of

a scientifically theoretical political science.

It is his

contention that "the search for reliable knowledge about
empirical political phenomena requires ultimately the con
struction of systematic theory, the name for the highest

173

The discussion which follows makes no pretense of
being a complete enumeration. The inclusion of these think
ers is based upon their having written eaqolicitly on the
aforementioned subject, their general acceptance of the
premise that social inquiry is subject to scientific expla
nation, and an (admittedly subjective) assessment of the
impact of their writings on social, and particularly, polit
ical inquiry.
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order of generalization."

174

He further contends that

"political science is too little sensitized to the need for
inquiry into the problems that stand in the way of such a
comprehensive or general theory of political activity,"

175

and that, "without a conscious understanding of the role of
theory and its possibility...political research must remain
fragmentary and heterogeneous, unable to fulfill the promise
176
in its designation as political science."
Easton argues
that "universal generalizations about social relations are
possible," and that it is "to the necessary task of develop
ing verifiable theory" that political science must direct
177
itself.
It is clear that by "systematic theory" Easton intends
theory which is deductive in form and which is capable of
expressing "discoverable uniformities in political behavior"
which have "explanatory and predictive value" and which are
178
"testable in principle by reference to relevant behavior."
The model for the development of this theory is to be found
in the physical sciences, particularly in physics where
"from a few basic premises, empirically derived, it has

l^David Easton, The Political System, (New York:
fred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 4.

Al

^•^Ibid. , p. 5.
176ibid.

(Emphasis in Easton)

^■^ibid., p. 37.
■^®David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 7.

124
proved possible to formulate deductively a whole body of
intermediate theory and from this in turn to predict the
179
occurrence of empirical events,"
which, m their turn,
180
serve as an affirmation or denial of the theory itself.
It is true, Easton says, that for political science as
it now exists "such advanced theory is still in the distant
181
realm of aspiration"
and, further, that the social sci
ences should beware of "the premature and slavish imitation
182
of the physical sciences."
But it is obvious that Easton
intends that these sciences can serve as a guide to the
development of a mature theoretical knowledge of political
phenomena.
There is a deeper and more pervasive influence of the
R.V. of science upon Easton than is indicated by his prescrip
tions for the development of a mature science of politics as
sketched above.

This has to do with his view of the relation

ship between facts and the theories by which they are
explained.

Easton is highly critical of what he considered

to be the dominant trend in political science up to the time
he wrote The Political System.

He labels this trend "hyper-

factualism" and by this term he means an overwhelming concern

■^^Easton, op. cit., p. 58.
180Ibid.
181Ibid.
182Ibid., p. 59.
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with the collection and classification of "data."

This

tendency, which has had as its consequence "theoretical mal183
nutrition and a surfeit of facts,"
is the result of an
inadequate view of the nature of science, a view which sees
science as being primarily descriptive of individual phenom
ena and cumulative only when the collection of facts "yield"
singular generalizations derived inductively.

This is, for

the most part, an older view of science, a view similar to
that of the early Vienna Circle that was so severely criticized by Popper. 184

The R.V. supplanted this older version

of science and it is to the R.V. that Easton turns for his
critique, and for his ideas about the nature of science.

He

shares with this newer version of scientific inquiry his
opinions about the relation between theory and facts.

It

is clear from his criticisms of "hyperfactualism" that his
major objection to it is that it will never result in the
kinds of systematic generalization capable of organizing
information and providing the conceptual basis for directing
and evaluating research.

To put it a little differently,

from the accumulation of particular facts, one cannot arrive
at systematic (i.e., deductive) theory.

Or, more simply yet,

you can't get there from here.

183T, . ,
n n
Ibid., p. 77.
IQ A

See chapter 3 for a full discussion of this older
view and Popper's criticism of it.
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The view of science which emerges from his criticisms
is one in which the emphasis is placed on its organizational
and explanatory function.

Rather than science being an

accumulation of facts to which theory is an afterthought 7
for Easton, as for the R.V. philosophers, science is explan
atory and theory serves a central function in providing
structure to research:
It begins with a few postulates of empirical
reference and from these deduces a series of
narrower generalizations. Prom these, in turn,
stem singular generalizations capable of empiri
cal test. This is the theoretical system which
serves as an analytic model of the concrete
political system.
A second political scientist who is concerned with the
development of scientific political and social inquiry is
Karl Deutsch.

Deutsch discusses theory in terms of "models."

For Deutsch, a model is a conceptual structure intended "to
186
aid the economy and power of our thinking."
It codifies
"an agreement on...basic assumptions and methods."

187

For

a model to be effective, it must "lead to inferences capable
of being confirmed or refuted by repeatable physical opera
tions, and...it must lead to new observations and esqperi188
ments."
It guides research by pointing to questions

185Ibid., p. 58.
186
Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. (New York:
The Free Press, 1966), p. xxv.
187Ibid., p.3.
188Ibid., p. 4.
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worth ashing, propositions worth verifying or disproving
189
and data worth collecting.
For Deutsch a model has four functions in scientific
inquiry.

First, it serves an organizing function; it serves

"to order and relate disjointed data...to show similarities
or connections between them that had previously remained
unperceived, (and) to make isolated pieces of information
190
fall suddenly into a meaningful pattern...."
Second, a
model serves a heuristic/explanatory function.

It places

information into an understandable pattern and points the
191
way to the discovery of "new facts and new methods;"
that
19
is, it tells us "where to look for something interesting."
Third, a model serves a predictive function.

It suggests

"ways of looking for new knowledge, and help(s) to predict
regularities that may or may not be confirmed by later
193
experience or measurement."
It provides a conjecture as
to "the pattern of the distribution of a set of known data
and (extends), tentatively, a similar pattern into some area
of space or some period of time, from which we have as yet

189Ibid.
~^98Ibid. , p. 8.
191
192
193

Ibid.. pp. 8-9.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid.. pp. 6-7.
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194
no firsthand data.1'
ment function.

Finally, models indicate a measure

In order that a model be effective, it must

be specifically related to the thing modeled.

To demon

strate this relationship, a model must indicate a measure
of applicabilityj it must designate the way in which the
model fits the data.

If the "laws" indicating the relation

ship between the model and the thing modeled are weakly
formulated or poorly understood, the data "yielded" by the
application of the model serve only as "indicators" to the
195
cogency and usefulness of the model.
If the "laws" re
lating the model to the thing modeled are well-formulated
and understood, then the data which it "yields" are "meas196
ures" of its applicability.
In the latter case, the
power and precision of the model in its organizing, explana
tory/heuristic, and predictive functions is greatly increased.
The functions of a model are superintended by a structure
including "a set of rules" {a 'logic' or 'calculus'), some
"laws of operation," and a "set of symbols" to which the "set
197
of rules" and "laws of operation" are applied.
This, then, is Deutsch's idea of how science operates
and his proposal for developing useful political theory

194ibid.
19^ibid., p. 9.
196Ibid.
197 Ibid., p. 19.
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which would be "comparable to such bodies of knowledge
as economic theory, the theories of evolution and genetics
in biology, or to take an extreme case, theoretical phys198
ics...."
Although Deutsch is all too brief on the
structure of a model, I think it is clear that what he has
in mind is something corresponding to the R.V.

The func

tion of models in organizing and directing inquiry, the
notion of specifiable correspondence between model and
thing modeled, the emphasis on prediction and testability,
the somewhat nebulous formulation of the structure of a
model as a calculus, an extralogical vocabulary {the set of
symbols) and correspondence rules (laws of operation) are
central features of the R.V.

And, although he does not

explicitly use the term, I think it is fairly clear that
the process of explanation according to models is a deduc
tive one, one in which unexplained events are explained by
199
subsuming them by a model.
Another social scientist who has written explicitly on
the nature of explanation in the social sciences, and other
sciences, is George Homans.

In a monograph entitled The

Nature of Social Science Homans contends that the social
sciences, including psychology, anthropology, sociology,

198
199

.
Ibid., p. xxvi.

It should be noted that Deutsch contends that the
unfamiliar is explained by reducing it to the familiar, a
condition of explanation not held by the R.V.
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economics, and political science, are a single science that
200
share the "same body of general explanatory principles."
Moreover, the social sciences are of a kind with the physi
cal sciences because they share the "aim" if not the results
of those sciences:
What makes a science are its aims, not its
results. If it aims at establishing more or less
general relationships between properties of
nature, when the test of the truth of a relation
ship lies finally in the data themselves, and the
data are not wholly manufactured— when nature
however stretched on the rack, still has a chance
to say "No!"— then the subject is a science.201
In what way are the aims of social science commensu
rate with those of the physical sciences, and how are these
aims to be achieved?

About these issues Homans is straight

forward and concise. The twin aims of any science are dis202
203
covery
and explanation.
The manner in which these
aims are achieved is through theory.

He maintains that

"theory of a phenomenon is an explanation of the phenomenon,

York:

2^George Homans, The Nature of Social Science, (New
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), p. 3.
201Ibid., p. 4.
202

Since my concern here is with theory and explanation,
I will not discuss Homans' ideas concerning Discovery. Suffice
it to say that Homans' idea of discovery as the "stating and
testing of more or less general relationships between proper
ties of nature...(when) the relationships were unknown before
research revealed them," (Ibid., p. 7) is sufficiently simi
lar to his treatment of explanation and prediction that
little further need be said of it. It is reasonably clear
that he is not explicitly presenting a "logic of discovery."
203Ibid., p. 7.
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and nothing that is not an explanation is worthy of the
204
name of theory.n
Homans unpacks the notion of theory through a discus
sion of explanation.

Citing Hempel, Homans says that he is

"using explanation in the special sense of explaining why
205
under given conditions a particular phenomenon occurs."
Further,
In the special sense, the esqplanation of a
finding, whether a generalization or a proposition
about a single event, is the process of showing
that the finding follows as a logical conclusion,
as a deduction, from one or more general proposi
tions under specified given conditions.20”
For Homans, an explanation is the result of subsuming
propositions stating relationships between properties,
events, or classes of events under more general propositions
given certain specified conditions.

The proposition stating

the event to be esqplained "is deduced from, derived from,
the other propositions, the whole set forming a deductive
207
system."
Like Hempel, Homans claims that these explana
tory general propositions are themselves susceptible of
explanation by subsumption under propositions of still
greater generality.

In each case, the explanation of the

204Ibid., p. 22.
20^Ibid., pp. 22-23.
206Ibid., p. 23.
20^Ibid., p. 25.
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phenomenon to be explained is the theory of that phenome208
non.
In each case, "explanation is the deduction of
209
empirical propositions from more general ones."
Homans
suggests that we look at theory as being a game:

"The

winner is the man who can deduce the largest variety of
empirical findings from the smallest number of general prop210
ositions, with the help of a variety of given conditions."
These tenets apply to social as well as physical theory.
Although the content of the propositions and explanations
is different in social science, the result only of a differ
ent subject matter, the requirements for an eaqplanation are
211
the same in both.
There are, however, some problems of
ejqplanation involved in attempting to employ this "special
sense" of explanation in the social sciences.

They are two

in number and both have to do with the nature of the propo
sitions accessible to the social sciences.

The first con

cerns the nature of our general propositions.
they?

What are their sources?

constructed?

What are

Of what elements are they

The second, devolving from the first, concerns

whether or not (lower level) empirical propositions can be
derived from them.

The first problem is a conceptual problem

298Ibid., p. 26.
209Ibid., p. 31.
210Ibid., p. 27.
211

Ibid., p. 28.
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resulting from the too-frequent vagueness and imprecision
in the terms occurring in the propositions.

The second

problem is that, because of this imprecision, it is diffi
cult to derive empirically testable statements from them.
Throughout his discussion of theory and explanation,
Homans' reliance upon and acceptance of the R.V. is patent
and unmistakable.

The deductive model of esqplanation com

plete with general propositions, initial conditions, pre
diction/testability criteria, and the explanatory function
of theory is that of the R.V.

Even the particular problems

of applying this model to the social sciences are the prob
lems of the deductive model generally— the problem of
relating theoretical constructs to observational phenomena
via adequate rules of correspondence.
Walter Wallace is another social scientist who is an
advocate of the application of the R.V. model of explanation
to the development of adequate social explanation and theory.
For Wallace, a theory is a conceptual structure that is
capable of explaining known empirical generalizations, and
predicting empirical generalizations that are, as yet, un212
known.
These functions are possible "...when the set of
propositions that are yielded by conceptual transformation
of known empirical generalizations are arranged in a

Walter Wallace, The Logic of Science in Sociology,
(Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), p. 57. For a more con
cise outline of the same ideas, see Walter Wallace, Socio
logical Theory, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969).
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specifiable form— especially a deductive form— then not only
can the original empirical generalization be explained but
also new and untested empirical generalizations can be pre213
dieted or hypothesized."
The predictive function of
theories is important because "confirmed predictions
214
increase our confidence in theoretic explanations."

They

direct our attention to what we should look for and should
215
"be able to measure before doing empirical research,"
and they direct our attention "when observations are made,
via interpretation of the hypothesis, scaling, instrumenta216
tion, and sampling"
to the salient testable grounds which
are the basis of scientific explanations.
In discussing the structure of theories as explanatory
and predictive strategies Wallace restates Hempel's D-N and
217
.
I-S models of scientific explanation.
The strong impli
cation is that for a theory to be an esqplanatory-predictive
device it must satisfy the conditions of an adequate deduc
tive explanation as presented by Hempel.

Wallace also

considers Kaplan's "concatenated theory or pattern model" as
an alternative explanatory-predictive strategy: but he

213Ibid.
214Ibid., P- 90.
215Ibid., P- 58.
•
H
CM

216Ibid., P*

217Ibid., PP . 91-100.

135
concludes, with Kaplan, that ultimately "a pattern has
explanatory force insofar as thereby we are enabled to show
how what is being explained can be deduced from more general
218
considerations.M
Therefore, at the present, the concate
nated or pattern model can be considered as a variation on
219
the basic deductive model.
Another group of social theorists, closely related to
those presented above, accept the general tenets of the R.V.
of scientific explanation and theory as a model to be emu
lated by the social sciences.

This group including, for

example, Torgerson, Wilson and Dumont, Blalock, Costner,
Zetterberg, Downs, and Riker, among others, directs the
greater part of their attention to the problems of applying
these generally accepted tenets to social inquiry.

For the

most part, these problems are those adumbrated above.

To

facilitate exposition I will collapse these problems into
three related categories.

The first might be called the

Problem of Conceptual Imprecision or Conceptual Ambiguity.
Attempts at solving this problem are concerned with designat
ing more or less precise referents for the terms of social
discourse, explicating the intended range of usage for these

218Ibid., p. 95.
9 IQ

For other essentially similar accounts of the appli
cability of the R.V. to social inquiry, see Kaplan, The
Conduct of Inquiry, Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological
Explanation, Scott Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry, Arnold
Brecht, Political Theory, Anatol Rappoport "Various Meanings
of Theory," American Political Science Review, vol. 52,
(1958), pp. 972-988.
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terms, or developing indices and indicators from which the
meaning of terms can be derived.

Often such solutions

entail the development of techniques of measurement.
The second problem may be called the Problem of Corre
spondence.

It is concerned with the relationship between

the theoretical structure and the phenomenon to be explained.
"How is it," the question may be posed, "that we can link
the concepts of a theoretical structure with the intended
observed events in such a way that these events may be said
to be explained?"

Viewed from one perspective, this is a

problem of testability; and, as such, it points to and
suggests the Imprecision Problem— particularly to the
development of scales, indices, and social measurements as
ways of increasing conceptual precision and linking "theo
retical" concept to "empirical" referent.
The third problem may be called the Problem of Axiomatization.

Briefly, this is the problem of providing a deduc

tive form to social explanations and theories.

It is con

cerned with the characteristics of social generalizations,
the nature, to use Homan1s terms, of social propositions,
their source and structure, and the relationship between
such statements and the phenomena that they explain.

As

such, this problem implies the correspondence problem, and,
less directly, the imprecision problem.

To a large, and

usually unrecognized extent, the axiomatization problem
involves a choice between the two models of scientific
explanation presented by Hempel, the D-N and the I-S.

In
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the remainder of this section, I will deal with these prob
lems and the responses to them by social theorists, with
the intention of further demonstrating the influence of the
R.V. on social explanation and theory, and of indicating
the direction in which social theory has been, and is,
developing.
The Problem of Conceptual Imprecision is one of the
most serious and multifaceted difficulties of the social
sciences.

Its resolution must attend not only to the speci

fication of meanings or empirical referents for the terms
used in social explanation and theory, but also involves a
decision as to what those terms should be.

Should we, for

example, attempt to study politics as a set of institutions,
a system of personal interrelationships, a process for the
allocation of values, a group of legal constraints, a way
of achieving and maintaining concensus, a bartering or other
kind of economic marketplace?

Should the unit of analysis

providing the basic terms of political discourse be power,
decision-making, the system, an exchange of one sort or
another, or a function?

While I do not want to minimize

the importance or significance of choices of this kind, it
should be emphasized that, regardless of the choice made,
the problem, from the point of view of developing, in this
example, a science of politics along the lines articulated
by the R.V., remains constant.
selected mean?
politically?

What do the terms we have

How are these terms related to what goes on
How can they be used to understand political
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phenomena?

Questions of this form are invariant across all

scientific disciplines, and explanation in the more fullydeveloped scientific

disciplines is facilitated by the fact

that some choices of

this kind have already been made.

Attempts at increasing the precision of political and
social scientific discourse have taken many forms.

The

earliest and most frequent of these is a process of defini
tion.

Definition may be the simple

extention of the use

of a term.

designation ofthe

In such cases,

if the term

is defined in isolation, its usefulness to an adequate solu
tion of the imprecision problem, according to R.V. criteria,
is fairly limited.

A second form which definition might

take, one which is more consonant with the dictates of the
R.V., I will call theoretical or contextual definition.

In

this form the referent, use or meaning of a term is derived
from its place in a conceptual framework.

The meaning of a

term derives from and is dependent upon the meaning of other
220
terms defined in a similar fashion, or of primitive terms,
or of both in conjunction.

The paradigm case for definition

of this kind comes from geometry where "point" is an unde
fined (primitive) term; "line" is defined as a series of
contiguous points, "plane" is defined as a series of parallel
contiguous lines, etc.

In cases similar to this, the meaning

particularly of theoretical terms is constructed relationally,

^ ^ S e e the discussion in chapter 3 for specification.
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each term deriving a meaning by relation to other theoreti
cal terms.

Examples of the use of this technique include
221
222
attempts by T. D. Weldon,
and Lasswell and Kaplan
to
specify a uniform vocabulary for political inquiry.

Al

though this technique is widely used, and perhaps even
essential to the development of a theory, its utility is
mitigated by the fact that definition of this kind need not
necessarily specify the criteria for relating the term with
its empirical referent.

This has the effect of regressing

the problem of this relationship one step— to correspondence
rules.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this; in

fact, it may be interpreted as the prescribed method accord
ing to R.V. thinking.

Other strategies, ones more frequently

used to designate the meaning of terms, seem to predominate
and the work of correspondence rules is usually restricted
to relating the whole of a theory, not just its constituent
terms, to the intended phenomenon.
These other strategies for increasing the precision of
terms may be categorized by the loose label "operational
procedures."

According to these procedures, the terms of a

theory are defined by the operations or techniques by which
they are measured.

For the most part, this occurs through

221

T. D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics, {New York:
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1953).
222

Harold Lasswell, and Abraham Kaplan, Power and
Society, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).
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the construction of scales and indices which specify the
observational characteristics of the term.

The meaning of

a term is designated by the procedures according to which
223
it selects and organizes observable phenomena.
To use
an overly-simple and hypothetical example, if we were
interested in the influence one's social status had on one's
voting behavior (i.e., if we wanted to "explain" voting
behavior by generalizations containing the term "social
status"), it would be beneficial to be more precise about
what was designated by the term, "social status."

We could,

by derivation from other terms in the theory, specify status
as being primarily socio-economic in nature, and then decide
on indicators (education, occupation, and income) which
could be measured in some way, that is, for which indices
could be constructed (education in years, occupation by the
Hatt-North Occupational Prestige Rating, income in dollars),
and, then, relate these measures to one and other.

The

meaning of "social status" would then be defined according
to the characteristics indicated by the procedures for speci
fying the term "social status."

The logic and techniques of

constructing and using such scales is widely employed as a
method for specifying the observational consequences of social
224
science terms.
For example, the same fundamental procedure

223Warren Torgerson, Theory and Method of Scaling, (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), p. 4.
224

See, for example, Ibid.
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has been used to increase the precision of terms like "prej
udice" (social distance), "intelligence," "authoritarian,"
"political efficacy," "powerlessness," "alienation," and a
multitude of other terms.
In addition to increasing the precision of terms, the
construction of indices facilitates the determination of the
degree to which the term applies, and therefore allows for
comparisons and rankings of various kinds.

For example, a

properly constructed index for "alienation" will permit not
only the judgement that a person is "alienated," but will
also allow a judgement as to how much a person is alienated.
Operational procedures, as strategies for increasing
the precision of terms, are not without difficulties.

For

one thing, it is possible to develop a set of indicators
for virtually any term.

But this possibility will not, of

itself, increase the esqplanatory capability of the social
sciences.

A set of indicators taken by itself is, at best,

a descriptive device.

For a term whose meaning is specified

by the construction of a set of indicators, or other opera
tional procedure, to gain explanatory significance it must
be lodged with other terms in those specified systems of
relation-statements that I have been calling theories.

Warren

Torgerson implies this criterion when he talks about "measurement by fiat" and "measurement by fundamental process."

225Ibid., pp. 21-23.

225
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In the former, the magnitude (measurable property) of the
term is decided on or selected on the basis of intuition,
hunch, educated guess, or the like.

In the latter, the

magnitude of a particular term is decided on because of the
theory.

The theory provides information not only about

which terms can serve to help explain a particular phenomenon,
but also about which property or dimension of these selec226
ted terms needs to be made more precise.
The main
difference between the physical and social sciences for
Torgerson is that in one the rationale linking "construct"
to observable "data," and, therefore, dictating measurement,
is spelled out and justified by the theory, which itself is
explicit; and in the other this rationale is either implicit
227
or non-existent.
Dumont and Wilson, two sociologists, have attempted to
provide a stratgey for increasing the precision of the terms
of social discourse which remedies the short-comings of
operational procedures while, at the same time, permitting
228
the introduction of isolated theoretical terms.
What
they suggest is, in effect, a combination of what I have
called "theoretical or contextual" definition, and the

226Ibid.
22*7I

b i d .

gee diagrams, and discussion, pp. 2-6.

2^®Richard Dumont and William Wilson, "Aspects of Con
cept Formation, Explication, and Theory Construction in
Sociology," American Sociological Review, vol. 32, no. 6
(December, 1967), pp. 985-995.
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operational procedures discussed above.

For a term to be

considered precise it must occur in an esqplicitly formu
lated theory, and its observational consequences must be
non-arbitrarily specified by the appropriate operational
229
procedures.
Thus the precision or lack of ambiguity of
a term depends not only upon whether a term has observational
consequences, but also upon how esqplicitly formulated or
articulated is the theory in which it occurs.
A second problem with operational procedures has to do
not so much with its use as a strategy for increasing con
ceptual precision, but with how extensively it should be
applied.

It was once thought that for a theory to be "scien

tific" that all of its non-logical terms must be reduced
(or reducible) to observational terms. Several attempts to
231
demonstrate this were made,
and the general prescription
to reduce theoretical statements to observational statements
came to strongly influence the social sciences under the
auspices of "operationalism."

The uneasiness with which the

imprecision of theoretical terms in the social sciences were
regarded was perhaps justified, but the start made toward
remedying this situation by operationalism was a false one.

Ibid., pp. 989-994. The authors discuss concepts in
terms of "significance" rather than precision.
230

Given this construal the relationship between the
first and third problems cited becomes even closer and more
interdependent.
231

See chapter 3 for a brief discussion of these.

The several conceptual difficulties with operationalism
232
have been extensively discussed by Hempel
and by
233
Kaplan,
among others. The main problems are that no
particular set of operations can completely exhaust the
meaning of a theoretical term.

For example, there is no

good reason for assuming that the concept of intelligence
is exhausted by its operational definition via a particular
intelligence test.

The test may partially specify some of

the meanings of the term, but there is no reason to insist,
as do the operationalists, that intelligence is purely and
simply defined by its measurement procedure.

A second prob

lem with operationalism is its restrictiveness.

For example,

if, following operationalist strictures, we consider intelli
gence to be defined by one's score on a Wexler I.Q. test,
then what is the result to be called for the score on a
Stanford-Binet test?
definitions.

Here we have two different operational

It follows from the operationalist position

that we have two concepts of intelligence.

Shall we label

them Intelligence^ and Intelligence^

What would be gained?
234
What criteria could be offered for choosing between them?
It is now generally recognized that the meaning of theo
retical terms cannot be specified with absolute precision.

232Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," in Aspects of
Scientific Explanation, pp. 187-189.
233Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, pp. 39-42.
Another, perhaps niggling, objection to operationalism concerns how one would go about giving an "operational
definition" of operationalism.
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They are not even viewed as being in-principle replaceable
by observation terms.

Other attempts at replacement have

also been less than satisfactory.

As a result, the call

for total interpretation of a theoretical vocabulary by an
observational vocabulary has yielded to a criterion of
"partial interpretation," where not every term is given an
observational interpretation, and the explanatory function
235
of statements containing theoretical terms is maintaxned.
A consideration of the function of theoretical terms leads
to the second and overlapping problem confronting social
scientists in attempting to apply the R.V. to social theory,
the Problem of Correspondence.
As was stated earlier, the Problem of Correspondence is
the problem of delineating the connections between the con
ceptual structure that is a theory and a phenomenon which
the theory is said to account for.

From another point of

view, the problem is, or implies, a problem of testability:
What test can be made— what evidence can be provided— that
will demonstrate a significant relationship between the
event to be esqplained and its eaqplanation?

Correspondence

rules are the nexus between theory and empirical phenomena.
They state the conditions by which a connection is made, and
also establish at least minimal expectations about the kind
of evidence that would warrant the acceptance or rejection

23^See chapter 3. For a more fully-articulated dis
cussion, see Hempel's "Theoretician's Dilemma."
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of a theory.

Depending upon the "maturity" or "sophisti

cation" of the theory, the conditions and expectations will
be stated with varying degrees of exactness.

For example,

in what Hempel calls an "explanation sketch," the correspond
ence rules of the theory "point to" or "indicate" the pro
cedures for relating theory to phenomenon and loosely speci
fy acceptance criteria.

In a mature, fully articulated

theory the connections between the constructs of the theory
and the phenomena to be accounted for, the data, are pre
cisely stated; and the conditions for accepting or rejecting
a theory are explicitly established.

Furthermore, in the

more fully articulated theory, the justification for choos
ing a particular set of correspondence rules derives from
236
the theory itself.
All of this points to the obvious similarity between
the Imprecision Problem, with its "solution" in more precise
empirical statements of the meaning of terms, and the
Correspondence Problem, with its "solution" in a more pre
cise statement of the connections between theory and phenom
ena.

The two may be viewed as opposite sides of the same

coin in that both are concerned with establishing venues by
which increasing precision may be reached and with construct
ing criteria capable of guiding judgements about conceptual
formulations.

Therefore, it should not be surprising that

^ ® S e e Torgerson, op. cit., pp. 2-7.
Wilson, pp. cit., pp. 988-990.

Also Dumont and
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some of the strategies for dealing with problems of corre
spondence are also similar to the strategies for increasing
the precision of specific terms.

Let me reiterate:

The

difference between the Problem of Conceptual Imprecision
and the Correspondence Problem is the difference between
increasing the precision of terms and increasing the pre
cision of statements as to how they function in explaining
and predicting phenomena.
The first strategy for establishing correspondence
between a theory and its referent phenomenon is operational
ism.

Although it is primarily a strategy for increasing

the precision of terms, it also implies, and has been used
as, a strategy for formulating correspondence.

For the

operationalist, the meaning of a term resides in the proce
dures of its measurement and application.

To use the pre

vious example, we can meaningfully use the term "intelli
gence," according to the operationalist, because we know of
and can specify operations by which it can be isolated,
measured, and applied.

Operational strategies can be used

as a means of establishing correspondence when all of the
terms of a theory are given operational definitions, and
operational meaning.

The correspondence of a theory to a

phenomenon is demonstrated when operations for measuring all
of the observational consequences of all of the non-logical
terms of the theory are given.

A theory thus becomes a kind

of "short-hand" or "code" for the complete and complex set
of esqperimental and measurement techniques.

This is
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admittedly vague and unsatisfactory, especially in its
extreme form.

It is heir to all of the difficulties, dis

cussed above, of operationalism as a solution to the Problem
of Conceptual Imprecision.

In addition, I think it begs the

question of how a theory is related to a phenomena in such
a way that it eiqplains it; that is, it fails to come to
grips with the function of a theory.

Furthermore, it has

the debilitating effect of blinding a researcher to other
dimensions, other observational consequences, which may be
implied by a theory by focusing attention on only those
consequences specified by the particular selected operation
al procedure.

This is a particularly odious consequence,

the likelihood of which is increased by the fact that most
social theories are, at best, inexplicitly articulated with
the result that any choice of one operation over another is
more or less arbitrary.

To return to an earlier example,

we can assume that because there is no fully articulated
theory of social status, there is no significant reason for
choosing to operationalize status in terms of income, educa
tion, and occupation as indicators of S.E.S. over, say, the
number of bathrooms or telephones in one's home or the num
ber of cars one owns.

And in either case, nothing specifies

the relationship between status and either set of indicators.
In any case, operationalist strategies for constructing
rules of correspondence fail, as did operationalist strate
gies for specifying the meaning of terms, because it cannot
be demonstrated that such rules would exhaust the range of
applicability of the theory.

149
Two other procedures for specifying the correspondence
between theories and phenomena have been investigated by
social theorists.

In an article in Sociology and Social

Research, William Wilson and Richard Dumont consider "reduc
tion sentences" and "translation rules" as alternatives to
237
operationalism.
The reduction sentence strategy, first proposed by
Carnap, maintains the demand for empirical reference in
defining terms and establishing correspondence, like opera
tionalism, but it allows for greater flexibility.

Instead

of insisting that the meaning of a term or of a theory is
the procedure, and only the procedure, by which its obser
vational consequences are measured, the reduction sentence
approach views any particular procedure as a part of the
meaning of a term.

No procedure would exclude the possi

bility of other procedures in constituting the meaning of
a term or the correspondence between a theory and a phenom
enon.

Instead of one procedure exclusively and exhaustively

providing the esqplicit definition of a term, a series of
procedures, taken together, provide a partial definition of
a term or a partial interpretation of a theory.

As Wilson

and Dumont correctly contend, "whether an operational

William Wilson and Richard Dumont, "Rules of Corre
spondence and Sociological Concepts," Sociology and Social
Research, vol. 52, no. 2 (Jan., 1968), pp. 217-227. These
authors also discuss operationalism at some length. Their
general discussion follows closely that of Hempel in the
"Theoretician's Dilemma."
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definition provides a complete or full definition of a
concept...i.e., there remains no possibility for alterna
tive meanings being attached to {it)..., reduction sentences
238
specify the meaning only partially...."
This permits
terms to have an "openness of meaning," and theories to be
applied in cases where their applicability can be demon
strated:

"...the provision for a set of different, and

mutually supplementary, reduction sentences...reflects the
availability, for most theoretical terms, of different
operational criteria of application, pertaining to different
239
contexts."
The form and technique for constructing correspondence
rules and for increasing the precision of terms for reduc
tion sentences would be similar to that used by operationi

alists.

Reduction sentences are different from operational

procedures mostly in terms of strategy rather than tactics.
The reduction sentence strategy provides a different, less
restrictive, interpretation of correspondence and meaning
techniques than does operationalism without seriously effect
ing empirical content or empirical relevance.

For this

reason, the authors imply that it is preferable to opera
tionalism, particularly in lesser developed areas of
scientific inquiry like the social sciences.

238yjiig0n an(j Dumont, Ibid., p. 220.

There are some obstacles to the use of reduction
sentences as rules of correspondence or techniques for
improving the precision of terms in the social sciences.
As presented by Carnap, and interpreted by Hempel, reduc
tion sentences seem to require rigorous forms of measure
ment and detailed statements of test conditions to be
240
applicable.
Further, the condition that not all terms
be given operational definition seems to suggest that these
non-defined terms have some contextual meaning in order
that the theory be saved from vacuousness.

This would re

quire that the internal relationships among these terms in
the theory be fairly well delineated.

This is tantamount

to the requirement that they occur in a more or less fully
articulated theory.

This brings us full circle to the

problem which, for the social sciences at least, initiated
the discussion— the dearth of fully explicated theory— in
the first place.

Still, despite these difficulties, reduc

tion sentences seem to be a more fruitful correspondence
and meaning strategy than operationalism.

Potentially, the

same result is achieved without imposing the limitations
carried by the operationalist program.
Another form of correspondence rule considered by Wil
son and Dumont is what they call "translation rules."
following the lead of Carnap and of Hempel, Wilson and

240Ibid., pp. 221-222.

Again
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Dumont contend that correspondence can be demonstrated and
precision of meaning increased via the translation rule
strategy if it can be demonstrated that an observation
sentence corresponds to a theoretical sentence, and is
241
true.
The authors argue that, following this strategy,
a theoretical term is "implicitly defined" "by connecting
the sentence in which it is embedded to an observational
242
sentence."
Although their discussion of this particular
strategy is brief, I think that it is obvious, particularly
in light of the more extensive discussion of this subject
243
by Hempel,
that the translation rule strategy requires
fully articulated theory in order to be fruitfully applied.
Recognizing this, Wilson and Dumont suggest that it might
be used to aid theory construction in the social sciences;
but they provide little specific information about how this
would be accomplished.
There is another trend in the construction, interpre
tation and use of correspondence rules that has been and is
developing in the social sciences.

According to this view,

the function of correspondence rules in interpreting theory
and in establishing the connections between a theory and
the phenomena with which it is concerned, remains unchanged.

241Ibid., p. 223.
242Ibid.
243Hempel, "Theoretician's Dilemma," pp. 189-210.

What advocates of this position argue, and what separates
them from "orthodox" R.V. thinkers is the notion that,
properly conceived, correspondence rules are not part of a
theory.

Rather, correspondence rules are auxiliary

theories which delineate ways of establishing and, perhaps
more importantly, of testing the relationship between a
theory as a conceptual and logical structure and observed
{or in principle observable) phenomena.

I do not think

that, as a first approximation, it would unduly oversimpli
fy this position to say that those procedures falling under
the general term "methodology" are the kinds of things
referred to as "auxiliary theories."

Thus, for example,

the several procedures described by Torgerson in Theory and
Method of Scaling would provide auxiliary theories for
establishing the empirical (testable) correspondence between
propositionally related concepts and their observational
referents.

Such procedures are attempts to specify criteria

by which one can judge (or test) whether or not the relation
ships stipulated to hold among terms also obtain among the
things in the world to which the terms refer.

Strictly

speaking, these procedures, or the rationale for them, would
not "belong" to any particular theory but, rather, would
be appropriable by any moderately well-formulated theory
the object of which is some empirical social phenomenon.
This line of thought concerning the nature of correspondence rules was first brought to the social sciences,

244

244This interpretation of correspondence rules had been
developed earlier by some philosophers of science. See Fred
erick Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theory, (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 15)74), pp. 102-109.
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as far as I can determine, by Hubert M. Blalock.

Blalock

is concerned with what he calls "the inherent gap between
245
the languages of theory and research."
More specifically,
he is concerned with the development of "causal models that
246
have implications that are indirectly testable."
The
problem is this:

Causality is a characteristic of theoret

ical systems, while testability is a characteristic of
empirical systems.

Causal thinking is helpful in construct

ing theories about social phenomena but to be scientifically
useful, these theories must be testable.

In order for the

social sciences to provide explanations rather than simple
statistical descriptions, causal thinking and language must
be incorporated in social science explanations; but such
thinking must be "warranted" or "underwritten" by observa
tions expressed in an observation language.

"The whole

matter depends, then, on our ability to specify the rules
247
for going back and forth from one language to another."
For Blalock, "...causal laws are essentially working assump
tions or tools of the scientist rather than verifiable
248
statements about reality."
But for these working

Hubert Blalock, Causal Inference in Nonexperimental
Research, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1964), p. 5.
246
.
,
Ibid., p. 6.
247

Ibid., p. 29.

248Ibid., p. 12.
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assumptions to be useful, it will be necessary "that auxiliary
theories be constructed applying the general theory to par
ticular substantive problems and testing the general theory
249
{indirectly, to be sure) in specific research settings."
Thus, for Blalock, the establishment of correspondence
is dependent upon developing testable auxiliary theories.
Since Blalock is interested in causal inference, it can be
supposed that these auxiliary theories be susceptible of
causal interpretation.

Linear causal models, such as path

analysis, provide one such methodology; and it seems to have
become the auxiliary theory of choice among causal social
250
theorists.
Indeed, Herbert Costner has outlined a program
for "representing the auxiliary theory in the form of an
explicit causal model;" and, following Blalock, he argues
that such auxiliary theories provide explicit rules of
251
correspondence.
Costner also contends that the development
of "more complex and intricate auxiliary theories" than the
one he presents "would help provide a needed integration of

249Hubert Blalock, Theory Construction, (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 5.
250See, for example, 0. D. Duncan, "Path Analysis:
Sociological Examples," in Hubert Blalock, Causal Models in
the Social Sciences, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company,
1971), pp. 115-138.
251Herbert Costner, "Theory, Deduction, and Rules of
Correspondence," in Blalock, Ibid., pp. 299-313.
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high levels of abstraction and testable deduction in socio252
logical theories."
By this point, I think it is fairly obvious that the
Problem of Correspondence, as presented and interpreted
through the R.V., has had considerable impact on and
received much attention from social theorists.

Torgerson

summarizes the significance of the construction of rules of
correspondence to social theory in the following way:
The best of theoretical models is of no use
if rules of correspondence are chosen unwisely or
unfortunately. Yet chosen they must be, since
models without constructs which are anchored
firmly to observable data have no scientific
import whatsoever.2^
The Problem of Axiomatization shall be considered in
terms of two components.

The first of these concerns the

form of social scientific theories and explanations.

The

second is concerned with the nature of our general proposi
tions.

Concerning the form of social scientific theories

and explanations, we have seen that the paradigmatic form
for a R.V. explanation is deductive— one in which the
explanandum is subsumed or covered by the explanans.

The

Problem of Axiomatization, as generally interpreted by
social theorists, is one of providing the proper, deductive,
propositional form to social scientific theories and explana
tions.

In one sense, this is tantamount to requiring that

^^Costner, Ibid., p. 319.
253 Torgerson, op. cit., p. 8.
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social science theories be explicitly formulated or fully
articulated.

Reference has been made to the difficulties

of solving the problems of Conceptual Imprecision and
Correspondence when no explicitly formulated theory is
available.

Stipulating, for the moment, the perceived

benefit of axiomatization by some social theorists, the
questions now are:
like?"

"What does an axiomatic theory look

"How is it to be developed?"

And, "What is the

advantage of fully-articulating our theories?"
An axiomatized, fully articulated theory is one in
which all of the elements of the theory are given full or
nearly full exposition.
precisely.
context.

Assumptions are stated clearly and

Terms are given meaning "operationally" or in
Hypotheses are presented clearly using only those

terms previously "defined."

The criteria for accepting or

rejecting an hypothesis, or even an assumption, are stated
unequivocally.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the

interconnections among all of these elements are precisely
set down.

The calculus, or logical framework, of the theory

is given; and it is applied in stating the relationships
between the aforementioned elements.
The putative advantages of axiomatization are several.
Few would deny that social theory would benefit from clear
statement of the assumptions underlying a theory.

A more

careful statement of the meanings of terms and the relation
ships between them, a precise notation of their range of
applicability, would be helpful in almost all cases.

A

158
statement of the logical connections between elements may
very well help to control the intervention of bias on the
part of the researcher, and help to guard against post
factum and/or ad hoc attempts to "save the phenomenon" or
the theory.

Axiomatization would also facilitate the com

parison and evaluation of different theories about the same
phenomenon, and make it potentially easier to interrelate
similar theories about different phenomena.

But most

importantly, I think full articulation could provide not
only more precise meanings for terms or correspondence
between theory and phenomena, or even more precise proce
dures for establishing meaning or correspondence, it could
also provide the justification for selected meanings or
correspondences or the procedures by which they are selected,
within the context of the theory.

For example, if the theo

retical terms of a theory and the interconnections were
stated causally, one would know not only that the meanings
of these terms via a measurement procedure must be of a
certain (high) level of precision (e.g., interval), and the
correspondence rules, or auxiliary theory, must be suscepti
ble of causal interpretation (e.g., path analysis), but why
this is so.

In a fully articulated theory, the rationale

or justification for adopting these particular procedures
would be given both logical and substantive warrant by the
theory, including its component criteria of acceptance or
rejection.
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If, as we are stipulating, axiomatization is bene
ficial— a stronger version of the R.V. would say "necessary"—
why are not social theories fruitfully axiomatized?

One

reason is that theorists have not made the effort to pre
sent their theories in this form.

A second reason has to

do with the requirement of the R.V. that the axiomatic
theories be partially interpreted, that is, that the obser
vational consequences of at least some of the terms be
254
precisely spcified.
It seems that some social theorists
are not concerned with the precise specification of these
consequences, or the possible procedures for delineating
these consequences.

A third, and for present purposes, the

most important reason has to do with the nature of general
propositions in the social sciences.

In the previous chap

ter, during a discussion of the R.V. of explanation, it was
seen that a necessary part of the eaqplanans was laws or law
like statements for the D-N model, or probability statements
for the I-S model.

Further, such general propositions when

conjoined with initial conditions (D-N model) or instantiation
(I-S model) were said to esqplain the explanandum if they
fulfilled certain conditions.
reduce these to two.

For simplicity's sake I will

The first condition is that these

254See chapter 3. It will be remembered that this re
quirement was intended to eliminate purely mathematical or
logical axiomatizations from being considered "scientific."
It might be added that, in terms of social theory, it serves
to eliminate most "metaphysical" or "normative" theories.

general propositions be sufficiently general to encompass
phenomena of the kind under consideration within their
scope.

The second is that they provide sufficient, detailed

information about the kind of relationship for which an
explanation is sought.

The problem with the general propo

sitions of the social sciences is that they fail to satisfy
one or both of these conditions.

Concerning the first con

dition, many of the general statements found in the social
sciences are definitional rather than propositional; they
state characteristics rather than relationships.

They take

the form of assertions like "Power is..." or "Liberty i^..."
or "Authority involves...."

Such statements are important.

They can be given propositional form or can be used, in
conjunction with other similar statements, to form proposi
tions.

Too frequently, however, this is not done; statements

such as these are left to stand on their own.

The reason I

say they are insufficiently general is because they are not
extended to state relationships.

And some statements which

do occur in the social science literature state relation
ships, but are insufficiently general because they refer only
to a specific time or particular instances.

For example, a

statement of the relationship between "sense of citizen
duty" and "proclivity to vote" in the 1960 presidential
election, or a statement of the relationship between the
"industrial capacity" or "morale" of the United States and
its "ability to'mount a successful war effort" are too
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restrictive to serve as the kind of proposition for which
the R.V. position is looking.
There do exist in the social sciences statements of
propositional form which are temporally unbounded and unre
stricted to specific instances or events.

The frequent

difficulty with these propositions is that they fail to
satisfy the second condition mentioned above; they fail to
provide sufficiently detailed information about the relation
ship postulated.

Most propositions of this kind take the

form, "A change in X is caused by (results in, is associa
ted with) a change in Y," "There is a strong (weak, no)
correlation between X and Y," or "The relationship between
X and Y causes (is associated with, etc.) Z."

The point to

be made here, with reference to the R.V. of theory and
explanation, is that for propositions to serve as explanans
statements, it is insufficient that they state only that a
relationship exists, or that a change or attitude is associ
ated with something else; in addition, they must tell "how,"
"when," "how much," "to what degree," "over how long."

The

paucity in the social sciences of statements conveying this
kind of information is perceived as one of the main reasons
why our theoretical formulations are considered to be expla
nation sketches rather than explanations.
In spite of these criticisms, or perhaps because of
them, the suggestion that social theory should be axiomatized
has frequently been voiced in recent years; and the effort
to present axiomatic or axiomatized theories has been and is
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being made.

In sociology, one of the earliest efforts at

providing a format for the development of axiomatic theory
was presented by Hans Zetterberg.

Zetterberg argues that

sociological propositions be designated as "theoretical" or
"ordinary" depending upon their informative value, and that
the arrangement of these propositions should be such that
255
the latter can be deduced from the former.
The benefit
to be derived from such an arrangement is that, properly
done, it will aid in the synthesis of already completed
research and serve as a guide in the construction of theory.
Zetterberg suggests to the theorist "that he arrange his
propositions in the axiomatic way" because "it forces him
to spell out his assumptions, to make explicit his deduc
tions; and it will remind him of any by-passed implications."

256

To demonstrate the utility of his approach,

Zetterberg offers an axiomatization of theory and research
findings on social solidarity deriving from Durkheim's
257
theory of the division of labor.
Zetterberg's framework
for axiomatizing theory, as well as the particular axiomati
zation he presents, has been subjected to rather severe
criticism.

Costner and Leik argue that the types of inference

Zetterberg employs do not support the kinds of conclusions

255iians Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in
Sociology. 3rd ed., (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1965),
p. 80.
256Ibid., pp. 99-100.
257See Ibid., pp. 159-174.

he wishes to draw, and they present an alternative proce258
dure for axiomatizing and testing theories.
In a more
recent discussion, Movahedi and Ogles argue that Zetterberg's rules for deriving ordinary from theoretical propo
sitions are faulty and that Zetterberg offers no clear
criteria for deciding the informative value of propositions.
For these reasons, the authors find that Zetterberg's proposal "is not self-consistent and leads to contradictions."

25

Furthermore, Movahedi and Ogles contend that in applying his
schema to particular cases, Zetterberg "seems to violate
the most fundamental rules of deductive logic, whether tra260
ditional or modern."
This is a particularly telling
criticism since this is exactly one of the things that
Zetterberg hopes that axiomatizing theory will help to avoid.
It should be noted that, despite their sometimes severe
criticisms, neither pair of critics questions the utility of
axiomatization as a strategy to be emulated by the social
sciences.
Hubert M. Blalock is another proponent of the develop
ment of axiomatic theory in the social sciences.

Blalock's

25®Herbert Costner and Robert Leik, "Deductions from
'Axiomatic Theory'," American Sociological Review, vol. 29,
no. 6 (Dec., 1964), pp. 819-83HTI
OCQ

Siamak Movahedi and Richard Ogles, "Axiomatic Theory,
Informative Value of Propositions, and 'Derivation Rules of
Ordinary Language'," American Sociological Review, vol. 38
(August, 1973), p. 423.
260Ibid.
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favorable attitude toward this strategy is implicit in much
of what is said in Causal Inference in Nonexperimental
261
Research
and is developed eaqplicitly m Theory Construc
tion.

Blalock feels that axiomatization is most beneficial

in developing causal theories.

In Theory Construction he

advocates that
Our axioms should be causal assertions that
strictly speaking will be untestable because of
the fact that it will never be possible to control
for all "relevant" variables. For example, if we
assume that a change in X causes or produces a
change in Y, even if we observe covariations and
temporal sequences we can never be sure that these
have not been produced by some extraneous factor.
But if our axioms contain such causal assertions,
and if we make certain additional assumptions
concerning the operation of extraneous factors, we
shall then be in a position to derive from our
axioms testable theorems about covariances and
temporal sequences.
Blalock makes it clear that three benefits would accrue
from an axiomatization strategy.

First, axiomatization

would provide a structure for arranging propositions in such
a way so as to make explicit the linkages between causallywritten theories and their auxiliary theories, thus facili263
tating the comparison of theories.
Second, because
axiomatization would make explicit the relationship between
propositions, the testability of a theory would be increased,
and warrant would be provided for evaluating causal claims

^ ^ S e e especially pp. 5-11.
Blalock, Theory Construction, p. 11.
^ ^ S e e section above on The Correspondence Problem.
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by covariance statements.

Third, axiomatization would

facilitate the translation of verbal theories into mathe264
matical reformulations.
Although Blalock's primary con
cern is with the evaluation and testability of theories,
because he does see axiomatization as a way of facilitating
the former and enhancing the latter, he provides two rules
for stating theories axiomatically :
Rule 1:

Select as axioms those propositions that
involve variables that are taken to be
directly linked causally: axioms should
therefore be statements that imply direct
causal links among variables.

Rule 2:

State theorems in terms of covariations
and temporal sequences, thereby making
them testable provided adequate measures
of all variables can be obtained.

There have been numerous other suggestions that axio
matization is a potentially useful strategy and several
additional efforts at restating sociological theories axio
matically.

Stinchcombe seems to imply the utility of the

axiomatic approach, among other approaches, in his Construct266
inq Social Theories.
Wallace suggests a type of axiomati
zation in his discussion of the "theory component" of his
"model of the scientific process" and his application of that

o C. A

Blalock, Theory Construction, pp. 17-26.

265Ibid., p. 18.
Arthur Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1968), see
especially chapter 2, sec. 4.

166
model to Durkheim's Suicide.

267

Additional attempts to

axiomatize existing sociological propositions include Hugh
D. Duncan's effort to axiomatize symbolic interactionism in
268
Symbols in Society.
the presentation by Hamblin, et. al.
of a theory of social change "using axioms from general
mathematical systems theory and from behavioral sociology,"

2

Schwirian and Prehn's "An Axiomatic Theory of Urbaniza270
tion,"
Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin's "Urbanization,
271
Technology, and the Division of Labor,"
among others.
In political science, as in sociology, axiomatization
of theories has received strong support in some quarters.
One of the earliest and most influential efforts towards the
development of axiomatic theory in political science was
Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy.

In this

book Downs attempts to provide "a generalized yet realistic
behavior rule for a rational government similar to the rules

2®^Wallace, The Logic of Science in Sociology, p. 28.
See also chapter 6.
288Hugh D. Duncan, Symbols in Society, (New York:
ford University Press, 1968).

Ox

269Robert Hamblin, et. al., A Mathematical Theory of
Social Change, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973). See
especially chapter 10.
270
Kent Schwirian, and John Prehn, "An Axiomatic Theory
of Urbanization," cited in Costner and Leik, op. cit., p.
819.
271
Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin, "Urbanization, Tech
nology, and the Division of Labor: International Patterns,"
cited in Costner and Leik, Ibid.
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traditionally used for rational consumers and producers."
It is Downs' concern to present a series of assumptions
about democratic government, and to derive and trace the
implications of these assumptions.

For the most part,

Downs' assumptions are borrowed from economic decision
theory, particularly that of Kenneth Arrow.

For Downs,

democratic government is party government of a kind that
273
satisfies certain critera,
and this inclines him to
orient his model to the ways in which parties "maximize
274
political support,"
and to the ways in which citizens
make social (especially political) choices.
The purpose of Downs' economic theory is the derivation
of testable, empirical propositions which emanate directly
(by deduction) from the assumptions (axioms) of the theory
275
itself.
For Downs "theoretical models should be tested
primarily by the accuracy of their predictions rather than
276
the reality of their assumptions."
Seemingly, the only
limitations Downs places on the choice of assumptions is
that, taken together, they be internally consistent, and
that from them can be deduced propositions which are

York:

27^Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New
Harper & Row, 1957), p. 3.
273Ibid., pp. 23-24.
274Ibid., p. 11.
275Ibid.. p. 295.
276Ibid., p. 21.
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susceptible of empirical test.

The former condition would

serve to preclude the possibility that any possible concate
nation of assumptions could serve as a theory and also
implies that the theory be constructed in such a way as to
be corrigible; the latter condition, in addition to providing
an empirical check on the accuracy of the model, would also
serve to insure that the assumptions were explicitly related
to the subject matter.
Downs is not overly concerned with specifying in any
great detail the exact nature of the relationship between
his "assumptions" and the testable propositions that are
derived from them.

Nor is he very explicit about what would

count as an adequate empirical test.
matization is mostly by example.

His advocacy of axio-

And the manner in which

An Economic Theory of Democracy is presented, with a state
ment of propositions to be proven initiating each chapter
and a summary chapter consisting of derived "testable propo
sitions," exemplifies the influence of axiomatization on his
theory.
William Riker is another influential proponent of axio
matization as a strategy for improving the quality of polit
ical theory.

Writing in The Theory of Political Coalitions,

Riker comments, with envy, on the success of the physical
sciences and suggests that, while "slavish imitation" is
not advisable, "...there is no reason why the general methods
of formulating provisional generalizations, of rendering
them susceptible to verification...cannot be taken
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over."

Riker is somewhat more explicit than is Downs

about how this might be accomplished:
The essential feature of this method is
the creation of a theoretical construct that
is a somewhat simplified version of what the
real world to be described is believed to be
like. This simplified version or model is a
set of axioms (more or less intuitively justi
fiable) from which nonobvious general sentences
can be deduced. These deduced propositions,
when verified, become both an addition to the
model and a description of nature. As more and
more sentences are deduced and verified, greater
and greater confidence in the validity of the
axioms is felt to be justified. Conversely,
the deduction of false or inconsistent sentences
tends to discredit the axioms. 78
Riker is primarily concerned to demonstrate the appli
cability of the axioms of game theory to political phenomena. 279

Like Downs, he is interested m

the derivation of

testable hypotheses, in the form of predictions, as an
indicator of the utility of his theory.

In fact Riker's

work is a specification and elaboration of both the substance
and method of An Economic Theory of Democracy.

In effect,

Riker revises and supplements Downs’ axiomatic theory.

He

illustrates the utility, and attempts to demonstrate the
"universality" of his model by offering examples from U.S.
and Indian politics where the model would yield accurate

William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 7. He continues,
"Those who are interested in creating a science of politics
must, therefore, first become students of scientific method
in the hope that they can use it in their own concerns."
278Ibid.
279Ibid., pp. 14ff.
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predictions.

280

In addition, he offers what might best be

described as a formalization or abstract strategy applicable
281
to coalitions of a given kind.
It is interesting to
note that much of the literature generated in response to
Riker's seminal work questions not the applicability of
axiomatization as a useful theoretical tool, but rather
whether or not specific hypotheses are warranted empiri282
cally.
Riker has recently suggested that axiomatization be
employed not simply as a strategy in research on political
coalitions, but as a general approach to theory development
for political science.

In An Introduction to Positive

Political Theory, Riker and Ordeshook contend that political
science has moved beyond the stage where information gather
ing or data collection is of primary importance.

It is

essential now that political scientists "...begin to theorize,
subsuming much empirical detail under abstract sentences,
and generating models as simplifications of the complexity
of the real world— simplifications that presumably esqplain
283
the most significant features."

280Ibid., pp. 54-66, 66-76, 149-158.
nOi

Ibid., pp. 127-145.
282See, for example, the exchange between Robert Butterworth and Riker on the "reality" of the "size principle,"
American Political Science Review, vol. lxv, no. 3., (Sept.,
1971), pp. 741-748.
28^William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction to
Positive Political Theory, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice HallT
Inc., 1973), p. xi.
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In this book the authors propose to introduce "theory
284
of an axiomatic, deductive type"
as the best way of
accomplishing this end.

For the most part, Riker and

Ordeshook's Introduction is a compendium in which are
described a number of approaches to axiomatizing theory.
That these methods are employed is demonstrated by copious
examples from and references to their utilization in recent
political science research.
The preceding discussion I think demonstrates that the
Problem of Axiomatization is a significant one to which much
attention has been directed.

The injunction to social

scientists to axiomatize existing theories and to present
new theories axiomatically may be separated for purposes of
analysis— one might add only for purposes of analysis— from
the corollary and related problems of the specification of
meaning and the development of adequate criteria of correspond
ence as described earlier.
inextricably intertwined.

In practice, the problems are
Whether axiomatization of theories

is the key to developing more nearly "scientific" explana
tions of social phenomena is a matter over which there can
be reasonable disagreement.

It should be noted, in passing,

that the centrality, and even the utility, of axiomatization
to the R.V. of scientific explanation and theory is a

284ibid.
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subject of some controversy even among R.V. philosophers of
285
science.
I think that it has been shown that the philosophy of
science, and in particular the Received View of scientific
explanation and theory, has had a significant and pervasive
impact on recent social theory.

This influence has been

exerted by philosophers of science who are interested in
social theory, by social theorists who are concerned with
seeing that social inquiry become more scientific, and by
social scientists who have directly addressed themselves to
specific problems with regard to social inquiry which have
emerged from the R.V. reconstruction of scientific explana
tion and theory.

It remains to consider the criticisms of

the R.V. by other philosophers of science and the as yet
limited effect of these criticisms on social theory, and to
re-introduce the concept of explanation in light of these
criticisms.

2®^See, for example, Frederick Suppe's excellent criti
cal introduction to Suppe, op. cit., pp. 62-66, 110-114.

CHAPTER FIVE
Political Theory and the Problem of Explanation
Dissents from the Received View in Philosophy of
Science and in Social Science
The Received View, as a reconstruction of the nature of
explanation and of theory in science has from its earliest
formulation been subjected to severe scrutiny and criticism
from within the philosophy of science.

No sooner had it

been articulated than its adequacy as a model of explanation
and as an account of the structure of theory was questioned.
So persistent and unrelenting have been these attacks that
today there are few remaining proponents, among philosophers
of science, of the Received View in the form it was presented
in chapter 3.

Despite the fact that most philosophers of

science have moved away from the Received View reconstruction
of scientific esqplanation and theory, its influence on
political and social scientists has been and continues to
be considerable.

Indeed, it may be contended, and I believe

that the information in the previous chapter supports the
contention that the last bastion of Received View thinking
in its purer form is to be found in political and social
science.
Although the R.V. account of explanation has exerted
substantial influence on the development of scientific social
173
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inquiry, the reception of the R.V. and attempts to adopt
social inquiry to its major tenets has not been entirely
enthusiastic.

Criticisms of the susceptibility of social

phenomena to scientific explanation, and of R.V. scientific
explanation, can be made on two grounds.

The first of

these I will call extrinsic or external grounds.

Critics of

this disposition argue that social phenomena cannot be
accounted for according to the canons of scientific inquiry
because they are too complex, cannot be predicted or require
different categories than those provided by science.

Though

many such criticisms are interesting, insightful and informa
tive, most of the difficulties they present have been deflected
by R.V. philosophers or social theorists.

In the final analy

sis, exchanges of this kind between this type of critic and
proponents of the R.V. as a model for social inquiry turn
into duologues— people talking past one another— or polem286
ics.
Neither situation is conducive to the solution of
the problem at hand.

286

An excellent example of these tendencies is provided
by two exchanges in recent issues of the American Political
Science Review. In both cases, what might be called "moderate
critics" of contemporary practice in scientific social inquiry
were taken to task by advocates of this view. See John
Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific
Inquiry," and Responses, American Political Science Review,
vol. LXIII, no. 4 (Dec., 1969), pp. 1233-1262, and Eugene
Miller,"Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," and
Responses, American Political Science Review, vol. LXVI, no.
3 (Sept., 1972), pp. 796-873. For a similar example in
Sociology, see Lewis Coser, "Two Methods in Search of a Sub
stance," American Sociological Review, vol. 40, no. 6 (Dec.,
1975), pp. 691-700, and responses in The American Sociolo
gist , vol. 11 (Feb., 1976), pp. 4-38.
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A second basis for criticizing the R.V., and its appli
cability to social and political science, may be called
intrinsic or internal grounds.

Criticism of this type is

directed to questions of the adequacy and efficacy of the
R.V. itself.

Although criticisms of this kind are only

beginning to have an impact in the social sciences, I think
it is obvious that they are extendable to social inquiry.
As was demonstrated in the previous section, the R.V. has
greatly influenced recent efforts in the development of
political and other social scientific theory.

I do not

think that it is too much of an overstatement to say that
the concerns of the R.V. have increasingly become the prob
lems of political and social scientific inquiry.

If it can

be satisfactorily demonstrated that the R.V. is inadequate
as an account of scientific explanation and theory, then I
think it would be reasonable to conclude that its utility
as a model for social and political scientific inquiry is
questionable; and the attempt to construct social theory
according to its guidelines would be misdirected.

In order

to assess the cogency of the claims that the R.V. is inade
quate as a reconstruction of scientific explanation and
theory, it will be useful to summarize and collate the
criticisms of components of the R.V. made by philosophers of
science and to present some arguments about the general
limitations of the R.V. approach.
One of the most strongly criticized components of the
R.V. model is the dichotomy between observational and

theoretical terms, a distinction which is fundamental to the
R.V. reconstruction.

It is generally agreed that the obser

vational-theoretical term distinction is unwarranted.
Attempts to present a cogent and consistent account of the
nature of the distinction have been unsuccessful.
the rationale for the distinction is questionable.

Further,
The

intent of the observational-theoretical term dichotomy seems
to have been to insure that theoretical terms will be meaning
ful according to empiricist criteria and that this meaning
will be supported by, and derived from, an empiricist
methodology.

Theoretical terms are interpreted, or partially

interpreted, according to the indirect or direct reference
made to them by observational terms.

There seems to be no

good reason why theoretical terms have to be interpreted in
this way.

Further, it is uncertain that the distinction

between theoretical and observational terms distinguishes
anything at all, especially since it seems apparent that
classical observation terms can be used to characterize
things which are indirectly observable or unobservable, and
that theoretical terms are frequently used in making obser
vations.

The distinction between observation and theoreti

cal terms seems to be overly simpler and there is some doubt
that, even if the distinction could be meaningfully drawn, it
would reveal much of significance about scientific theory
and esqplanation.
Correspondence rules have fared little better at the
hands of R.V. critics.

Again, the brunt of the criticism is

177
borne by the argument that the R.V. formulation of corre
spondence rules is overly simple.

It is clear that the

purpose of correspondence rules is not to provide explicit
definitions for theoretical terms nor to insure that they
are cognitively significant, as Hempel implies, but rather
they are intended to provide "the admissible experimental
procedures for applying theory to phenomena and/or the
various sorts of correspondences asserted to hold between
287
the theory and observable phenomena."
It is in this
regard that the R.V. is overly simple.

The R.V. notion of

correspondence rules is unable to provide aprecise
characterization of the ways in which a theory is applied
to phenomena because of the variety of ways this may be done.
To the extent that a precise characterization of correspond
ence rules is impossible, any generalized characterization
will be misleading.

To the extent that only a very gener

alized characterization is given by the R.V., the account is
vague and of minimal utility in the formulation of theories.
Because of this, there is an increasing tendency to consider
at least some correspondence rules to be independent of the
288
theory.
This has the effect of recognizing the role
played by auxiliary hypotheses, independent experimental

287
288

Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theory, p. 103.

As previously noted this refinement of the R.V. has
found its way into the social theory literature via Blalock's
writings.
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procedures and antecedently available theories in applying
a given theory to a set of observable phenomena, while, at
the same time, permitting the formalization of the remain
ing theoretical components.
The importance of formalization or axiomatization to
the R.V. is itself a matter of some controversy.
troversy has two parts.

The con

The first concerns whether or not

all scientific theories can, or more strongly, must, be
fruitfully axiomatized.
cannot.

The answer seems to be that they

Suppe provides a lengthy list of theories generally

considered to be scientific which do not admit of fruitful
axiomatization, including, for example, Darwin's theory of
evolution and Hoyle's theory of the origin of the universe.

289

For Suppe, axiomatization characterizes a stage in the
development of a body of knowledge that occurs when enough
is known about the systematic interconnections between the
concepts of the theory that the theory can be reformu290
lated.
To require fruitful axiomatization as a condition
of the R.V., or of scientific theory, would severely restrict
the domain of science, perhaps only to some areas of physics.
The second part of the controversy over axiomatization
concerns the advantages of axiomatization.

Some philosophers

of science consider axiomatization to be essential to solving

289suppe, Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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most of the problems that have been posed.

Others feel that

axiomatization obscures almost all of the interesting and
significant problems considered by philosophers of science.
Still others, taking a middle position, find axiomatization
to be of some usefulness, but contend that this usefulness
291
is limited.
This part of the controversy seems to be
over the selection of tactics in approaching theories.
Those who tend to view theory as sets of logical rules
appear to favor the former position.

Those who are con

cerned with "meaning” and "logical significance" are more
dubious about the benefits of axiomatization.

Despite the

fact that the issue is not yet resolved, it is clear that
there is some reasonable doubt over the necessity of axio
matization in the R.V. reconstruction.
The arguments summarized thus far have, for the most
part, been directed at specific elements of the R.V.

There

is another line of argument that is more sweeping and which
calls for a more complete rejection of the R.V.

Indeed,

some of the thinkers representing this line of argument find
it necessary to present alternative analyses of scientific
explanation and theory.

Although there are some considerable

differences among those proposing what I will call alterna
tive versions, these more radical criticisms share a number
of common premises.

291Ibid., p. 110.

One common complaint among those who reject the R.V.
account of explanation and theory is that it bears little
resemblance to what actually goes on in science or to
scientific theories as presented by scientists.

Few, if

any, theories are presented as axiomatic calculi with
specified correspondence rules.

Further, the R.V. emphasis

on rational (i.e., logical) reconstruction leads to a rather
static view of theory and of science.

The emphasis by the

R.V. on the "structure" of theory and on formal "relation
ships" among "parts" of a theory results in a highly
stylized and artificial notion of science.

Robert Causey

has likened the R.V. to a "stillshot" and suggests that
"sometimes these stillshots are subjected to a great deal
of retouching; this is called 'logical reconstruction'."

292

Further these "...still pictures are taken through a very
narrow lens with a filter. They usually do not show theory
293
growth and change."
While not denying that, at times,
294
"still pictures of theories can be very illuminating,"
motion pictures, which emphasize not so much the structure
of scientific theory as the nature of scientific processes,
would present a more accurate and less misleading view of
science.

0Q0

Robert Causey, "Professor Bohm's View of the
Structure and Development of Theories," in Ibid., p. 392.
293Ibid.. p. 400.
^ ^Ibid., p. 393.
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Probably the primary reason for the static nature of
the R.V. lies in the insistence by most of its proponents
on the separation between supposedly distinct contexts of
discovery and of justification.

Most R.V. accounts are

concerned only with the justification of explanations and
theories, with establishing structural and logical con
ditions under which one would be justified in accepting a
theory and in applying these conditions to existing theories
to assess their adequacy.

The investigation of the act of

discovering or formulating theories and explanations is con
signed to areas of inquiry like psychology or the sociology
of knowledge.

The result is a tendency to view theory as a

"thing," as a finished product to be evaluated according to
criteria of logical and structural adequacy, rather than as
a process.

The emphasis in the R.V. account of theory is

not so much on an accurate representation of theory as it is
actually done, but on theory as it should ideally be done.
Most of the alternative versions of theory and explanation
are more historical.

They emphasize the use of case histo

ries of theories, and are more concerned with how theories
come about and how they change.

The gap between the "context

of discovery" and the "context of justification" has narrowed
considerably.
Several alternative versions to the R.V., for example,
295
Hanson's ,
have attempted to show how intimately related

295Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cam
bridge: The University Press, 1969), and "Is There a Logic
of Scientific Discovery?," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Max
well, Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, (New York:
Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston' 1961), pp. 20-42.

these two contexts are.

As a consequence of the rejection

of a hard and fast distinction between discovery and justi
fication, the idea of a theory is opened up; but it simul
taneously becomes less elegant and less precise.

This

decline in elegance and precision is tolerable to most who
present alternative versions not only because it better
reflects real as opposed to idealized theories; but also
because, as Stephen Toulmin contends, the "gaps, incoherences
and contradictions...give rise to the conceptual problems of
(a) science, and so compel the scientists concerned to introduce conceptual changes into its intellectual content."

296

Toulmin well reflects the general attitude of those who
propose alternatives to the R.V. when he argues that "gappiness" is characteristic of science and that science and its
theories need to be considered not merely as logical systems,
297
but, more importantly, as "rational enterprises."
Par from a science forming a complete logi
cal system, it is its logical gaps and incon
sistencies that keep the subject alive as an
active, developing field for scientific inquiry;
and its very atypical, unsystematic, non-axiomatic character is what generates the real head
of steam behind its problems. With this in
mind, we may think it better to speak...not of
"theoretical calculi and their structures," but
rather of "scientific enterprises and their
problems." In order to understand the true
nature and function of scientific concepts, we

296Stephen Toulmin, "The Structure of Scientific Theory,
in Suppe, op. cit., p. 611.
297Ibid., p. 609.
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need to analyze not just their logical relations
with other concepts of the same theoretical cal
culus, but also the rational procedures by which
conceptual problems are dealt with in a develop
ing science. The crucial defect of the traditional
approach lies in itsQequation of the "rational”
with the "logical.1,298
In addition to their agreement on the historical and
analytical inaccuracy of the R.V. account, and the conse
quences of this inaccuracy, most of those who think it
necessary to provide alternative versions of scientific
eaqplanation and theory pay special attention to the relation
ship between theory and observation.

Unlike those who

merely criticize the R.V. formulation of the theoreticalobservational dichotomy and point to its technical deficiency,
most proponents of alternative versions argue that the
distinction is fundamentally erroneous and seek to replace
it with an understanding that emphasizes a relation of
dependence between "observation" as a process, and worldor phenomena-ordering conceptual structures, such as theories.
Norwood Russell Hanson, for example, contends that observa
tion is nothing like the pristine activity portrayed by R.V.
theorists.

An observer does not simply, passively record

visual or other sense data.

Rather, he is actively involved

in the process of observation.

Observation is not simply a

matter of "seeing," but rather of "seeing-that."

The

observation of a phenomenon is shaped by prior knowledge,

298Ibid., p. 611. (Emphasis in the original).
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e^qperience, and by the theories we have. Observation is
299
11theory-laden. "
And, far from having observational terms
provide independent, empirical meaning to theoretical terms,
theories "provide patterns within which data appear intelli300
gible."
"There is more to seeing," says Hanson, "than
301
meets the eyeball."
Further, most of the terms used in
a scientific theory depend on that theory for their meaning.
Terms like "pressure," "temperature" and "stress" depend on
the theory in which they occur for their meaning.

In this

respect, they are similar to terms used in sports and games,
words like "check-mate," "home run," "ace," and "slam-dunk,"
302
that depend for their meaning on the game being played.
The strong implication is that any view of science and theory
that fails to account for this complexity, any account that
considers observation simply as a neutral recording process,
"a retinal reaction...a physical state— a photochemical
303
reaction"
misses the point.
"People, not their eyes, see"
and scientific observation is not so much a physical state
as it is a complex experience involving the entire conceptual
organization of the observer.

Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 19.
300Ibid., p. 90.
301Ibid.. p. 7.
^ ^ Ibid. , p. 61.
303Ibid.. p. 6.
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Stephen Toulmin presents a parallel criticism of the
R.V. distinction between theoretical and observational
terms, and a parallel alternative.

Toulmin agrees that a

fundamental component of any scientific explanation, an
element not accounted for by the R.V. reconstruction, is
what he calls Ideals of the Natural Order.

Ideals of the

Natural Order are "general notions which make sense of the
observed regularities, and in terms of which they all hang
304
together."
They specify a certain conception of the
"regular course of events" as being natural, expected and
part of the order of things. As such they do not themselves
305
require explanation.
To clarify this idea, Toulmin uses
the following example of Ideals of the Natural Order:

For

Aristotle, the natural course of events for a body which was
not acted upon by external forces was for it to remain at
rest.

Bodies at rest required no explanation.

However,

bodies in motion did require explanation— they were phenomena
and had to be accounted for by discovering the forces that
made them move.

For Galileo, bodies moving in a circular

orbit followed the ideal of the natural order.

Objects at

rest, or objects exhibiting non-circular motion, or bodies
which change their rate of motion were phenomena and needed
to be explained.

York:

For Newton, bodies at rest, or bodies

^O^Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding, (New
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961), p. 33.
305Ibid., pp. 45-46.
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moving in straight lines at a constant rate of speed were
acting naturally and, thus, required no explanation.

Only

bodies which deviated from this pattern were phenomena
306
whxch needed to be accounted for.
Each Ideal of the
Natural Order does more than separate the problematical from
the non-problematical, it also determines the conditions of
discourse, "Every step of the procedure (of explanation)—
from initial identification of phenomena requiring ejqplanation to the final decision that our eaqolanation is satis
factory— is governed directly by the fundamental conceptions
307
of the theory."
The consequence of this is that there
is no uniquely preferred observation language to give mean
ing to theoretical terms.

To the contrary, "Men who accept

different ideals...have no really common theoretical terms
in which to discuss their problems fruitfully.
not even have the same problem:

They will

events which are 'phenomena'

in one man's eyes will be passed over by the other as
308
'perfectly natural1."
Paul K. Feyerabend presents what is perhaps the most
radical and thorough-going attack on the R.V. version of the
observational-theoretical term distinction.

For Feyerabend,

306Ibid., pp. 50-57. This treatment of the example
follows that of William Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Conscious
ness," Polity, vol. 6, no. 1 (Fall, 1973), pp. 9-10.
307 Toulmin, op. cit., p. 57.
308.
*Ibid.
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not only are all terms occurring in a scientific explana
tion "theory-ladenr" they are also completely "theorydependent."

This includes all so-called observation terms.

Feyerabend denies what he calls the R.V. principle of
"meaning invariance" for observational terms.

There are no

terms in a theory, even observation terms, the meaning of
309
which remains constant between theories.
Far from theoretical terms deriving their meaning from
observational terms, observational terms are meaningful only
in the context of a given theory.
vation presupposes a theory.

For Feyerabend all obser

He goes so far as to deny

that the same term (i.e., same word or arrangement of
letters) used in two different theories means the same thing
310
at all.
And since the description of observables depends
upon the theory in which they are lodged, no independent
"test" of the theory is possible.

As a consequence, com

peting or alternative theories about the "same" phenomena
are "incommensurable."
choosing between them.

There are no independent grounds for
311

There are other salient differences between alternative
versions of scientific explanation and theory and the R.V.

3® Paul Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction, and
Empiricism," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. Ill, (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 29.
310Ibid., pp. 36-37.
311

Ibid., pp. 31, 78, passim.

188
version, but the range of variation among the alternatives
is also broad, and nothing like the general concensus
around the above issues exists for these other differences.
For example, Thomas Kuhn's alternative version of develop
ment or progress in science is as severely criticized by
proponents of alternative views of science as by R.V.
312
theorists.
Similarly, although there is broad-based
agreement that the R.V. version of theory is erroneous, for
the reasons cited above, there is little specific agreement
as to what a "proper" account of theory would be like.

Toul

min considers a theory to be composed of three elements,
Ideals of the Natural Order, other laws which are used to
account systematically for regular deviations from the
Ideals of the Natural Order and hypotheses, the purpose of
which is to express regularities of a more conjectural
313
nature.
For Toulmin, theories are not hierarchically
organized deductive structures.
making inferences.

Rather, they are rules for

In this regard, they are more like a

"conceptual map" depicting the conceptual terrain than they
are like a logical (deductive) argument delimiting procedures

312 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
2nd Edition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1970). For criticisms of Kuhn's work, see Imre Lakatos and
Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
*51

130.

Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theory, pp. 128-
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of verification.

314

.
.
Like maps, theories are neither true

nor false; but rather, their value is instrumental— they
work or do not work, are fruitful or not fruitful— in
approaching and accounting for phenomena and in making
predictions.
For Hanson, a theory provides patterns for making data
316
appear intelligible.
They are not so much road maps or
rules of inference as they are "conceptual gestalts" that
make it "possible to observe phenomena as being of a certain
sort, and as related to other phenomena" by putting phenomena
317
into systems.
A theory, argues Hanson, "is a cluster of
318
conclusions in search of a premiss."
It provides a set
of possible explanations.
The number of different versions as to what comprises
an "adequate" or "fruitful" account of theory can be multi
plied by the number of persons presenting an alternative
version.

There appears to be little specific agreement as

to what should replace the R.V. of theory and explanation,
other than that the R.V. needs to be replaced and that the

For Toulmin's analogy of theories as "maps," see
Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, (London: Hutchinson's
University Library, 1953), Chapter IV.
315Ibid., pp. 161-162.
•^^Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 90.
317Ibid.
318Ibid.
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replacement must account for the considerations presented
earlier in this section.

There are similar disagreements

over such issues as the relationship between particular
theories and the contexts in which they occur, the nature
of the process by which science changes and develops, how
and why new concepts emerge, the precise nature of the
f

relationship between theories and the phenomena they are
intended to explain, and the criteria, if any, for choosing
between competing theories.

The range of these issues and

the debate over their solutions will probably define the
subject matter of the philosophy of science in coming years.
The ability of philosophers of science to provide generally
accepted solutions to these problems will determine whether
there will be an accepted alternative version to replace the
R.V.

It should be noted that there is some disagreement as

to whether such a project is desirable, or even possible, to
the extent of denying that "a formal and 'objective* account
319
(can) be given."
The Influences of Alternative Versions of Scientific
Theory and Explanation on Political and Social Science
Given the pervasiveness of the influence of the R.V. on
political and social scientific theory, it should not be
surprising that alternative versions have had relatively
little impact on these areas of inquiry.
this are several.

The reasons for

First, there appears to be a time-lag

319Feyerabend, op. cit., p. 95.
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between the articulation of innovations in the philosophy
of science and their communication to and adoption by polit
ical and social scientists.

Alternative versions are

generally newer than the R.V. and they may simply not have
had enough time to "trickle-down" yet.

Second, alternative

versions and the critiques of the R.V. emanating from them
are, like the R.V., abstruse, technical and difficult to
deal with.

Couple this with the fact that critics of the

R.V. and proponents of alternative versions are usually
concerned with theory and explanation in the physical
sciences, that unlike R.V. thinkers, few have written anal
yses dealing with political or social science, and one is
confronted with the problem of not having a direct and
immediately usable interpretation at hand.

Third, the

variability of formulations among alternative version
thinkers, when compared with the "neatness" and "elegance"
of R.V. constructions, provides a less readily accessible
model of scientific inquiry.

Fourth, there already exists

a tradition of criticism of the applicability of scientific
methods within political science, and social science
generally.

It seems that those who are critical of "scien

tific" political or social science are unlikely to avail
themselves of the kind of critiques provided by proponents
of alternative versions because their interests lie else
where.

Their criticisms are based on what I earlier

characterized as extrinsic or external grounds.
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Despite the fact that alternative versions have neither
received the attention, nor had th= impact of the R.V. on
political or social theory, there are several examples in
the recent theoretical literature indicative of a growing
awareness of alternative versions of scientific theory and
explanation and their applicability to political and social
inquiry.
In an article entitled "Theoretical Self-Conscious
ness," William Connolly employs Toulmin's conception of
theory and discusses additional concepts from Kuhn and
Peyerabend to analyze concensus and conflict models of
320
democracy.
The main difference between these models,
according to Connolly, is that each assumes different Ideals
of the Natural Order.

Concensus-model theorists assume that

concensus is the ideal of the natural order: it is ejected,
natural and requires no further eaqplanation.

Conflict and

coercion, however, are "phenomena" for concensus theorists.
They need to be explained and accounted for by introducing
"auxiliary hypotheses which either square the unejqjected
deviations with basic theoretical presumptions or require
321
minimal adjustment of them."
For conflict model theorists,
the opposite is the case.

Conflict is the ideal of the

natural order and requires no further explanation, but con
census and cooperation do.

^2®William Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness,"
Polity, vol. 6, no. 1 (Pall, 1973), pp. 5-35.
^2^Ibid., p. 15.
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Connolly's interests in "Theoretical Self-Conscious
ness" are larger than just trying to account for the
differences between conflict and concensus models of democ
racy.

He is making a statement about the nature of social

theory by attempting to demonstrate that the conflict and
concensus perspectives are not simply two "complementary
faces of society," but, rather,
...each theory incorporates presumptions
about the organization of society which are
quite incompatible with those adopted by the
other. Neither is it the case that one per
spective pays attention to "conflict" while
the other deals only with "concensus." Each
deals with both, but within the framework of
its own assumptions and esqoectations... .The
concepts employed reflect the presumptions of
the perspective and tacitly gear perceptions
to fit these presumptions.^22
Connolly further contends that the "incorporated pre
sumptions" and the "concepts employed" influence decisions
about test procedures, and the determination of what will
count as "evidence" for or against a theory to the extent
that communication between proponents of both models becomes
difficult because they have no common theoretical terms in
323
which to discuss their problems fruitfully.
Although Connolly is obviously indebted to Toulmin1s
alternative version, and in spite of the fact that he is at
least tacitly promoting its acceptance by political and

322Ibid., pp. 17-18.
323Ibid., p. 21. (Connolly citing Toulmin.)
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social theorists, his emulation is not slavish.

He seems,

for example, unwilling to accept Toulmin's instrumentalist
interpretation of theory (i.e., theories are instruments
for making predictions).

Further, he seems to be more

skeptical than Toulmin about the possibility of specifying
criteria for choosing among competing theories.

Despite

these departures, Connolly inherits some of the difficulties
of Toulmin's analysis, the most obvious being that we some
times seek explanations of the natural order.

In any event,

the influence of Toulmin's alternative version on Connolly
is manifest.
Another example of the influence of alternative versions
on political and social theory is provided by the use of the
work of Thomas Kuhn, particularly The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, and of Kuhn's concept of "paradigm.11324

In a

1972 American Political Science Review article entitled
"Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," Eugene
Miller cites with apparent favor Kuhn's idea of paradigm and
the attendant notions of "normal" and "revolutionary" science
and credits Kuhn with being one of the main sources of the
contemporary revolt against what he calls "positivism" in the
325
philosophy of science.
Miller seems to suggest the
adoption of an essentially Kuhnian orientation to analyze

324Kuhn, op. cit., p. lOff.
323Miller, op. cit., see especially pp. 804-811.
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recent political theory and to suggest new directions for
its development.

Although Miller's analysis is frequently

confusing, and his conclusions far from obvious, it is rea
sonably clear that in his criticisms of "positivist” accounts
of theory construction and in his favorable comments about
Kuhn's notion of paradigm and ideas about scientific change.
Miller's orientation is more compatible with the outlines
of alternative version thinking than with the R.V.
Sheldon Wolin also employs Kuhn's notions about science
326
and paradigms to make the seemingly bizarre suggestion
that definite and recognizable parallels exist "between
327
scientific theory and traditional political theory."
Wolin further contends that the conflict between behavioral
theory and traditional political theory "resembles" the
difference between normal and revolutionary science respec
tively, and that it would be more fruitful to view these two
trends in political theory as compatible components of a
general political scientific enterprise rather than hostile
328
competitors.
Several articles have appeared in the past few years in
the journal, Political Theory, which also make use of Kuhn's

Sheldon Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theory," in
Preston King and B. C. Parekh, eds., Politics and Experience:
Essays Presented to Michael Oakeshott, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968), p. 129.
32^Ibid. (Emphasis is mine.)
328Ibid., p. 152.
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model of science and his concept of a paradigm.

Phillip

Beardsley makes what he calls "limited use" of the idea of
a paradigm in his analysis of contemporary political science
to determine whether or not it has a paradigm as Kuhn uses
329
the term.
He concludes that it does not, that political
330
science is "unparadigmatic,"
and suggests that rather
than developing one dominant paradigm, political science
ought to move in the direction of becoming "multiparadig331
matic."
Richard Ashcraft makes similar reference to Kuhn's
work in attempting to illuminate the controversy over the
relationship between theory and methodology between "tra332
ditionalists" and "methodologists."
Ashcraft applauds
Kuhn for presenting "a different assessment of scientific
methodology, one which moves away from a definition of
science in terms of the thought processes of individual
scientists or philosophers of science...to one framed in
terms of the historical activities of groups of scientists
333
within a scientific community."
He suggests that such a

3^Phillip Beardsley, "Political Science: The Case of
the Missing Paradigm," Political Theory, vol. 2, no. 1 (Feb.,
1974), p. 47.
330Ibid., p. 58.
331Ibid., p. 60.
333Richard Ashcraft, "On the Problem of Methodology and
the Nature of Political Inquiry," Political Theory, vol. 3,
no. 1 (Feb., 1975), p. 12ff.
333
Ibid., p. 12.
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perspective might be fruitful in understanding political
theory if it were to focus on a similar understanding of
334
what was intended by the term "political."
Finally, in sociology, Robert Friedrichs has attempted
to analyze contemporary developments in sociological theory
and research.

In the course of his analysis, Friedrichs

suggests two "modes" of sociology, the "Priestly" and the
"Prophetic," corresponding roughly to Kuhn's normal and
revolutionary science, and concludes by arguing, a la
Feyerabend, for "epistemological pluralism" as a tactic for
dealing with "the wealth and depth of all socially relevant
335
experience."
Other political and social scientific theorists have
employed alternative version thinking in either criticizing
the current conduct of political and social theory, or in
suggesting alternative theoretical approaches themselves.
John Gunnel, in a 1969 American Political Science Review

^•^ I b i d ., p. 16.
335
Robert Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology, (New
York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 297-298. It should be
noted that most of those who utilize Kuhn's work rely on
Kuhn's earlier formulation found in The Structure of Scien
tific Revolutions. Since its publication, Kuhn has sub
stantially altered his position by substituting for the
troublesome and overly vague concept of "paradigm" the twin
notions of "disciplinary matrix" and "exemplar."
(See: Kuhn,
"Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in Suppe, op. cit., pp. 459482). Although Kuhn does not explicitly reject the dis
tinction between normal and revolutionary science, the effect
of his reformulation is, in the words of Stephen Toulmin, to
show Kuhn to be "far nearer than he had previously appeared
to be to the traditional logical empiricist position." (Toul
min, "The Structure of Scientific Theories," in Suppe. p. 607).
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article, criticizes the application of the D-N model to
social theory, and, following Toulmin and Michael Scriven,
another proponent of an alternative version to the R.V.,
argues that the task of the philosophy of science is to
render "scientific practice intelligible rather than attempt
ing to construct formal and definitive representations of
336
scientific explanation.11
He then proceeds to argue for
the superior applicability of what he calls the "contextualist position" and against the use of the deductive model.
Similarly, in a work entitled Abandoning Method, Derek
Phillips suggests that sociologists should turn away from
"vulgar imitations of what we mistakenly think physical
337
scientists do,"
and favorable cites the work of Kuhn,
Hanson, and Feyerabend as indicating the foundation of a
new direction for sociological inquiry.
In addition to the work of the authors mentioned above,
several recent contributors to the literature on social
explanation and theory share the conviction that the R.V.
version of explanation and theory is overly restrictive, at
least as it applies to the social sciences.

Most of these

thinkers, including Brown, Louch, Winch, Taylor, Connolly,
and Harre and Secord, agree that the R.V. is inaccurate as

336 Gunnel, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scien
tific Inquiry," American Political Science Review, vol.
LXIII, no. 4 (Dec., 1969), p. 1238.
337
Derek Phillips, Abandoning Method, (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973), pp. 121-122.
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a description of how social scientists go about explaining
phenomena, and inappropriate, in varying degrees, as a model
for constructing social theory.

Concerning the proper

approach to explanation, the kinds of elements that would
be counted as explanatory, and the appropriateness of
"scientific" approaches to the social sciences, there is
considerable disagreement among these thinkers.
As a final example, Paul Deising characterizes his work
as "parallel in spirit" to the work of Kuhn, Feyerabend, and
338
Toulmin.
In Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences,
Deising proposes to deal with "the whole process of inquiry,
the whole process of 'discovering' or creating or developing
knowledge, and not just the verification aspect."

339

In

taking as his task, the study of "the four or five different
methods or modes of procedure...that social scientists use
340
today,"
Deising further demonstrates the influence of
alternative version concerns on his work.
To summarize, although the impact of alternative version
thinking on political and social theorists is not as pervasive
as that of the R.V., there are indications that the influence
of the work of philosophers like Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn and
Feyerabend is spreading.

Whether any particular alternative

■^®Paul Deising, Patterns of Discovery in the Social
Sciences, (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971), p. 299.
339Ibid., p. 1.
340Ibid.
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version will come to dominate political or social theory to
the extent that the R.V. has is a matter over which reason
able men may reasonably disagree.

I personally think not,

since it is not the concern of most alternative version
thinkers to construct one overarching reconstructed logic
for explanation, nor a model of what a theory should be
like.

This does not preclude the possibility that a philos

opher of science or a political or social theorist who is
interested in these matters will propose a "process for
constructing esqplanations" or a "set of theoretical con
cerns" for the political or social sciences which will be
highly influential.

If this occurs, it will probably not

be of the form "X is an adequate scientific explanation of
phenomenon P if and only if it satisfies the following
conditions...," but more of the form "the process of esqplanation in the political or social sciences usually proceeds
along the following lines...."
To return, briefly, to the conjecture which initiated
this discussion, there seems to be little doubt that the
R.V. is inadequate as an account of the nature of explana
tion and theory.

There are but a few remaining adherents

of this position among philosophers of science.

Even Hempel

has abandoned much of the R.V. position, and has presented
an admittedly moderate alternative version of his own
designed to remedy many of the deficiencies of his earlier
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formulation.
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I do not feel that it is too much of an

overstatement to say that the last bastion of R.V. thinking,
in its purer form, is to be found in the political and
social sciences.

Given the failure of the R.V. to provide

an adequate account of theory and explanation in the physi
cal sciences, where problems of measurement, concept and
theory formation and testing seem less intractable, it
would be unlikely, then, that the R.V. would be any more
adequate as a model for theory and explanation in the polit
ical and social sciences.
Political Theory and the Problem of Explanation
The problem that remains for this inquiry is to consider
the nature and function of explanation in political and
social science in light of the preceding consideration of
the R.V., its influence on political and social science, the
criticisms that have been leveled against it, and the
alternative versions that have been proposed.

Ideally, what

should follow would be a concise, rigorous, and functional
esqolication of a concept of explanation uniquely capable of
helping to solve most of the theoretical problems which be
set political and social science, or, perhaps, a dialectical
synthesis which incorporates the strengths of the R.V. and

Carl Hempel, "On the 'Standard Conception' of Scien
tific Theories," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, eds.,
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IV,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), pp.
142-163.
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alternative versions, eliminates their respective weaknesses,
and is immediately and apodictically applicable to political
theory.

Unfortunately, no such ideal conclusion will be

reached here.

However, several alternative strategies for

dealing with the absence of an adequate formulation of the
concept of explanation can be suggested.
The first of these strategies would be to deny that
there is a problem.

The "problem of explanation," the argu

ment would run, is a pseudo-problem.

Its "solution,11 if

one were possible, would make no difference to the develop
ment of theory in political science.

Furthermore, specula

tion about explanation has no effect on how theories are
developed either in political or in natural science.

That

I consider this strategy as unsatisfactory should come as
no surprise.

The premise of this inquiry is that explana

tion is a significant problem, and my present inability,
and the apparent inability of others, to provide an adequate
solution does nothing to diminish its importance.

My

objections to this strategy may be summarized on two grounds.
First, this strategy is empirically false; and, second, it
is epistemologically naive, if not pernicious.

That this

strategy is empirically false should be obvious from the
information presented in the previous two chapters.

Specu

lation about eaqplanation and the nature of theory has
directly and substantially influenced inquiry in political
and social science.

This is particularly evident in the

rejection of the older, "positivist," science-is-the-
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accumulation-of-facts view in favor of the R.V. with its
emphasis on explanation and the justification of explana
tory structures.

Whether political science should consider

explanation a pseudo-problem is a separate question, the
answer to which is the basis of my second ground for reject
ing this strategy.
The denial of the importance of explanation as a prob
lem is naive and/or pernicious because it seems to entail
the image of the scientist, political or natural, as a
passive, "objective," observer recording data and seeking
to "discover" regularities manifested by that data.

This

is naive because the process is more complicated than that.
If there is a distinguishable line of development in the
philosophy of science, and in science itself, it is in the
direction of recognizing the complexity of observation and
the inability to characterize science strictly in terms of
sense experience.

This thread is exemplified by the change

that has occurred since the time when theories were held to
be only "notational," a convenient short-hand for escpressing
observation statements, to Hempel's demonstration that the
meaning of theoretical terms could not be exhausted by
procedures attempting to reduce them to observation terms.
Further changes include the rejection of a hard and fast
observational-theoretical term distinction and the recognition
that, to some extent, observation is "theory-1aden," and that
something like Ideals of the Natural Order provide the
framework within which inquiry, including observation, is
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conducted.

There is, to use Nietzsche's apt phrase, no

such thing as "immaculate perception."

Rather than being

passive, observation is an active process, and involves
imposition as much as discovery.

A proper regard for

developing a concept of explanation provides the opportunity
for becoming self-conscious about the nature of our imposi
tions and the effect they have on what we observe.

It helps

to focus our attention on the very close relationship
between what we assume we understand and how we approach
that which we do not understand, including what we expect,
what we observe and what we will count as evidence.

The

extent to which we are willing to discount the significance
of speculation about the activity of explanation or the
purpose of theory is precisely the extent to which we give
up the project of becoming conscious and critical of what we
do as theorists.
A second alternative strategy for dealing with the
absence of an adequate account of explanation in political
science is to acknowledge the nature of the problem, acknowl
edge the deficiencies of the R.V., and resolve to accept
the R.V., or some slight modification of it, anyway.
is not an altogether unattractive strategy.
useful and beneficial features of the R.V.

This

There are many
As a model for

political and social science for explanation, and as a guide
to theory construction, it would be better than no model at
all, or the model provided by the earlier positivists and
logical positivists.

The R.V. does have the merit of
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demanding precision and rigor, of directing attention to the
need for specifying connections between theories and support
ing observations, of making clear under what conditions an
explanation can be said to have been adequately provided, of
stressing the importance of meaning and presenting procedures
for specifying meaning and of emphasizing the desirability
of "cumulativeness" as a concern in the development of
theories.

None of these concerns would be detrimental to

political or social science at its current stage of develop
ment, and the R.V. version of these concerns need not be
disqualified simply on the grounds that it is inadequate or
inaccurate.

Indeed, it may well be that an understanding of

explanation and theory according to the R.V. is necessary
for evaluating and improving inquiry in political and social
science, especially because of the considerable impact it
has had on them.
The major problem with accepting this strategy is in
the limitations it imposes.

Although the R.V. is beneficial

in many respects, it is also deficient for the reasons dis
cussed previously and at length.

It is also difficult to

see how the major theoretical problems discussed in the
previous chapter could be solved within the framework of the
R.V. since it may very well be that that framework is
responsible for these problems.

The pattern, at least in

terms of the social sciences, seems to be viciously circular.
To put it simply, in order for the meaning of terms to be
precisely and non-arbitrarily determined, the procedures for

specifying or increasing the precision of meaning of these
terms must be justified and flow naturally from a wellarticulated theory.

But, for a theory to be well-articu

lated requires that the connections between the constructs
of the theory, and the phenomenon to be accounted for, be
precisely stated.

This is tantamount to requiring precision

of meaning, or, at least, precision of measurement, and
brings us back full circle.

One may be willing to loosen

these conditions somewhat, and settle for the kinds of
connections present in Hempel's "explanation sketch" as
adequate to the needs of political and social theory; but to
do so is to consign political and social theory to a second342
class scientific citizenship, perhaps permanently.
Even
the adoption of Nagel's suggestion to employ the "successful
logical strategy" of the physical sciences by presenting and
treating "ideal conditions" for "pure cases" of phenomena,
and, then, systematically accounting for discrepancies seems
to depend on the availability of precise, non-arbitrary
measurement to determine what, and to what extent, is dis
crepant, and to normalize and idealize conditions.

342^ further suggestion may be made that the political
and social sciences consider more systematically Hempel's
I-S model, rather than the D-N model
It may well be true
that the I-S model more accurately depicts what goes on in
social, and particularly survey, research. In addition to
the appearance Hempel gives of presenting I-S explanation
as a sort of "consolation prize," another indication of
second class scientific citizenship, there are considerable
problems with the I-S model as a pattern of explanation, as
was discussed in chapter 3.

Finally, the emphasis of the R.V. on the form of expla
nation and the structure of theory may very well detract
from the substantive concerns of political and social
science.

It may lead to an overemphasis on the "science"

in the descriptive, discipline title "political science" to
the detriment of an understanding of the qualifying adjective,
"political."

This should not be taken as a suggestion that

the methodological and theoretical concerns of science in
political inquiry be extirpated.

Rather, and in line with

the suggestions of some of the R.V. critics, the suggestion
is that by emphasizing the function of scientific explana
tions and scientific theories rather than their structure
the substantive interests of the political and social
sciences will be given greater consideration.

It may well

be more fruitful for science, as for art, that form follow
function.
A third alternative strategy for dealing with the
absence of a well-formulated concept of explanation may best
be characterized as acknowledging the problem, but denying
that there is a solution.

According to this strategy, one

would deny that any single account of esqjlanation, or of
theory, is adequate to deal with the variable and complex
demands which can be made of a theory, or for the contexts
in which an explanation can be given.

In its more extreme

form, the denial would be that it is not only practically
impossible but also logically impossible because each theory
and form of explanation carries with it its own framework
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for deciding on problems, defining terms, formulating
measurement procedures and establishing criteria for decid
ing what will or will not count as a test, that is, for
declaring under what conditions one would be willing to
give up a theory.

In short, because there are no inde

pendent, "objective" grounds for deciding between theories,
much less patterns of esqplanation, there is no justifica
tion for prescribing one version over another:
343
"incommensurable."

They are

I am unwilling, at this time, to accept this radical
alternative.

But I would suggest a more moderate form of

this third strategy as an appropriate way of confronting
the absence of an adequate notion of e^qplanation for polit
ical and social science, and the obvious difficulty in
forming one.

I would suggest that a number of plausible

notions of explanation be entertained.

And, as one such

plausible notion, at least for political and social science,
I propose the extended definition of explanation presented
344
in the second chapter of this dissertation.
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Kuhn, for example, is caught m the middle m this
problem in wishing to affirm, simultaneously, the "incommen
surability of paradigms" and "anomolies" which imply an
independent observational base. See Harvey Siegel, "Dis
cussion: Objectivity in Science," Philosophy of Science,
vol. 43, no. 3 (Sept., 1976), pp. 441-448, for a discussion
of this problem.
3440ther such "plausible notions" of explanation are
presented by Wesley Salmon, Peter Achinstein, Toulmin, Put
nam, Hempel (second formulation), Brown, Louch, and Harre
and Secord.
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The concept of explanation in chapter two has a number
of features to recommend it.

Sharing more in common with

alternative versions than with the Received View, this
account of explanation emphasizes explanation as a process.
It focuses attention on explanation more as a rational
enterprise than a logical structure, and emphasizes "under
standing" over axiomatic, deductive rigor.

As a consequence

it does not prejudge or impose premature closure on what
will or will not count as a science, allowing this to be
determined by historical and developmental, practical or
research-related considerations rather than supervenient,
exclusively logical factors.
The proposed "plausible version" of explanation is
sufficiently general to accommodate a number of explanatory
forms.

The treatment of "evaluation" in this definition

provides the foundation for systematically understanding
factors leading to the adoption of a type of explanation
and the conditions under which a change in explanatory form
would occur.

The worldview from which an explanation

develops becomes more ejqplicit.
Of considerable importance to the political and social
sciences

this definition of esqplanation permits a considera

tion of the influence of socio-cultural, group and individual
factors in the formation and evaluation of any particular
explanation.

In this respect, this general notion of

explanation is more responsive to the particular substantive
interests of political and social scientists.

It directs
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attention to the fact that explanations of social behavior
are themselves social phenomena; and, as such, they are, or
may possibly become, part of the phenomena being investi
gated.

Because this account points to factors influencing

the political or social scientist, it provides the oppor
tunity for becoming critically self-conscious of the sources
and limitations of his particular explanations.
Finally, the discussion of description, explanation and
prediction as explanatory activities, or as constituent parts
of the explanatory process, provides a minimal set of
structural characteristics for an esqplanation.

The symbiotic

relationship between description, explanation and prediction,
and the function served by each component, as discussed in
chapter two, when combined with the more general perspective
set down in the definition of explanation provides what I
feel is a plausible outline for constructing plausible expla
nations in political and social science.
There are some severe limitations to the proposed con
cept of explanation.

The first of these is that the general

ity and complexity of this definition makes it unwieldy, to
say the least.

It is difficult to imagine the conditions

where a political scientist, working on a specific problem,
would use such a cumbersome formulation.

Part of this

difficulty may possibly be remedied by an improved articula
tion of the concept and by the specification of specific
"eaqplanatory frameworks" compatible with this general con
cept.
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A second limitation of this plausible conception of
explanation is that it offers no basis for discriminating
"scientific" from "non-scientific" explanations.

I per

sonally do not consider this to be an overwhelming diffi
culty.

All attempts with which I am familiar fail to pro

vide any satisfactory, precise criteria for making this
judgement.

They fail by either including too much or by

excluding most of what is usually considered to be science.
More tellingly, this notion of explanation only implicitly
provides any but the most general criteria for discriminating
"good" from "bad," or "useful" from "useless" explanations.
This partly because it makes no claims as to what ultimately
and exclusively constitutes the explanation of a phenomenon
and partly because this definition, less than others, carries
with it its own criteria of adequacy.

Again, this deficiency

may be remedied by carefully articulating specific "esqplanatory frameworks" in which the conditions of adequacy and
boundary conditions are more fully articulated.
The third and final limitation, the one indicated as
the "remedy" to the other limitations, and the most severe
deficiency of this inquiry, is that it fails to present any
adequate account of an "explanatory tool" for political or
social scientific explanation, that is, of theory.

Many of

the difficulties which can be presented require such an
account for their solution.

Moreover, a precise statement

of how a particular explanatory framework, theory, is related

212
to a plausible conception of explanation seems to be essen
tial.
My consternation concerning my present inability to
construct an alternative account of explanation and theory
adequate to the at least temporary solution of theoretical
and methodological problems in political and social science
is mitigated, if only slightly, by the apparent inability
of anyone else to do so.

What follows will not, I hope, be

interpreted as a set of rationalizations for the short
comings of this inquiry, but as a set of notes to myself and
others about why the kinds of problems discussed above seem
so intractable.

I believe these speculations to be extend

able to others who have grappled with the same problems with
much the same results.
The main difficulty is, I think, the result of the
extreme generality and abstractness of the problems them
selves.

A framework of inquiry, the combination of a con

cept of explanation and a model of a theory, for which I
have been looking is the product of a natural conceptual
relationship between two levels of abstraction.

It derives,

however, from speculation on what might be characterized as
a third level abstraction, sometimes referred to, somewhat
inelegantly, as "meta-theory."

At the first level of

abstraction would be concepts which have as their specific
referents phenomena or precise and limited relations between
phenomena.

The second level of abstraction would consist of

forms of relationships between concepts and would contain
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various conjectures and prescriptions about how concepts are
to be meaningfully related to one and other.

This is the

level we normally associate with "theory," that is, with
specific, sometimes competing conjectures about the proper
understanding of the relationships between phenomena repre
sented by concepts.

Examples would include Darwinian and

Lamarkian theories about the phenomenon "evolution" in
biology, "steady-state" versus "big bang" theories about the
phenomenon of the origin of the universe in astronomy,
"classical" and "quantum" theories in microphysics, and
things like pluralism, Marxism, structuralism, functionalism,
systems theory in political and social science.

The third

level of abstraction is, as I have said, the level of the
explanatory framework.

This level consists of conjectures

about the nature of theories, and contains prescriptions,
organizing principles and criteria about how theories are to
be constructed, interpreted, evaluated and justified.

The

analysis contained in this dissertation is conducted, for
the most part, at this third level of abstraction, at the
level of the explanatory framework and its effect on specula
tion at the other "levels."

It has been my contention that

a theory is an extension of an explanatory framework, that
"theory" in the particular sense in which I have been using
it is the "explanatory tool" of a particular esqplanatory
framework, that of "science."

The "theory" part of "a

theory of (anything)" is warranted and underwritten by the
particular esqpectations and prescriptions of the esqplanatory
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framework employed, in the present case, that of "science."
It implies that the "proper" way has been used to conduct
an inquiry of the object under investigation.
The analogy of levels of abstraction, though useful in
illustrating the generality and complexity of the problem
being considered, is overly simple and, in the final analy
sis, misleading.

It is overly simple because it presents a

too-neat picture of the conceptual components involved in
scientific inquiry and the relationships between them.

The

portrait is reminiscent of a layer cake— each level easily
distinguishable from the other, one layer resting neatly on
the other— when in reality if inquiry were a confection, it
would be more like a marble cake— where each part flows in
and out of the other to the point where separation is a
practical impossibility.
The analogy is misleading because it implies a simple
solution to a complex situation.

One need only to articulate

the content of the explanatory framework, the third level of
abstraction, and then specify the necessary and sufficient
connections between it and the other levels of abstraction,
demonstrating how one level derives from or is supported by
the other; and the problem is solved.
what the Received View tries to do.

This is essentially
The difficulty, in

retrospect, is that the connections specified by the Received
View are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for any
but a very limited number of cases of scientific explanation,
and then only with limited applicability.

It is not inappropriate to ask why, given these diffi
culties, one should bother with an analysis of this kind.
From a practical point of view, what difference does it
make?

I have attempted to answer this question throughout

the course of this inquiry by demonstrating the consequences
which attend the acceptance of a particular concept of expla
nation.

I might cite again the by now familiar recitation:

The acceptance of a c.oncept of explanation and a model of
theory is a prescriptive activity which helps us to decide
what is to be considered a "problem," what kinds of topics
are amenable to investigation, how investigations of selected
phenomena ought to be conducted, what forms of analysis are
fruitful or unfruitful, what kinds of information ought to
be gathered, what should or should not count as evidence and
how that evidence may be interpreted.

I take it to be uncon-

troversial that all investigations operate within the context
of a framework of inquiry, the combination of a concept of
esqplanation and a model of theory.

All of us have learned

or, less frequently, formulated, a set of rules which help
us to make decisions of the kind sketched above.

On a

practical level, we are influenced by considerations of a
highly abstract nature, and I take it almost as an article
of faith that it is in our best interests as political and
social scientists to become more aware of the conceptual
influences that help to shape our work.

On a still more

practical concept of explanation and model of theory derived
largely from the philosophy of science, the Received View,
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has strongly influenced political and social scientists.

In

point of fact, I would, and have, argued that much of the
conceptual apparatus we employ is borrowed from or derived
from the highly abstract considerations of the Received View
philosophers of science.

Indeed, the three "major problems"

(the problem of conceptual imprecision, the problem of
correspondence, and the problem of axiomatization) which I
contend, in chapter four, absorb a goodly amount of the
attention of political and social theorists attempting to
develop scientific methods of inquiry are in their present
form artifacts of the Received View reconstruction of scien
tific explanation and theory.

It seems reasonable, then,

that ~or practical reasons we should attempt to understand,
as fully as possible, the benefits and limitations that
attend the acceptance of this particular concept of explana
tion, to understand not only how we do what we do but also
why.
Another benefit of analysis at this level of abstraction
is that it provides the opportunity to approach theory as
theory.

Theory, as a structure or a process, becomes a

proper object of inquiry.

The immediate benefits of such an

opportunity are not so obvious as those outlined above; but
I believe, for reasons I find difficult to articulate, that
the step from studying "So and So's theory of such and such,"
or "A (particular) theory of (such and such)" to understand
ing what it is about such theories that makes them "theoret
ical" is an essential stage in the maturation of political
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and social science.

It has been my contention that what it

is that makes theories "theoretical" is that they provide
explanations of the phenomenon under investigation, they
provide us with the means to understand what is being investi
gated.

To approach theory from the perspective of explana

tions, or as the tool of more general explanatory frameworks,
provides the opportunity to separate the form or process of
understanding from the object or relationship that is under
stood.

Such a strategy may be fruitful in that it may pro

vide guidelines for determining the particular strengths and
weaknesses of particular explanatory forms, as well as the
basis for extending strong forms to other phenomena.

At the

very least, I believe that this approach forces us to become
more conscious of the theoretical choices that we make, and
of the consequences of these choices.

For these reasons, I

believe that it is at this level that theory in political
and social science ought to be approached.
The notion of explanation and the tri-partite model of
explanatory activities presented in chapter two, and later
suggested in chapter five as a tentative alternative to the
Received View, moves in the direction prescribed above.
Although it is cumbersome and lacks the detail and precision
necessary to aid directly in the construction of theories, I
believe that it provides a useful perspective for analyzing
and interpreting the relationship between existing esqjlanatory frameworks and theories.

In a sense, it attempts to

establish minimum expectations for explanatory frameworks
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and directs attention to the implementation of the framework
in the form of a theory.

It does this by allowing what I

believe are the proper questions to be asked:
non or relationship is being investigated?
being used to account for that relationship?
phenomenon understood?
ing involved?

What phenome

What process is
How is the

What is the nature of the understand

How may this understanding be evaluated?

What

factors influence the presentation, interpretation and
acceptance of this understanding?

Further, the elementary

tri-partite model of explanatory activities, in terms of
description, explanation and prediction, provides in outline
form what I believe are the minimum structural characteris
tics for any particular esqalanatory framework and for any
particular theory that derives from that framework.

It does

this by providing expectations concerning what these frame
works and their accompanying theories should do— they should
describe, explain and possibly predict phenomena and/or re
lations between phenomena in such a way that the phenomena
are accounted for and are capable of being evaluated.
I realize that this set of considerations is far from
conclusive.

The nature of the preceding discussion is such

that all manner of explanatory frameworks would be included
as satisfying these minimal conditions, including the
Received View.

In a very real sense this proposal indicates

a step backwards from the elegance and precision of specific,
existing explanatory and theoretical conjectures.

Although

I am aware of this consequence, I find that, at present, I
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am unable to propose a more constructive strategy for deal
ing with the problems discussed.
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